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Note from the editor
Dear reader, 
It is a pleasure to be involved with the Newsletter as its 
editor this year. I have been a reader and occasional con-
tributor to this publication since its first issue in 1999, and 
have been impressed by the sustained quality and tremen-
dous variety of the articles that appear here. Last year, we 
saw some distinctive pieces under the imaginative editor-
ship of Philippe Steiner, and I am sure I speak on behalf of 
all the Newsletter’s 1900 subscribers when I thank him for 
his tremendous work throughout the year. 
This is a packed issue, reflecting the generosity of its con-
tributors, their enthusiasm for publishing here, and their 
capacity to meet my deadlines. Thanks to them all, and to 
Christina Glasmacher for her superb work in putting all of 
this material together and managing the whole editorial 
process. Predictably, most of the papers reflect my own 
interests and knowledge of the economic sociology field – 
the sociology of money and finance. In addition, I tried to 
pull in papers on topics, or which have a theoretical frame-
work, that have not necessarily been covered here in the 
past. But my key rationale was simple: I approached authors 
whose work I had enjoyed reading. 
Timothy Sinclair, co-author of an upcoming book The Prob-
lem with Banks (Zed), kicks the issue off with a provocative 
piece on the ratings agencies. He takes on the rather com-
monplace view that these important agencies are under-
mined by a conflict of interest, and argues that we should 
be focusing on the dilemmas these agencies face as ‘gate-
keepers’ in a market system. The conflict of interest argu-
ment, while throwing up important issues, mainly serves a 
political purpose, he suggests. There is no ‘simple fix’ where 
the ratings agencies are concerned, rather we must get to 
grips with the complex circumstances under which they 
have developed and rebuild the relations of trust on which 
their effective operation depends. 
Daniel Mügge, author of the recently published Widen the 
Market, Narrow the Competition (ECPR), invites us to stand 
back and think about finance, particularly financial regula-
tion, in light of the issues raised by Armatya Sen’s impor-
tant book The Idea of Justice which was published last 
year. Criticisms of finance are commonplace these days. 
What struck me about Daniel’s argument is that he was 
moving on from this largely negative and increasingly un-
helpful debate about finance to consider, in a rather 
pragmatic way, issues about how financial reform might 
answer key questions about the nature of justice. The 
challenge he lays down for scholars in this field is both 
important and exciting. 
Andreas Langenohl sets out a different kind of challenge 
to scholars in the sociology of finance. He argues that the 
field lacks a systematic category of ‘expectation,’ and he 
seeks to develop such a category through an intriguing 
interpretation of the sociology of Georg Simmel. His argu-
ment that we should reclaim the notion of ‘expectations’ 
takes its point of departure from a particular understand-
ing of price as an effacement of the complex motivations 
behind the actions of others. In financial markets, all that 
participants have to work with in terms of deciding how to 
act is therefore a particular model of expectations. Neces-
sarily, they must reduce each other to ‘carriers of expecta-
tions’. This, he argues, is something sociologists need to 
understand in more depth. 
During the past year we have witnessed a major crisis in 
the eurozone, and two of the papers in this issue deal with 
some aspects of its unfolding so far. Looking back, Sonja 
Juko’s paper should be a sobering reminder that the pre-
cise nature of the ‘crisis’ in the eurozone deserves to be 
debated and contested far more than has hitherto been 
the case. As she points out, neither the precise timing nor 
the actual unfolding of the crisis – she focuses on Greece, 
but one can surmise that similar issues would arise in rela-
tion to other ‘troubled’ states – can be explained by refer-
ence to the ‘fundamentals’ alone. Part of the picture that 
seems to be missing, she suggests, is the role of the media 
in framing the crisis, both as a crisis, and as a particular 
kind of crisis. Juko’s detailed analysis of this problem is 
important and timely. 
Looking forward as the crisis continues to unfold, my own 
paper, co-authored with Johannes Lenhard, deals with the 
euro crisis and suggests that the increasingly widespread 
critique of the eurozone as a ‘transfer union’ misrepresents 
some important sociological aspects of the union as it has 
developed so far. The paper’s main proposal about the 
eurobond, together with its attempt to bring Bataille’s 
arguments to bear on our understanding of the moral 
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economy of the eurozone, are intended to stimulate de-
bate about some important issues that are likely to preoc-
cupy us for some time to come as we face up to a future in 
which the eurozone may be fundamentally changed. 
The paper by Aleksander Miłosz Zieliński and Dietmar Wet-
zel builds on work they have been doing on power rela-
tions among banks in contemporary society. This is a wide-
ranging project, and in the paper included here the specific 
focus is on how we might categorize the relationship be-
tween banks and other areas of societal life in economy, 
politics and media. The ‘matrix’ they come up with for 
examining these relations throws up some fascinating 
insights, and we should welcome this attempt to get to 
grips with banks as a major part of society, not least be-
cause there are actually very few systematic treatments of 
this subject. 
The last two papers of the issue explore a similarly ne-
glected side of our monetary and financial systems, namely 
the circulation of forms of money at the local level. 
Throughout the time of the current crisis, the local cur-
rency movement has continued to develop and offer 
communities alternative ways of managing their local 
economies through the medium of money. Josh Ryan-
Collins, one of the founders of the Brixton Pound launched 
in London last summer, reflects on the theory behind local 
currencies, offering some interesting insights into the 
points of intersection with more conventional theories of 
money. Meanwhile, the paper by Gill Seyfang, Adrian 
Smith and Noel Longhurst examines the thinking behind 
the major research they are undertaking which looks at the 
role of complementary currencies as ‘grassroots’ innova-
tions which offer solutions to problems of sustainable 
development. These are important topics that deserve to 
generate a lot of sociological discussion. 
Nigel Dodd 
n.b.dodd@lse.ac.uk 
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Credit Rating Agencies 
and the Global Financial Crisis
By Timothy J. Sinclair 
University of Warwick, timothy.sinclair@warwick.ac.uk  
Introduction 
The often vitriolic public debate about the role of the credit 
rating agencies in the generation of the subprime crisis has 
revolved around an idea which now seems deeply en-
trenched in popular, financial market and academic under-
standings of the agencies and their incentives. The core 
element of this thinking is that how the agencies are re-
munerated generates a significant problem for the quality 
of the ratings they produce. The issue identified is a con-
flict of interest between the central purpose of ratings and 
the remuneration model that funds the ratings of the ma-
jor, global agencies. 
I argue that the concern with conflicts of interest in rating 
agencies is largely mistaken. Conflicts of interest permeate 
social and economic life in capitalism. How institutions 
acknowledge and respond to conflicts of interest is impor-
tant, but the existence of conflicts of interest in itself was 
not the major cause of the subprime crisis. I will argue that 
rating agency involvement in the crisis is not a result of 
breaking implicit regulative rules about conflict of interest, 
but is attributable to fundamental dilemmas about the role 
of rating agencies (and similar gatekeepers) in a market 
system. Although criticism of conflicts of interest may serve 
a useful political purpose, too much attention to issues at 
this level will produce complacency about the inherent 
volatility of global finance, setting the world up for a re-
peat of the global financial crisis once the appetite for risk 
returns (Vestergaard 2009: 9). 
I begin this article with a short review of the agencies’ 
history and how they function. The article then considers 
the claims about conflicts of interest which have domi-
nated the debates about the agencies since the beginnings 
of the crisis in the summer of 2007. I then develop an 
argument about the role of the agencies in making struc-
tured finance possible. It is this role that is key to under-
standing the global financial crisis not as a result of rule 
transgression, but as a crisis at the level of the social rela-
tionships which make global finance possible. This is why 
the crisis is so deep and why it has been so hard to develop 
a response by policy-makers and market actors. The nature 
of this crisis transcended the very definition of crisis as 
understood by these actors.  
Origins and Purpose 
Henry Paulson, U.S. Treasury Secretary at the end of Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s administration, made it clear when 
presenting the policy statement of the President’s Working 
Group on Financial markets in March 2008 that in the 
midst of market turbulence, officials, politicians and their 
advisers believe credit rating agencies “play a major role in 
financial markets,” and that the  work of the agencies 
must be ‘improved’ in terms of the specific challenges 
faced in rating complex financial instruments like struc-
tured securities, and by avoiding the reality or appearance 
of conflicts of interest (Paulson 2008). 
These comments, and the energetic reaction of European 
financial regulators to the perceived culpability of the 
agencies in the generation of the subprime crisis, point to 
the increasingly important job done by wholesale credit 
rating agencies in global markets. In fact, it was not too 
many years ago that rating agencies were little known 
outside the United States. Until the mid-1990s most Euro-
pean and Asian companies relied on their market reputa-
tions alone to secure financing. But this changed when the 
pressure of globalization led to the desire to tap the deep 
American financial markets and to a greater appetite for 
higher returns and thus risk. In these circumstances, the 
informality of traditional old boys’ networks is no longer 
defendable to shareholders or relevant to pension funds 
half way around the world. The result is that an essentially 
American approach to market organization and judgment 
has become the global norm in the developed world, and 
increasingly, in emerging markets as well. 
Ratings are increasingly central to the regulatory system of 
modern capitalism and therefore to governments every-
where. Getting credit ratings ‘right’ therefore seems vitally 
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important to many observers. But in pursuing improvement 
in the rating system we need to appreciate the challenges 
and limits to rating. I argue, after due attention to the 
origins and work of the agencies, that our expectations of 
the agencies are founded on a limited rationalist or ma-
chine-like understanding of the workings of capital mar-
kets. A more appropriately social (and dynamic) view of 
markets makes the challenge of effective rating even more 
daunting. The increasingly volatile nature of markets has 
created a crisis in relations between the agencies and gov-
ernments, which increasingly seek to monitor their per-
formance and stimulate reform in their procedures, just as 
they do in other institutions. 
Rating agencies emerged after the Civil War in the United 
States. From this time until the First World War, American 
financial markets experienced an explosion of information 
provision. The transition between issuing compendiums of 
information and actually making judgments about the 
creditworthiness of debtors occurred after the 1907 finan-
cial crisis. By the mid-1920s, nearly 100 percent of the US 
bond market was rated by Moody’s. 
Two major American agencies dominate the market in 
ratings. Both Moody's and S&P are headquartered in the 
lower Manhattan financial district of New York City. 
Moody's was sold in 1998 as a separate corporation by 
Dun and Bradstreet, the information concern, which had 
owned Moody’s since 1962, while S&P remains a subsidi-
ary of McGraw-Hill, which bought S&P in 1966. Both 
agencies have numerous branches in the US, in other de-
veloped countries, and in several emerging markets. S&P is 
famous for the S&P 500, the benchmark US stock index 
listing around $1 trillion in assets. 
Rating agency outputs comprise an important part of the 
infrastructure of capital markets. They are key benchmarks, 
which form the basis for subsequent decision-making by 
participants.  In this sense, rating agencies are important 
not so much for any particular rating they produce, but for 
the fact that they are a part of the internal organization of 
the market itself.  So, we find that traders may refer to a 
company as an 'AA company,' or some other rating cate-
gory, as if this were a fact, an agreed and uncontroversial 
way of describing and distinguishing companies, munici-
palities or countries. 
A rationalist way to think about what rating agencies do is 
to see them as serving a ‘function’ in the economic system. 
In this view, rating agencies solve a problem in markets 
that develops when banks no longer sit at the centre of 
the borrowing process. Rating agencies serve as what 
Gourevitch calls “’reputational intermediaries’” like ac-
countants, analysts, and lawyers, who are “essential to the 
functioning of the system,” monitoring managers through 
a “constant flow of short-term snapshots” (Gourevitch 
2002: 1 and 11). Another way to think about the function 
of the agencies is to suggest rating agencies establish psy-
chological "rules of thumb" which make market decisions 
less costly for participants (Heisler 1994: 78). 
But purely functional explanations for the existence of 
rating agencies are potentially deceptive. Attempts to verify 
(or refute) the idea that rating agencies must exist because 
they serve a purpose, have proven inconclusive. Rating 
agencies have to be considered important actors because 
people view them as important, and act on the basis of 
that understanding in markets, even if it proves impossible 
for analysts to actually isolate the specific benefits the 
agencies generate for these market actors. Investors often 
mimic other investors, "ignoring substantive private infor-
mation” (Scharfstein and Stein 1990: 465). The fact that 
people may collectively view rating agencies as important – 
irrespective of what ‘function’ the agencies are thought to 
serve in the scholarly literature – means that markets and 
debt issuers have strong incentives to act as if participants in 
the markets take the rating agencies seriously. In other 
words, the significance of rating is not to be estimated like a 
mountain or national population, as a ‘brute’ fact which is 
true (or not) irrespective of shared beliefs about its existence, 
nor is the meaning of rating determined by the ‘subjective’ 
facts of individual perception (Ruggie 1998: 12-13). 
What is central to the status and consequentiality of rating 
agencies is what people believe about them, and they act 
on collectively – even if those beliefs are clearly false. In-
deed, the beliefs may be quite strange to the observer, but 
if people use them as a guide to action (or inaction) they 
are significant. Dismissing such collective beliefs misses the 
fact that actors must take account of the existence of so-
cial facts in considering their own action. Reflection about 
the nature and direction of social facts is characteristic of 
financial markets on a day-to-day basis.  
Global Financial Crisis 
The subprime crisis that began in the summer of 2007 may 
rank as one of the most traumatic global developments of 
the last one hundred years. It caused dismay and panic 
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throughout elite circles in developed countries as efforts to 
reignite confidence in the financial markets were frustrated 
again and again. Given that the subprime securities market 
was worth only $0.7 trillion in mid-2007, out of total 
global capital markets of $175 trillion, the impact of sub-
prime assets is out of all proportion to their actual weight 
in the financial system (Bank of England 2008: 20). This 
suggests that an explanation for systemic crisis cannot be 
deduced in rationalist terms. The ‘subprime crisis’ is not a 
direct consequence of subprime mortgage delinquencies. 
The paralysis that came over global finance is a conse-
quence of the intersubjective nature of markets, rather 
than the logical result of relatively minor problems with 
lending to the working poor. But this analysis of the sub-
prime crisis is difficult to incorporate in a rationalist view of 
markets, in which events have logical causes. In a rational-
ist world, panics, crises and collapses have to be explained 
as a result of specific failures. It is necessary, in these cir-
cumstances, to find those institutions that did not do their 
jobs properly and make sure they do in future. This as-
sumes, of course, that a proper job can be done and the 
problem solved. 
It comes as no surprise then that the rating agencies have 
been subject to unprecedented criticism and investigation 
in the midst of the subprime meltdown. Congressional 
committees, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
European Parliament and Commission, and the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators have conducted investi-
gations, amongst others. A very senior rating official has 
indicated that the crisis over subprime ratings is the most 
threatening yet experienced by the agencies in their cen-
tury of activity. This is a curious development, given that 
the rating agency business is now open to greater compe-
tition since NRSRO designation became subject to the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. It suggests that 
the image of a movement from regulation to self-
regulation, or from police patrol to fire alarm has not cre-
ated a world of autonomous non-state authorities. What 
we see instead is a serious disciplining of the agencies by 
states, intent on improving their performance (Moran 
2003: 1-11). Or perhaps the identification of the agencies 
as scapegoats in the context of elite and public dismay 
over the effects of globalized markets, as US investment 
banks were in the 1930s (Galbraith 1954). An outcome of 
this crisis is likely to be a limited reconstruction of the 
agencies along more ‘accountable’ lines. 
Reconsidering Conflict of Interest 
The major discrete criticism of the agencies that followed 
the onset of the subprime crisis is that ratings were defec-
tive and did not warn of trouble ahead because of the 
perverse incentives created by a conflict of interest at the 
heart of the business model adopted by the agencies. The 
idea is that because rating agencies are funded by fees 
paid by issuers or sellers of securities they have strong 
incentives to inflate ratings to please their customers. The 
financial and popular press alike treated the observation 
that rating agencies were funded by those they rate as a 
scandalous revelation (Wighton, 2009; Baker 2009: 100). 
Originally, in the first days of Moody’s Investors Service, 
ratings were paid for by the sale of newsletters about 
credit quality. But this model became less effective in the 
1960s when a bull market put a premium on information. 
Newspapers and other news services treated ratings as 
news, turning ratings announcements into public goods, 
obviating the need for payment by investors. Free riding 
became a major issue. The expansion of the financial mar-
kets in the 1960s, after decades of subdued activity follow-
ing the Great Depression, World War II and the founding of 
the Bretton Woods regime meant the agencies needed more 
resources to respond to the greater volume and complexity 
of securities than could be provided by the vulnerable sub-
scription system. This is what drove the agencies to change 
their business model at the end of the 1960s. 
In principle, there is indeed a conflict of interest in rating. 
Crockett et al. assert that “Conflicts of interest occur when 
a financial service provider, or an agent within such a pro-
vider, has multiple interests that create incentives to act in 
such a way as to misuse information” (2003: xix). The idea 
here is that conflicts of interest mean the market gets less 
information or lower quality information than otherwise. In 
concrete terms, the inference is that payment of fees by 
issuers compromises the principle-agent relationship be-
tween the agencies and investors who use ratings as part 
of their decision-making. The agencies are assumed in 
these circumstances to issue less critical ratings than they 
otherwise would. 
The problem with this view is the assumption that an in-
herent conflict must equal an empirical problem. But there 
is no equivalence in the material world. What we actually 
find in rating, as in many other spheres, is a conflict of 
interest certainly, but no more so than exists in universities 
in which students pay tuition fees that support the salaries 
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of the professors who grade their examinations. Rating 
agencies, like universities, manage this dilemma, in the 
case of the agencies through codes of conduct, and by de-
linking analysis and remuneration for analytical staff. 
The management of this conflict is not just in a negative or 
legalistic form. The agencies have strong incentives to 
maintain their reputations. Prior to government utilization 
of ratings in prudential regulation starting in the 1930s a 
Moody’s rating was already a market-determined necessity 
in order to sell municipal bonds. Rating cannot therefore 
be reduced to a ‘regulatory license’ as some scholars have 
suggested (Posen and Smick 2008: 8-9). There are strong 
business reasons for the agencies to avoid rating inflation 
because reputation underpins their franchise, as it does in 
eminent universities. 
If conflicts of interest were a major material problem in the 
rating industry we would expect to find a series of empiri-
cal cases that could be interpreted as supporting this claim. 
No doubt there would have been much talk of scandal and 
corruption in the agencies. But this is not the case, leading 
other observers to suggest that the agencies do indeed 
manage their conflicts effectively (Smith and Walter 2002; 
Crockett et al. 2003; Coffee 2006; Véron 2009). The prob-
lem with rating is not a conflict of interest in the conven-
tional sense. The problem is much deeper. I examine this in 
the next section. 
Conflict of Role 
Two impulses seem to dominate responses to major crises. 
The first is to search for and attach blame to those who are 
alleged to have brought the crisis about, the culprits. This 
provides material for the media and incessant chatter in 
blogs. This impulse gives rise to panels of bankers who are 
forced to apologize for their alleged errors in front of Con-
gressional and British Parliamentary committees. I have 
explored the uses of moral panic elsewhere (Sinclair 2010). 
If this first impulse is politically useful, embarrassing to a 
few and somewhat satisfying to many others, the second 
impulse is, in the circumstances of this crisis, more likely to 
damage collective welfare. The second impulse is to create 
– typically in haste – a framework of regulative rules that 
are “heavier” or “harder” or more somehow more “seri-
ous.” The impulse to regulate is derived from a failure to 
understand what it is the rating agencies did that was 
actually in error and a failure to accept the social nature of 
finance and the circumstances that brought this crisis into 
being in the first place. It is this understanding that forms 
the substance of my reconsideration of conflict of interest. 
The prevailing understanding behind the impulse to punish 
and regulate seems to be that the people involved were 
doing things wrong. It is as if the mechanic fixing your car 
has downloaded the wrong software updates to the car’s 
computers. No tip for him then and perhaps a remedial 
visit to mechanics school or the sack when the next round 
of layoffs come along. But this mechanical analogy will not 
do for global finance. Finance is not, contrary to the finan-
cial economists and their Efficient Markets Hypothesis, a 
natural phenomenon. While financial markets may display 
regularities in normal times, these regularities are not law-
like because diachronic change is an ever-present feature 
of all social mechanisms, including markets. 
John Searle made a useful distinction relevant to this prob-
lem. He suggested it is possible to distinguish rules that 
“regulate antecendently or independently existing forms of 
behavior…” from a much more architectural form of rule 
(Searle 1969: 33). These other “constitutive rules do not 
merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behav-
ior.” He goes on to suggest that chess and football are 
only possible with rules. The rules make the game. The 
basic point here is that the public and elite panic has fo-
cused on regulative rules and those who allegedly broke 
them. But this is not the problem with rating agencies or 
what has brought about the global financial crisis. Constitu-
tive rules have been damaged, and this is why the crisis is so 
deep and so obviously challenging to the powers that be. 
In the case of the rating agencies, I argue that what I 
would now term regulative conflicts of interest are insub-
stantial and no more than a useful rhetorical device to 
address poor forecasting. What are important and little 
commented upon are the constitutive conflicts. The major 
conflict of this order has been going on since the early 
1980s and the rise of structured or asset-backed finance. 
Structured finance is important because it has been the 
major means through which financial innovation has made 
illiquid debts like credit card receivables, car loans and 
mortgages into tradeable, liquid securities. In a context of 
low interest rates and the hunt for yield, structured finance 
has grown into around 40 percent of total global debt 
securities of around $30 trillion. 
When people think of financial innovation they inevitably 
think of computers and highly-educated ‘rocket scientists’ 
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developing quantitative techniques for managing risk. But 
that is not the heart of this matter. Lawyers are key to this. 
The real essence of structured finance is the legal rights to 
revenues organized in the contracts and trusts which un-
derpin the securities. This documentation can run into 
thousands of pages. The point is that these legal under-
pinnings give different rights to different tranches of a 
security. Some, such as the AAA tranche, have the right to 
be paid first. While others had to wait in line. This is how a 
mass of not very creditworthy subprime mortgages could 
produce some AAA bonds. These investors had first right 
to revenue and the expectation was that even if some 
subprime mortgage holders defaulted as expected enough 
would pay so that those with the highly rated securities 
would be paid in full. Unfortunately, when expectations 
are upset and people are uncertain this model does not 
work and securities of this type look dubious. Add reces-
sion to this picture and you can imagine a wholesale right-
down of the global market in securities. 
But as disastrous as this is, it is not the specific constitutive 
conflict of interest the rating agencies committed. That 
failure was to move into the markets themselves. For dec-
ades Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had played the role 
of a judge or referee, standing back from the action and 
making calls as necessary. This role is what they were val-
ued for and it is this role which allowed them to build-up 
reputational assets. The problem is that structured finance 
is only possible with the active involvement of the rating 
agencies. The agencies and their ratings actually make the 
distinct tranches of structured finance possible. Because of 
the complexity of the legal documentation and protection 
necessary for these tranches, the raters did not operate as 
judges. In structured finance the raters increasingly acted 
as consultants, helping to construct the securities them-
selves, indicating how they would rate them if organized in 
particular ways. 
Conclusions 
It is intriguing that despite the worst financial crisis since 
the 1930s and the identification of a suitable culprit in the 
rating agencies proposed regulation should be so insub-
stantial, doing so little to alter the rating system that has 
been in place in the US since 1909 and Europe since the 
late 1980s. Part of this can be put down perhaps to a lack 
of confidence on the part of regulators and politicians in 
the efficacy of traditional solutions to market failure. It may 
also recognise the weakness of ostensibly heavily regulated 
institutions such as commercial banks and an understand-
ing that the financial system is, despite the rating crisis, 
likely to continue to move in a more market and more 
rating-dependent direction in future. Indeed, the rating 
agencies have been major beneficiaries of the bailout pro-
gram, reporting substantial returns despite the crisis (Ng 
and Rappaport 2009). 
The global financial crisis is a crisis at the constitutive level. 
It reflects a deep loss of confidence in the basic infrastruc-
ture of the capital markets. This loss of confidence is a 
social rather than a technical process and tinkering with 
regulative rules, while tempting and politically distracting, 
will not address the heart of the matter. Like the Great 
Depression it seems likely that the damage done to the 
social relationships which underpin global finance, such as 
the reputational assets of the rating agencies and the trust 
financiers have in each other, may take many long years to 
recover. It is tempting in these circumstances to prescribe a 
simple fix, but institutions, contrary to some, develop over 
time and like communities, do not heal instantly. Encour-
aging institutional diversity and restraining hubris about 
alleged cures is our best way through. For the rating agen-
cies, attending to the relationships and the expectations 
that built their reputations in the first place is their best 
course of action. The extent of substantial change is likely 
to be limited. 
Timothy J. Sinclair is Associate Professor of International 
Political Economy at the University of Warwick. He is the 
author of the The New Masters of Capital: American Bond 
Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Cor-
nell University Press 2005). His next book, co-authored 
with Lena Rethel, is The Problem with Banks (Zed Books, 
forthcoming 2011). 
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Introduction 
Much political economy scholarship, including research 
showcased in this newsletter, has an implicit normative 
agenda. It sets out to uncover social structures that shape 
peoples’ lives without their consent. More often than not, 
these social structures generate or sustain inequalities, 
whether in material welfare, exposure to risk, access to 
education or democratic participation, or the ability to lead 
lives in line with ones own norms and preferences. 
Financialization is a hallmark of contemporary capitalism 
(e.g. Epstein 2005; Krippner 2005). Observers disagree 
about origins and consequences of the phenomenon and 
even its proper definition. For now, we simply take it to 
mean the growing relevance of processes in financial mar-
kets for structuring other economic or social domains. 
Financialization then highlights the reordering of produc-
tion under ostensible pressure from unleashed capital mar-
kets (Froud, Haslam et al. 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 
2000; Duménil and Lévy 2004; Glyn 2006) as well as the 
changes these markets have wrought on peoples’ everyday 
lives (Leyshon and Thrift 2007; Langley 2009; Warren 2010). 
This prominence of finance has made it a common target of 
normative criticism. Analyses of how finance is regulated – 
even in fairly technical domains such as accounting stan-
dards (Perry and Nölke 2006) or capital adequacy rules 
(Claessens, Underhill et al. 2006) – have tried to uncover 
unfair or unjust(ified) consequences of the rules in question. 
This work is often convincing in the analysis of regulation’s 
consequences. But equally often it is sorely lacking clearly 
spelt out normative standards. At times, plain material 
inequality, tied to financial market functioning, is sufficient 
to elicit disapproval. Alternatively, rules that affect various 
stakeholders differently trigger claims that surely, financial 
regulation should be subjected to more democratic scruti-
ny than is commonly the case (Mügge, Blom et al. 2010; 
Mügge forthcoming). 
Noble as such concerns, their advocates rarely offer con-
crete suggestions about the criteria financial regulation 
would have to fulfil to deserve our support. This is the 
point of departure for this article. Rather than starting 
from scratch, it climbs on the shoulders of a giant of con-
temporary political theory – Amartya Sen. His The Idea of 
Justice (Sen 2009) offers not only an accessible yet exhaus-
tive overview of his own ideas; he also situates his argu-
ments in broader debates in ethics, making comparisons 
with alternative formulations easy. An economist by train-
ing, Sen extensively draws on classics in political economy, 
including Smith, Marx and Mill, augmenting his relevance 
for debates over financial regulation. 
Sen dismisses utopian approaches to justice, which try to 
sketch the just society. Instead, he favours enhancing jus-
tice incrementally. ‘Enhancing justice’ means identifying 
aspects of our social environment which can (and should) 
be changed if thereby people were empowered to live 
their lives in line with their own wishes. Sen recognizes 
that given diverging norms and preference orderings, it is 
impossible to reason through to the just society. Rather, 
deliberation is indispensible to understand how contrary 
demands on society can be reconciled in practice. Sen does 
not start from an objective vision of the good life, which 
people should (be entitled to) live. Instead, the key lies with 
people themselves. That said, he concedes that people are 
often deprived of meaningful control over their lives to 
such a degree that we can still identify their living situa-
tions as instances of grave injustices.  
Convincing as the arguments are in their own right, it is 
not self-evident that they generate practical guidance 
when applied to financial regulation. While this article 
seeks to strengthen the foundations of normative debates 
about finance, it also explores the helpfulness of Sen’s 
arguments for debates in finance in the first place. 
Much of Sen’s work has concentrated on developing coun-
tries (notably Sen 1999), and his approach that sees capa-
bilities as freedom has relatively straightforward implica-
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tions there. For example, scholarship drawing on Muham-
mad Yunnus has spelled out how micro-finance might aid 
farmers and small entrepreneurs and insulate them against 
economic shocks (e.g. Young 2010). Normative impera-
tives here are relatively clear as credit is scarce and gross, 
and therefore easily identifiable, injustices abound. 
In contrast, this paper concentrates on the OECD world. It 
explores to what degree well-established normative argu-
ments are able to provide guidance in contemporary de-
bates about financial reform. Three conclusions emerge 
from its analysis: first, publicly guided provision of credit 
has significant potential to advance societal justice. Fram-
ing debates around for example student loans or mortgag-
es in terms of justice and empowerment (rather than for 
example economic investments) provides ammunition to 
those arguing in favour of heavy state intervention in this 
domain. 
Second, the financial system could be made more just by 
curtailing the insecurity it inserts into people’s lives. Finan-
cial innovation has often been hailed as an instrument to 
redistribute risk towards those actors willing and able to 
handle it. Arguably, the opposite effect has been at least 
as strong: by enticing corporations to plan short-term and 
pushing governments to deregulate labour markets, un-
leashed finance has increased many people’s insecurity. 
This effect of liberalized finance offers much scope for 
corrective measures and the promotion of justice. 
Finally, however, Sen’s Idea of Justice is unable to guide 
reform of the plumbing of global finance – regulation 
covering wholesale finance including accounting stan-
dards, derivatives regulation, rules for credit rating agen-
cies, etc. The effects of such rules are too complex and 
intertwined to allow an assessment of how their reform 
might boost people’s capabilities. Instead, Sen’s arguments 
suggest serious benefits from downscaling finance such as 
to allow meaningful political control. Given people’s di-
verse preferences and values, the enhancement of justice 
as empowerment requires economic frameworks in which 
people can shape their financial environment through the 
democratic institutions that they (hopefully) have at their 
disposal. A return to some form of Bretton Woods-like 
order seems desirable – an order that combined openness 
to trade and regulated capital flows with at least the ambi-
tion to install democratic control over national financial 
systems. While the mergence such an order may not be 
likely in the near future, the apparent difficulty to erect it is 
a crucial obstacle to the realization of justice. 
Ethics and financial governance 
Given the centrality of finance in people’s lives there is 
surprisingly little debate about desirable financial system 
design that takes ethics serious. When Adair Turner, 
chairman of the British Financial Services Authority, sug-
gested that we distinguish financial services that are ‘so-
cially useful’ from those that are not, his statement was 
seen as ground-breaking.1 From afar, of course, it is un-
clear what other than social utility we should consider 
when debating financial market policy. The furore sur-
rounding Turner’s statement was far more noteworthy 
than his ‘insight’ itself. 
That said, four divergent perspectives reject an explicit 
consideration of ethics in financial regulation. First, think-
ers of various hues deny that financial markets should be 
engineered with an eye to fairness standards of whichever 
kind. Libertarians see such tampering with markets as 
undue interference with individuals’ inalienable right to use 
property as they see fit. This exclusive focus on individuals 
precludes an engagement with justice and fairness, both of 
which are relational concepts. Common as this position is, 
it completely ignores that – rather obvious for readers of 
this publication – finance is necessarily social. It is difficult 
to imagine a complex financial system that could function 
without some collectively binding rules. Hence, the notion 
that there existed something such as pre-social property or 
finance is absurd. 
The second position trusts ‘markets’ to produce socially 
optimal outcomes. All that is necessary is to engineer 
proper market functioning – defined in narrow neoclassical 
terms – through regulation where necessary. All attempts 
to improve social welfare beyond this point are ultimately 
self-defeating.2 Underlying this vision are several ideas: (1) 
market efficiency is possible, (2) it generates the highest 
aggregate material welfare, and (3) the latter is the ideal 
yardstick for measuring social utility. All three ideas are 
dubious, at best: the crisis has dampened what remained 
of the optimism about potential market efficiency, certainly 
in domains as complex as global finance. Once efficiency 
becomes elusive, arguments about its effects on aggregate 
growth ring hollow. As the crisis has hit the poor segments 
of societies disproportionately and exposed their vulnera-
bility, it is unclear why the growth or decline of lower in-
comes should be treated similar to that of higher incomes, 
invalidating plain aggregation of material welfare. Finally, 
much theoretical and empirical work has demonstrated 
that material wealth narrowly-conceived is a poor guide to 
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people’s happiness and the capacity to live the lives they 
want, certainly in the higher echelons of the income distri-
bution. In short, a hands-off approach to financial markets 
in the name of market efficiency is indefensible. 
Third, stability as a key goal of financial regulation has at 
times been elevated to the one overall objective to which 
financial regulation should contribute. Since the crisis, rules 
were re-evaluated mainly with an eye to their potentially 
destabilizing effects. As will be argued below, ceteris pari-
bus such stability is also desirable from a justice as empo-
werment-perspective. But making stability the centre of 
reform efforts has setting policymakers setting their sights 
both too high and too low. On the one hand, financial 
stability, however difficult to achieve, leaves regulatory 
regimes underdetermined. Stable finance could take many 
shapes and colours, with widely divergent distributive ef-
fects. Facets of financial systems that have clear bearing on 
questions of justice would remain ignored. On the other 
hand, it is unclear whether financial stability can in fact be 
engineered. As Minsky (2008 [1986]) convincingly argued, 
stability inevitably creates complacency that sees policy 
makers and economic actors condone and indeed desire 
credit expansion lest economic growth is stifled. Booms 
and busts are the inevitable result. Investing all regulatory 
energy in ostracizing financial instability may thus be set-
ting the aims too high and detract from other ways to 
enhance justice in the meantime.  
The final argument in favour of ring-fencing markets against 
attempts to engineer specific outcomes is that market com-
plexity dooms any such endeavours. This claim boils down to 
a distinction between markets, which can function well only 
when left to their own devices (with potential props to pre-
vent market failure), and their non-market environment, 
including politics. Also this idea has been undermined from 
a variety of angles (Chavagneux 2001; Mitchell 2002; 
MacKenzie 2006). And the recent crisis has reinforced 
doubts that a self-contained financial system, which could 
be optimized according to its own ‘inner’ logic, could be 
distinguished. This is not to say that markets are ‘trivial 
machines’ in Herbert Simon’s sense, which can simply be 
instructed to produce one or the other outcome (Simon 
1962). Caution is clearly required, and our capabilities to 
bend financial markets to our own liking are seriously li-
mited. This point holds for optimizing efficiency as much as 
for other political projects, however, so that it is no argu-
ment against at least the ambition to tailor financial mar-
ket functioning to socially agreeable outcomes. 
Once these four arguments against taking ethical consid-
erations serious in financial market design are discarded, 
an explicit definition of what financial market policy is to 
achieve becomes necessary. Even the quest for financial 
stability is less straightforward than might be apparent 
right away. Clearly, stability advocates are not in favour of 
building a financial system so rigid that it would deprive 
most people of access to credit, just in the name of pre-
venting crises and instability. Just where the proper mix 
between dynamism, entailing risks and potential disrup-
tion, and stability lies is a question for normative theorists 
to answer. His prominence in this field makes Sen a prom-
ising starting point for a search for answers. 
Sen’s Idea of Justice in a nutshell 
Sen’s idea of justice can most easily be sketched by con-
trasting it with those conceptions he rejects. His most fun-
damental distinction is between utopian ideas of justice 
and those that take the status quo as their point of depar-
ture. The former start by outlining the perfect society – 
whether in terms of material equality, opportunities for 
societal participation, or intellectual, personal and spiritual 
fulfilment. 
Such utopias abound, but their champions rarely specify 
how they could be approached (indeed, whether that is 
possible at all) and how individual steps leading towards 
them should be evaluated on their own, given that we 
might ‘get stuck’ half way.3 Conceptions of justice – 
whether inspired by religious fundamentalism, radical libe-
ralism or socialist or communitarian thought – often paint 
societal choices in stark terms: any society that is not just 
or ‘right’ is necessarily wrong. It is a question of all or 
nothing. In political economy, this problem emerges when 
we try to reconcile the realization that power relations 
penetrate capitalism to its core with the aim of human 
emancipation from domination. Does partial emancipation 
exist? Or are there just different degrees of subtlety? En-
grossing as those questions may be, they inspire little guid-
ance for policy-choices here and now. 
Compared to the utopians, Sen takes a reformist and 
pragmatic position, going much further than his teacher 
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Rawls 2005 [1971]). 
Rawls had avoided a detailed sketch of the just society 
itself. But he did specify the rather demanding conditions 
under which humans might be able to agree on its con-
tours. Absent these conditions, justice was necessarily out 
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of reach. Sen, in contrast, starts in the here and now. He 
accepts that people’s preferences, norms and values may be 
incommensurable, whether as the result of socialization in 
different cultures or simply individual differences. We there-
fore cannot deduce what it is that people want; we can only 
go into the world and find out. Grand projects are eschewed 
in favour of incremental societal improvements.4 
The diversity of norms and values makes plain material 
welfare inadmissible as the primary yardstick of societal 
improvement. Drawing on his earlier work (e.g. Sen 1999) 
as well as that of Martha Nussbaum, Sen instead opts for 
people’s capabilities to attain their own goals as the anc-
hor of his conception of justice. Furthering justice means 
changing society so that humans to gain control over their 
own lives in line with their preferences. It means creating 
choices where hitherto, there were none. His aim is thus 
not to define, let alone to create, the just society, but to 
outline a political ethic that seeks to empower people. 
Furthering justice means identifying and using our collec-
tive potential to make society more just than it is now. 
What does all this mean for finance? What kind of finan-
cial reforms could empower people without unduly con-
straining others? Just what an ‘undue’ constraint on others 
is, is of course unclear. Extreme examples – a trade-off 
between one man’s access to shelter and another man’s 
third holiday home – may be easy to decide. Many other 
trade-offs are less clear-cut. 
Sen sidesteps this question, which might otherwise dog his 
whole approach. First, there is nothing wrong with leaving 
thorny questions for later and dealing with straightforward 
ones first. Second, he acknowledges – more than most 
utopian philosophers – that people’s perspectives differ, 
and that debate may change their mind, albeit in unpre-
dictable ways. Justice is inevitably linked with public delibe-
ration and some form of democratic decision making. It 
may thus be possible to craft sufficient consensus to re-
move at least some grave injustices – already a big step 
forward in its own right. 
The contentious issues in finance and justice fall into three 
categories: the availability of credit to individuals, indirect 
effects of financial system functioning, and the aggregate 
effects of global financial system design (or the lack the-
reof). The following three sections will delve into each of 
these to establish whether Sen’s thinking provides any 
guidance for policy. 
Just credit? 
The most immediate link between financial system func-
tioning and justice as empowerment lies in the provision of 
credit. In developed countries, which are in focus here, 
credit is particularly relevant to finance the three key in-
vestments people commonly make in their life – education, 
a house to live in, and old age provision. Credit can of 
course not be supplied indiscriminately. To the degree that 
it is financed through government debt, well-meant credit 
provision can turn into an excessive burden for society as a 
whole. The key condition therefore is that credit schemes 
have to be sustainable, meaning that the burden they 
impose on future generations should not grow over time. 
The question is thus neither whether markets function 
efficiently, nor whether they boost long-term welfare by 
enabling profitable investment (a view commonly espoused 
with respect to education), but whether credit provision 
gives people relatively more control over their lives. Again, 
potentially adverse future consequences of present-day 
profligacy are part and parcel of this consideration. 
Many OECD countries operate special credit arrangements 
for the domains mentioned: student loans and grants of 
various forms, mortgage regimes that target credit and the 
terms on which it is available to prospective house owners, 
and often highly intricate pension regimes. The existence 
of these regimes is good news from Sen’s perspective. 
Government intervention to target credit signals the reali-
zation that credit availability is too important to citizens’ 
lives to be left to the market alone. At least some of these 
credit-regimes have proven sustainable, meaning that they 
do not impose undue burdens on others, particularly on 
future generations through ever-mounting debt or exces-
sive inflation for the assets that credit regimes target.5 
Fine-tuning the credit supply to meet societal demands is 
thus possible and a worthy subject of public debate. 
To be sure, in each of the domains mentioned above there 
is ample room for controversy and, from the perspective of 
justice as empowerment, room for improvement. For ex-
ample, given scarce resources, it is unclear why tax breaks 
or concessional loans should be available to citizens who 
could follow their study of choice or build the home of 
their dreams without them. 
While far from revolutionary, such a view on finance 
roots it firmly in the social dimension of the financial 
system. The perpetuation of societal inequalities in oppor-
Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice and Financial Regulation 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 12, Number 1 (November 2010) 
14 
tunity on the back of a skewed allocation of credit be-
comes indefensible. 
Financialization and everyday life 
The observable influence of financial system functioning on 
peoples’ lives goes far beyond the distribution of credit. 
Consider three examples: the effects of corporate gover-
nance on employment, the impact of financial instability 
on life planning, and the distribution of micro-risks. All 
three centre on the same issue – relative stability of the 
economic context within which people can plan their lives. 
In line with a general shift towards neo-liberal economic 
governance, corporate governance reforms in the indu-
strialized world since the 1980s have emphasized the im-
portance of corporations’ flexibility. Maximum economic 
growth, so the argument, depends on the ability constant-
ly to reconfigure the combination of production factors, 
crucially including labour – hence the call for the flexibiliza-
tion of labour markets. The flexibility of the latter is pri-
marily shaped by labour market legislation. But at the same 
time, a strengthening of corporate owners at the expense 
of workers has increased the emphasis on short-term prof-
its and the attendant ‘need for flexibility’, particularly in 
economic downturns (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000, criti-
cally Froud, Haslam et al. 2000). 
For many workers, the result has been clearly negative 
(Glyn 2006). Irrespective of ultimately unproven effects of 
flexibilization on aggregate employment, the insecurity 
that flexible labour markets introduce in workers’ lives is at 
odds with the empowerment that Sen’s theory of justice 
champions. Insecure work arrangements introduce anxiety 
in many peoples’ lives and prohibit long-term planning. 
The potential need for periodic relocation can disrupt their 
social lives and generate an encompassing sense of root-
lessness (Sennett 2007). If financial regulation triggers 
managers to push for internal flexibilization, justice could 
be advanced by providing employment conditions that give 
employees at least a modicum of control, the potential for 
long-term life planning and simply some peace of mind. 
A similar argument centres on the deleterious effects of 
financial instability on such long-term planning. Even if in a 
liberalized economy the economic losses in downturns 
were compensated by additional economic growth during 
upswings, the disruptions such volatility introduces in 
people’s everyday lives argue in favour of stability-
promoting financial regulation. Such regulation might 
require limiting financial innovation and its potentially 
beneficial economic effects. But moderate losses in trend 
growth would be balanced by the increased control stable 
economic conditions would grant people. 
Finally, financial regulation at the retail end of the financial 
services food chain distributes the risks attached to finan-
cial transactions. Much customer protection legislation 
already attempts to insulate citizens from risks that they 
seem prone to misunderstand or unable to bear. That said, 
enshrining customer protection in financial regulation, 
often against resistance of the providers of financial servic-
es, has often been an uphill struggle, and frequently simply 
failed (e.g. Warren 2010). 
Sen’s approach bypasses legalistic arguments about where 
the responsibilities of customers begin and those of financial 
firms end. The real yardstick is much more practical: what 
works in the real world? Which way of organising finance 
would boost peoples’ grip on their finances and lives most? 
This includes a curb on predatory lending and the streng-
thening of financial education so that people understand the 
products from which they can choose. Where products’ 
complexity exceeds many peoples’ ability to understand 
them, a justice as empowerment-approach suggests their 
prohibition. Why should citizens be exposed to risks that are 
designed to be incomprehensible? The freedom of the 
banker to sell products as he or she chooses weighs less 
heavily than the potential loss of freedom of people who get 
entrapped in impenetrable legalese and debt. 
Justice and the nuts and bolts of global 
finance 
Important as financial institutions and regulations that are 
close to citizens are, cross-border integration of financial 
markets means that all these unfold and are embedded in 
the strictures of global finance. To take one recent exam-
ple, pensions, mortgages and student loans in Greece have 
probably been more affected by the eurozone turmoil in 
spring 2010 than by any specific Greek regulation. Global 
finance sets the boundaries in which national choices can 
be made. In this way, its regulation –particularly in whole-
sale capital markets – has a strong influence on peoples’ 
capabilities, and it should therefore be a proper object for 
Sen’s theory of justice. But does the latter have anything to 
say about how credit rating agencies, derivatives markets, 
accounting standards and the like should be transformed? 
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Alas, the link between regulation in any of these domains 
and humans’ capabilities is too indirect to allow any such 
claims. Do we know how derivatives trading could be re-
formed to serve the aim of justice? Regulation in any one 
domain interacts with rules elsewhere, and – as the recent 
crisis has powerfully demonstrated – it remains difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict the real-world effects that regu-
lation is likely to have. Also, justice for future generations 
prohibits opportunistic tampering with financial rules for 
example to boost consumption in the short term, only to 
invite an economic squeeze years down the line.6 In short, 
Sen is of no immediate help in reform efforts. 
At the same time, his approach points to two more fun-
damental conclusions. First, if financial globalization inhi-
bits country-level application of justice-standards to finan-
cial system design, the legitimacy of such globalization is 
seriously dented. Sen’s perspective thus supports those 
who see financial globalization as a critical loss of national 
sovereignty. Most often, such arguments are advanced in 
the name of national economic development. The empha-
sis here is different: national control over financial markets 
may not only be necessary to boost aggregate economic 
development, but also to allow micro-level choices about 
ways in which financial system design can help people live 
the lives they want. 
Second, then, global harmonization of regulatory stan-
dards is not necessarily desirable. Such harmonization 
normally advocated as a boost to market efficiency 
through the easing of cross-border flows and the emer-
gence of best practices. From a perspective of justice, 
linked with scepticism about the existence of ‘ideal’ stan-
dards, such considerations do not trump the variegated 
effects of financial standards on peoples’ capabilities. In 
short, financial regulation is not a case of ‘one size fits all’. 
Instead, empowerment would require meaningful political 
control and hence a set-up not unlike what Keynes had in 
mind at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. It would 
require an open debate about financial de-globalization to 
promote such control. Intriguingly, in late 2009 the Inter-
national Monetary Fund cautiously started to argue the 
case in favour of short term restrictions on capital inflows 
in emerging markets. In and of itself, this policy shift con-
stitutes but a minor crack in the intellectual edifice of neo-
liberal financial governance. But it does provide an opening 
that may yet lead to a wholesale reappraisal of the societal 
benefits of globally integrated finance and the ways in 
which it promotes or obstructs justice. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored to what degree Amartya Sen’s 
Idea of Justice can provide useful guidance for financial 
system design in general and financial regulation in par-
ticular. At the micro-level, his approach has clear potential: 
it provides a yardstick against which targeted credit provi-
sion can be evaluated. The key criterion, following Sen, is 
whether through custom-tailored credit regimes, we can 
boost people’s ability to shape their lives in line with their 
preferences without shifting the burden for such gain on 
others. Similar perspectives can be usefully applied to more 
indirect aspects of financial system functioning, for exam-
ple its effect on employment conditions. 
Sen’s thinking suggest also suggests the key constraint on 
reforming finance in this vein. The Pareto optimality that 
most economistic theories of justice put central – welfare 
gains that do not disadvantage other members of society – 
appears too restrictive. It effectively locks in existing wel-
fare levels and limits the scope for redistribution, not only 
of material welfare, but also of risk and opportunities in a 
more general sense. Once we consider extreme cases, such 
redistribution would clearly seem justified, for example 
when we contrast people living in opulence with those 
facing starvation. But a similar logic can be applied to less 
stark cases, and it holds for effects that financial systems 
have on peoples’ lives just as much as for straightforward 
material redistribution. Justice in Sen’s sense has to be 
more than just a progression of steps towards Pareto op-
timality. 
Rather, the main constraint lies in the sustainability of 
financial arrangements. Any regime aiming to enhancing 
justice should not do so at the expense of future genera-
tions’ abilities to operate a similar regime, for example 
because of excessive debts or credit-fuelled escalating asset 
prices. Justice has to be upheld also across generations. 
Sen’s approach is much less helpful as a guide for global 
regulatory reform in wholesale markets, largely because of 
the complexity of the financial system, our inability to link 
rule design directly to individual fortunes and unpredicta-
ble market behaviour. It does suggest, however, that glob-
al finance might need considerable downscaling and seg-
mentation to bring it back under a kind of political control 
under which justice-related considerations could function 
as policy yardsticks. National financial systems would need 
to be insulated against potentially volatile global capital 
flows for justice in Sen’s sense even to become possible. 
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Such de-globalization appears unlikely at this point. In-
deed, officially the whole thrust of discussion, for example 
in the G20, centres on strengthening global governance in 
order to salvage cross-border financial integration. The aim 
is not to reinstall public choice, however, but to entrench 
the exigencies of global finance even more deeply (cf. Best 
2003; Vestergaard 2009). Given the entrenched interests 
that stand to loose from a measured reinstatement of for 
example capital controls, this stance is hardly surprising. 
And there is little evidence that policymakers in charge of 
global finance spend much time poring over justice and 
how it could be enhanced through regulation. Pessimists 
would undoubtedly attribute this state of affairs to the 
presumed egotism of economic actors. But maybe we 
simply have failed to spell out clearly just what it would 
mean for regulatory reform if justice were taken seriously. 
In that case, the onus is on scholars of finance who do see 
room for normative considerations in financial governance 
to explicate and think through their own standards of 
ethical judgement. 
Daniel Mügge works as assistant professor in Interna-
tional Political Economy at the University of Amsterdam. 
He is author of Widen the Market, Narrow the Competi-
tion. Banker Interests and the Making of an EU Capital 
Market (ECPR Press 2010, winner of the 2009 Jean Blondel 
prize) and co-editor of Global Financial Integration Thirty 
Years On: From Reform to Crisis (Cambridge University 
Press 2010). 
Endnotes 
1See the interview with Turner in the August 2009 issue with 
Prospect Magazine. 
2Think, in a different context, about arguments that trying to 
increase employment through deficit spending will only spur 
inflation in the long run. 
3Consider the building of communist society. All attempts to 
create such a society have stalled way short of their ultimate goal, 
often installing authoritarian and repressive political systems along 
the way. Irrespective of one’s support for communist ideals, such 
effects of their implementation should figure in our normative 
assessment of these ideals. See von Hayek’s arguments against 
socialism in The Road to Serfdom  (von Hayek 2001 [1944]) and 
related arguments by Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies 
(Popper 2003 [1945]). 
4Here his arguments again chime with Popper, but also with 
skepticism of modernist top-down reform as articulated for ex-
ample by Scott (1998). 
5This is a particular worry in real estate markets, in which blanket 
tax rebates for mortgages, for example, arguably end up in the 
pockets of current house owners through increased real estate 
prices – an effect that is largely a consequence of limited short-
term supply of housing. 
6Think for example of calls on rating agencies to be more lenient 
towards sovereign governments in the eurozone. The effect 
would undoubtedly be a further build-up of debt, with dire con-
sequences in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial markets are meaning machines. Like no other 
contemporary social institution they lend themselves to the 
projection of hopes and fears, of illusion and catharsis, of 
the promise of absolute wealth and a whispering of ulti-
mate demise. Against this semiotic hyperproductivity which 
began sparking aesthetic, public, and scholarly discourses 
already in the 17th century, contemporary categories used 
to analyze the market for the market participants them-
selves remain surprisingly dry and uninventive. It is still 
mainly the category of expectation that is used to interpret 
market movements, inflicting great boredom on those who 
regularly watch financial news. Surprisingly as well, the 
social study of finance has so far not displayed any system-
atic interest toward the category of expectation, and has 
instead left the term to neoclassical finance and their psy-
chological critiques. 
The aim of this essay is to reclaim the notion of “expecta-
tions” for sociology as the one notion that is in elective 
affinity to the social dynamics of the financial markets. In 
other words, it will treat the predominance of the category 
of expectation in financial meaning making as indexing 
some crucial features of financial markets themselves. 
Methodologically the essay follows the research program of 
formal sociology in Georg Simmel’s sense, inferring the 
particular structures of financial sociality, not at the cost of 
an economic viewpoint on the markets, but rather as taking 
their economicity as a point of departure for a formal-
sociological analysis. 
The essay proceeds as follows. First, it will argue for the 
necessity to sociologically determine the specificity of social 
meaning in the financial markets through a formal analysis 
of the social situation in which investment takes place (2). 
Second, the price mechanism will be pinpointed as point of 
departure for such endeavor, because it is this mechanism 
that constellates actors to one another and thus structures 
the investment situation (3). Then, the essay will reference 
debates about a sociological notion of “expectation” in 
the discussion about the ontology of the social norm, with 
the aim to depict expectations as a form of sociality that is 
genuine to the financial market (4). Section (5) concludes.  
2. Formal sociology: the characterization 
of “interactions” (Wechselwirkungen) 
Simmel’s formal sociology: The case of money 
Society is not an absolute entity which must first exist so that 
all the individual relations of its members – super- und subor-
dination, cohesion, imitation, division of labour, exchange, 
common attack and defence, religions community, party for-
mations and many others – can develop within its framework 
or be represented by it: it is only the synthesis or the general 
term for the totality of these special interactions. (Simmel 
1978: 175) 
Obviously delimiting his approach from that of the positiv-
ist-functionalist sociology of Émile Durkheim, Simmel does 
not propose to explore society from the assumption that it 
is pre-given and “there” but insists that it has to be en-
acted; hence his question, “how is society possible?” (wie 
ist Gesellschaft möglich, cf. Simmel 1992 [1908], 42) The 
clue to answer ing this question resides not in assuming 
the existence of society apart from and above individuals, 
but in an analysis of ways of “sociation” (Vergesell-
schaftung, Simmel 1992 [1908]) which bring individuals 
into mutual relation and interaction with one another. The 
reconstruction of these relations is seen by Simmel as fun-
damental perspectives on sociality; and the notion of “so-
ciety” is introduced as depicting a novel perspective on the 
social, not a totality that is given the same way that nature 
is given (Simmel 1992 [1908]: 17). With respect to his 
“Philosophy of money,” the work that the present essay 
will refer to predominantly, he even regards this endeavour 
as “philosophy,” a term one would recast, with Giddens 
(1979), as “social theory” today. At the same time, 
Simmel’s analyses often provide a perspective on structures 
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and tendencies of modern societies, which is why Simmel 
forms an outlook on society – a contemporary analysis – 
that operates with the close description of social relations 
which are deemed exemplary for contemporary societies. 
Simmel’s program of formal sociology is strictly inductive, 
which explains the breadth of his empirical interests in all 
sorts of forms of sociation in contemporary society and in 
society in general – among those, economic sociation. In 
his “Philosophy of money,” the social-theoretical (“phi-
losophical”) and the contemporary-diagnostic perspective 
are intricately woven together. Simmel’s interest is mainly 
with money as a medium of exchange, the reason being 
that social relations mediated through money are highly 
significant both for a general social theory (or “philoso-
phy”) and for a social diagnosis of contemporary societies. 
While on the one hand money and the exchanges between 
individuals it makes possible are, for Simmel, paradigmati-
cally social processes because money is “entirely a social 
institution and quite meaningless if restricted to one indi-
vidual” (Simmel 1978: 162), at the same time they form 
part and parcel of modernity’s most characteristic features, 
like a high degree of individuality that coexists with an 
equally high level of interdependence between individuals. 
For Simmel, money functions as a means as such, it is the 
“purest reification of means” (Simmel 1978: 211). This is 
to say, money has the ability to bridge the gap between 
any individuals’ wants and desires and any objects that 
could satisfy them. Therefore, on the surface money seems 
to have value, as it brings into reach those objects a person 
regards as valuable; yet in actuality money merely encodes 
and represents the discontinuity between a desire and its 
fulfilment that is the actual constituent of value.  
From this it follows that money also redefines social rela-
tionships. On the one hand, it anonymizes and formalizes 
those relations. In the presence of money as a general 
medium of exchange, the person desiring an object does 
not have to create an extra motivation or persuasion for 
the person who owns that object to sell it since money, 
being an ultimate means to any end, is equipped with an 
inherent motivation to be accepted in exchange for any 
object. On the other hand, money creates tight and virtu-
ally all-encompassing interdependences between individu-
als since it can be accepted from any person regardless of 
her origin, gender, age, education, and affiliation. Thus, 
exchanges – relations – between any persons become 
possible. In Simmel’s analysis, money-governed exchange 
regimes make emerge a form of sociality that privileges 
anonymous interrelations between individuals and at the 
same time highly individualized life-styles which can disre-
spect others’ sanctions thanks to the self-motivating func-
tion of money exchange; precisely the nonchalant inatten-
tiveness to one another that Simmel observed in contem-
porary societies and in particular in the “economic jungle 
of modern urban life” (Simmel 1978: 199). 
The sociality of the price 
The one thing that materializes society between any two 
individuals who agree upon mutual exchange is money. 
While the desires for objects which equip those objects 
with value remain personal and insofar have no sociologi-
cal resonance, money, represented by the price, bridges 
the gap between subject and object through a representa-
tion that involves other exchanges, and thus society 
(Simmel 1989: 213). Therefore, the price is for Simmel the 
ultimate sociological fact. At the same time, the price – 
and here we start moving beyond Simmel – is that cate-
gory which distinguishes financial markets from all other 
markets. While this will be explained in more detail in the 
next section, I will first interpret Simmel’s take on the price 
a bit more thoroughly. 
For Simmel, according to my interpretation, the price has a 
dual quality. On the one hand, it is a localized manifesta-
tion of the property of money as a generalized medium of 
exchange, making possible an ultimate convertibility of all 
values, that is, of all individual desires (Simmel 1989: 124). 
This thought has not only been taken up in economic soci-
ology later (e.g., in Parsons/Smelser 1956) but was already 
prefigured in Marx’s famous analysis of money as the ulti-
mate means which “objectifies” social relations. On the 
other hand, though, in Simmel the price also figures as a 
factor in the self-fashioning of individuals and their desires: 
as the price renders desires convertible across individuals, it 
does so across life courses as well. In Simmel’s terms, the 
“sequence of purposes” (Zweckreihen, Simmel 1989: 204) 
between ends and means become prolonged, if not pro-
tracted; the desire for a certain object is remediated as a 
desire for money which, in turn, casts the different desires 
as comparable to each other with respect to their “price.” 
According to Simmel, this leads to an intellectualization of 
life, as one’s own biography becomes rearticulated and 
rationalized in terms of convertibility between desires 
(Simmel 1989, 591-616). Here, however, Simmel risks 
collapsing his analysis into a cultural criticism of contempo-
rary, i.e. fin-de-siècle society, for which an idiom of indi-
vidualism, self-objectivization, and intellectualism was all 
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too common. The “philosophical” problems he raised with 
respect to the money medium, though, may be developed 
further, embracing the price not only as a medium of ex-
change but as an object of value itself, that is, as a desire. 
This brings us directly to the financial markets. For it is here 
that the price takes on the quality of money itself, that is, 
of being desired. Many observers have argued that in the 
financial markets, money is turned upon itself, not longer 
remaining a medium but also becoming a commodity itself 
(Marx 1962; Weber 1988 [1894]; Parsons/Smelser 1956). 
Simmel himself had argued, as mentioned earlier, that 
money has the ability to replace the desired objects due to 
its potential to bring any object into reach. The point to be 
made with respect to financial markets is that not only 
money as a general means but the price as a concrete 
object can become the focus of desire. In this sense, the 
price replaces money which in turn replaces desires or 
rather, becomes the ultimate desire. It is through this ar-
gument that Simmel’s analysis, which ultimately led him to 
a cultural criticism of society and away from a formal per-
spective, can be taken to a fresh start: the price as an ob-
ject of desire is the point of departure for a formal sociol-
ogy of the financial markets, which has to begin with an 
analysis of the nature of the price in financial markets as 
opposed to the rest of the economy. 
The argument to be made in the remainder of this essay is 
thus that the fundamental characteristic of the financial 
markets – namely, to be markets on which prices are traded 
– results in a type of sociation not imagined by Simmel but 
analyzable in the framework of his heuristic, that is, as a 
formal description of the ways individuals relate to one an-
other in the presence of the financial market price. 
3. The price mechanism as the core 
characteristic of financial markets 
Financial market prices as products 
Financial markets differ from markets in the production-
based economy in several crucial aspects, which have been 
points of debate among sociologist. In particular, there has 
been a discussion ongoing about whether an economic-
sociological perspective should highlight the social em-
beddedness of financial markets like, for instance, through 
bank organization, social networks, and the social and 
cultural construction of prices (Abolafia 1996, 1998; Sas-
sen 1991, 2005; MacKenzie 2005; Power 2005, 2005a; 
Clark/Thrift 2005); or whether the emphasis should be put 
on the detachment of financial markets from the produc-
tion-based economy and therefore highlight its uniqueness 
(Baudrillard 1992; Albert et al. 1999; Baecker 1988; Cas-
tells 1996; Lee/LiPuma 2002; Knorr Cetina 2007). This 
debate, however, misses out on a couple of crucial points. 
First, it does not take into account that financial markets 
can detach themselves from their production-based con-
texts by virtue of certain features of their social, political, 
and technological embeddedness, as for instance in global 
cities, an argument which subverts the confrontation of 
embeddedness and detachment  (cf. Langenohl 2008). 
Second, the embeddedness thesis tends to lose sight of the 
economic dimension of the financial economy, treating the 
economy a field, system, or part of society to be wrested 
away from economics, with the consequence that the 
peculiar economic quality of the markets gets effaced. 
Third, a similar fallacy characterizes the detachment thesis, 
as its proponents often point out the genuine social – or 
“postsocial” – uniqueness of market interactions as avant-
garde modes of interaction or signification (Knorr Cet-
ina/Bruegger 2002), thereby also forgetting about – some-
times even openly denying (Baudrillard 1992) – the eco-
nomic effects of markets. 
There is thus some reason to assume that the contradis-
tinction between embedded and detached markets, which 
is often accompanied by a second opposition between 
production-basis and the absence of such basis, leads 
astray. At the very least, it leaves no space for an explora-
tion of the argument that the financial markets are more 
production-based than any market of the production-
based economy. Yet it is obvious that the values of the 
products traded on the financial markets depend in a 
much more existential way on their means of production 
than non-financial products. When a cornfield is devas-
tated, an industrial production plant is closed, a company 
goes bankrupt, or a famous painter dies, their products still 
may retain and often even gain in monetary value. In the 
case of these “material” products, that is, the value devel-
opment is in principle independent of the means of pro-
duction. However, this does not at all apply to financial 
market products. An option, a future, or a swap gain their 
value from their ability to be traded on the financial mar-
kets. When trade into these products stops, they slip into 
inexistence and their value cannot be fixed. In other words, 
the production sites of financial products are financial 
markets. 
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This is so because financial products are prices. One buys 
the right or sells the obligation to execute a certain price in 
a given product (which may be or may not itself be a fi-
nancial product). Financial products are thus comparable to 
money in that their use value is identical with their ex-
change value. However, given the specificity of financial 
markets that they are essentially future-oriented markets, 
the use/exchange value of a financial product depends not 
only on a synchronous comparison with alternative (finan-
cial) products but also on a diachronic comparison be-
tween bid and put prices of that product (or vice versa). 
The present price of a financial product thus varies in rela-
tion (a) to the price it will have achieved in the future (usu-
ally at a given date of expiration) and (b) relative to the 
price gains of alternative products. For instance, an option 
about a certain deal which is expected to achieve a higher 
rise in price than another deal traded through another 
option at a given point in time in the future will rise in 
value relative to the second option. Yet the time factor 
introduces an irreducible risk in this operation, to which 
portfolio theory has significantly responded by pointing out 
the necessity to reduce the time span of investments in 
order to minimize investment risks (cf. Markowitz 1952, 
1991; Lee/LiPuma 2004: 142-147). 
The futurity of financial markets, if connected to Simmel’s 
arguments that the value of a given object is a function of 
it being desired, and that this value becomes socially objec-
tivized through a generalized exchange medium generat-
ing a price, has two fundamental corollaries. It must first 
be guaranteed that a price will have been formed in the 
future, as this is the precondition for it being desirable in a 
future-oriented investment situation. Second, it must be 
possible to trade the product at any given time if the rela-
tionality between present price, future price and price of an 
alternative product – that is, in Simmel’s terms, the objective 
value of the price as the articulation of its desirability – 
changes. The consequence is that price formation for finan-
cial products must be operative at any given moment. 
To buy or sell a financial product means to buy or sell a 
price; but neither the price that is traded nor the price for 
which it is traded have any existence independent from the 
way they are produced, namely through price formation. 
Financial markets are exchanges and means of production at 
the same time and for the same entities: prices. If trade 
stops, the traded products/prices cease to exist as objectiv-
ized desirabilities. Products that can’t be traded dematerial-
ize, morph into economic virtuality, and take on a spectral 
existence, like the “toxic” papers lying in the now proverbial 
basements of banks for which at present there is no market. 
This line of argument displaces the discussion between the 
embeddedness and the detachment theses in the social 
study of finance and political economy. The alleged mate-
riality of the “real” economy and the detachment of the 
financial economy from the former is not the crucial issue 
here. First, value is not bound to materiality; Simmel, as 
mentioned, points out that value is nothing but the dis-
tance between a subject and a desired object, irrespective 
of the ontology of that object. Second, not only “material” 
products and the material production have material conse-
quences. Instead the point of concern and analysis are the 
ways in which ascribed value is maintained or modified, 
and how those ways refer to the means of production. 
The mathematicity of price formation as means of 
production 
Due to the requirement that price formation must take 
place at any given moment that the sociality of financial 
market products imposes, a type of price formation is 
needed that calculates on the basis of a supply-demand 
computation only. Historically as well as systematically it 
has been argued that financial markets tilt toward giving 
the circulation of products priority to channelling them 
from produces to consumer (Sombart 1955, vol. 1, 200-
202; Knorr Cetina 2007). In economic-functional terms this 
has been explained with the double role of speculation to 
form markets and keep them liquid as well as levelling out 
contingent differences between prices (Sombart 1919, vol. 
2, 663), a point hat has been taken up by arbitrage theory 
(Beunza/Hardie/MacKenzie 2006). If the priority is thus 
circulation, this requires a redistribution mechanism that 
self-organizes. This is exactly what the mathematical price 
mechanism does. 
With respect to the present argumentation, the mathe-
maticity of the price “mechanism” – rightly termed so by 
economists – guarantees the continuation of trade, and 
thus the continuity of the financial products’ value (desir-
ability). If financial markets were (on a regular basis) sub-
ject to contingent non-market intervention comparable to 
that of the non-financial economy, continuous price for-
mation would not be possible because the interventions 
would mark defining points without providing a continu-
ous sense of the value of the traded products. Financial 
products would, as it were, exist as tradable and thus valu-
able (desirable) entities only at the moment of intervention, 
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because only at these moments there would be a price. 
Simmel, throughout his work highlighting the mutual defi-
nition of money and commodity, remarks that money 
achieves “actuality” only at the moment it is used for pur-
chase, while a commodity “exists” only as it is sold: “Just 
as money is real money only at the moment when it buys 
something, i.e. when it exercises the function of money, so 
the commodity becomes a commodity only when it is sold; 
until that time, it is only a possible object for sale, an ideal 
anticipation.” (Simmel 1978: 138) Financial products, how-
ever, being money, commodity and price at the same time, 
have not only no use value apart from their exchange value 
but also no exchange value apart from their use value to be 
exchanged, and are thus threatened with complete annihila-
tion as carriers of use and exchange value when trade stops. 
In parentheses, this points to an additional differentiation 
in regard to the materiality or virtuality of financial prod-
ucts. They are not by themselves material or virtual, but 
oscillate within a continuum between materiality (when 
price formation is ongoing) and virtuality (when price for-
mation is suspended and prices cannot be fixed). The 
uniqueness of the mathematical price mechanism is that it 
produces representations of prices – with prices having no 
existence outside such representations – on a continuous 
basis, lending financial products the maximum of material-
ity they can have. Financial products escape the discussion 
about their ontology, as the latter depends exclusively on 
the actuality of the price mechanism. 
This astonishing mechanism of mathematical price forma-
tion, though, comes at a cost. It was Jürgen Habermas 
(1995 [1981]) who most systematically pointed to the 
inability of the market as a “systemic” mechanism to pro-
vide explanations and interpretations for what is going on 
in it. This goes back to his differentiation between two 
modes of social coordination and orientation: instrumental 
action, in which actors are interested solely in the effects 
of others’ actions; and communicative action, in which 
actors seek to achieve agreement about a certain claim or 
judgment and thus have to take into account the possible 
motivations that others might have for their actions and 
judgments. This distinction, Habermas continues, is not 
only an analytical differentiation but lies at the heart of the 
societal macro-structure of western modernity. As instru-
mental action becomes more and more institutionalized in 
social mechanisms like the administration or the market, 
the immediate experiential universe of actors, their “life-
world,” becomes liberated from those instrumental obsta-
cles to communicative action, and thus communicatively 
rationalizable. Although financial markets have not caught 
the particular attention of Habermas, they can be said to 
embody systemic mechanisms of instrumental action in an 
almost ideal-typical way: through the price mechanism, 
economic actors see only the consequences of others’ 
actions, cumulated in the prices, while the possible motiva-
tions behind those cumulated effects are effaced. 
It is exactly at this point that a Simmelean approach can be 
applied. Following my extrapolation of Habermas, the 
financial investment situation is such that actors have to 
make decisions on the basis of orientations which reflect 
only effects, but not motives, of others’ actions. This can 
be said to be a fairly unique type of sociation of individu-
als, that is, a form of sociality. As such it implies the objec-
tification and institutionalization of subjective value into a 
generalized mode of meaning whose features shall be 
analysed in the next section. 
4. Financial sociation: The category of 
the “expectation” 
Expectations in financial discourse 
Contrary to Habermas, who insists that systemic action can 
discard the motivations of others, the production of mean-
ing at financial market does involve representations of 
others’ motives all the time, be it in public debate and 
media reports, in professional circles in which novel ana-
lytical models like “sentiment analysis” are imported from 
behavioural finance, or in other arenas.1 For the purpose 
of the present essay, which is concerned with a formal 
sociological modelling of the financial investment situation, 
the empirical question of how market participants make 
sense of their actions can be recast as a formal analysis of 
the ways in which they relate to each other in the financial 
markets and in the presence of the mathematical price 
mechanism. Simmel points out that money, which he holds 
to be a “category of reified social functions” (Simmel 
1978: 209), is a structuring moment in sociation in that it 
connects as well as disconnects individuals. While on the 
one hand it puts a distance of nonchalant inattentiveness 
between them, it also interconnects virtually all individuals 
through networks of economic exchange. As regards the 
first point, a very similar argument has been circulating at 
least since the 19th century with respect to the financial 
markets, especially the stock exchanges. For instance, 
Werner Sombart (1928, 1077-1079) identified the great 
European stock exchanges as places where a certain drive 
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toward more abstract, objectified (versachlichte) and ra-
tionalized interpersonal relations in modern societies in 
general originated. With respect to the second point of 
Simmel’s argument, the 19th century has as well witnessed 
judgments which located the rise of the stock market 
within a new type of sociality. However, these interpreta-
tions of the rising importance of the stock exchange and 
the financial markets in general do not explain the ways 
actors refer and relate to each other. In regard to this 
question, what is more important than the above men-
tioned social diagnoses of the fin-de-siècle contemporaries 
are recurring remarks about expectations as a basic mode 
of interpretation in financial markets as already mentioned 
in the introduction. It is to this literature that I turn next. 
Apart from media representations where the category of the 
“expectation” is a very ubiquitously used explanatory device, 
expectations figure in at least two academic contexts. 
 First, there is work in neoclassical finance, which has 
been trying to apply the general theory of rational expecta-
tions in macro-economics (cf. Kirchgässner 2008: 84-5) to 
a modelling of financial markets. Very briefly put, the term 
“expectation” figures as a key device in these models, as it 
allows conceiving of financial markets as information-
efficient markets, given the presence of actors who con-
duct their trades according to expectations which have 
been formed on the basis of information available to all. 
The market – that is, the prices – can be modelled as re-
flecting all available information; which is to say, it does 
not develop any dynamics of its own as long as expecta-
tions are rational (cf. Fama 1970; Fama/Miller 1972). 
 At this point behavioural finance intervenes, arguing 
that concrete actors’ expectations are everything but ra-
tional. Focusing on herd behaviour, the psychology of 
booms, busts and bubbles, and the “bounded rationality” 
of human beings in general, this research concludes that 
financial markets do develop a life of their own, as actors 
have irrational expectations or interpret others’ expecta-
tions in an irrational way (cf. most prominently Shleifer 
2000, Shiller 2001). 
 From this, sociological and political-economic research 
has concluded that financial markets display a high degree 
of reflexivity of expectations; which is to say, the markets 
do not reflect anything outside the expectations and ex-
pected expectations that govern actors’ tactics and strate-
gies (s. Beunza/Stark 2010). 
It is not unfair to say that this sociological syntheses come 
rather late, given the proximity of the notion of the expec-
tation to sociological endeavors. Also, the sociology and 
political economy of the financial markets has so far re-
mained within an ultimately psychological notion of expecta-
tion, and thus has not that much to add to the findings of 
behavioural finance. The challenge thus is to re-appropriate 
the notion of expectation for a sociological analysis. 
A formal-sociological definition of expectation 
A brief excursus into a debate in German-speaking sociol-
ogy of the 1950s and 1960s will serve to move beyond the 
stage of the debate, introducing a sociological notion of 
expectation into the social study of finance. In 1958, Ralf 
Dahrendorf published his influential “Homo sociologicus,” 
a monograph which established the notion of the social 
role, and with it the notion of the expectation, as a key 
category of sociology and social theory. According to 
Dahrendorf, human beings in modern societies are con-
fronted with the “annoying fact of society” (ärgerliche 
Tatsache der Gesellschaft, Dahrendorf 1965, 21), that is, 
with norms and underlying expectations which address 
persons not as persons but as role carriers. While human 
beings have their very unique characteristics, what makes 
them social beings is exactly the presence of norms and 
expectations not addressing persons but action patterns. 
Against this notion of the norm Heinrich Popitz (1967), 
who was to become one of the representatives of German-
speaking sociology in the 1970s, contended in his habilita-
tion lecture published as “Der Begriff der sozialen Rolle als 
Element der soziologischen Theorie” that Dahrendorf had 
conflated sociological with social abstractions, and thus 
had effectively followed a psychological notion of expecta-
tion as opposed to a sociological one. Popitz argued that 
the existence of expectations and norms cannot be socio-
logically deduced from the observation of norm-obedient 
behavior, as such behaviour may have other motivations. 
Norm- and expectation-obedient behaviour may be the 
result of an individual’s desire to respond to a given expec-
tation, but it may as well be the outcome of traditional or 
habitual behaviour not subjectively directed toward others’ 
expectations. 
For Popitz the most important conclusion was that norms 
are stabilized not by actual obedience to norms and expec-
tations but by any behavior that may be socially interpreted 
as being obedient to norms and expectations. For the pre-
sent essay the most interesting point following from this is 
that expectations are not mental states but social devices 
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of interpretation and ascription. Popitz’s critique of 
Dahrendorf may be compared to the way Harold Garfinkel 
(1967) criticized the Parsonsian theoretical model for putting 
too much emphasis on the socialization function, arguing 
that social norms have no existence outside of the situations 
in which they are perceived as functioning. From a sociologi-
cal perspective radicalized in formal terms, norms and expec-
tations are first of all interpretive frames that structure situa-
tions and the ascriptions taking place in them. 
Expectations as meaning devices in financial markets 
This returns us to the financial markets. In the light of the 
recasting of expectations as ascriptions, the question is not 
why financial markets are governed by expectations, but 
instead why market observers prefer to see expectations in 
these markets and to ascribe them to other market partici-
pants. The non-triviality of this question becomes especially 
evident from the fact that alternatives to the ascriptive 
mode of expectation exist. For instance, one could ascribe 
the moving rates at the stock exchange to traditional or 
habitual or simply irrational behavior. While this sometimes 
does take place (especially in behavioral finance), the cate-
gory of the expectation, as a rule, is added to such inter-
pretations in explanations like, “There’s a high level of 
volatility because investors are nervous and do not know 
what to expect,” or, “Fear triggered by xyz reigned the 
stock exchange today, with people expecting the worst,” 
etc. Why is it that the category of expectation is so often 
used in the production of meaning in financial markets?  
I argue that expectations as a meaning category stand in 
an elective affinity to certain crucial features of the finan-
cial investment situation, and can thus be regarded a so-
ciological-formal quality of the financial markets as a 
unique site of sociation. This can be demonstrated through 
confronting expectations as mode of social meaning and 
ascription with other such modes: 
 First, an index of futurity is characteristic of expectations. 
Unlike memories, habits and traditions, expectations refer to 
the future respective to a given point in time. More specifi-
cally, they refer to something which will, or will not, have 
happened. Expectations are thus protentions in the sense of 
Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz, that is, their structure of 
anticipation is that of the grammatical futurum perfectum. 
Therefore, the interpretation that something happens ac-
cording to expectations introduces an accomplished future 
state as defining reference point of interpretation. 
 Second, expectations are concrete and specific. They 
anticipate a guess regarding clearly definable events or 
states in the future. Their specificity distinguishes them 
from presentiments or suspicions, their concreteness from 
typifications or interpretative frames. Interpretations that 
rely on the category of expectation thus screen the (possi-
ble) futures for concrete and specific events that might (or 
not) happen. 
 Third, expectations not only orient action but call for 
decisions. Contrary to the proverbial “hopes and fears,” 
which like expectations are directed toward the future and 
may be concrete and specific, the meaning structure of an 
expectation does not permit inactivity. Expectations neces-
sitate decisions and actions. Framed as an expectation, 
even inaction refers back to a decision, namely, the deci-
sion to expect the actualization of a clearly defined mo-
ment, and not just – as with hopes and fears – unspecified 
waiting. Interpreting situations in terms of expectations, 
thus, refers to a moment in which a decision to (not) act is 
interpreted as being or having been taken. 
 Fourth, expectations conceptually presuppose expecta-
tions of expectations (Erwartungserwartungen). In social 
settings governed by the logic of expectations, expecta-
tions irrevocably have to refer to other actors’ expectations 
prior to the formation of one’s own expectations, as it is 
the actions of others that have to be taken into account 
for considering one’s own actions. This point is most cru-
cial in regard to financial markets, as in such markets it is 
only the consequences of others’ actions that become 
visible to actors. Whereas in face-to-face interactions 
memories, habitualities, hopes, fears, and other modes of 
meaning can in principle be articulated without necessarily 
leading to future-oriented decisions and actions, in the 
financial markets it is only the consequences of such deci-
sions and actions that are in cognitive reach of actors. In 
other words, whatever takes place in the financial markets 
can meaningfully be referred back only to the attribution 
of expectations, because it is only expectations that can be 
expected to invariably lead to action. 
To sum up: the empirical, interpretative heuristic of the 
expectation fits the problematic of financial markets to 
anticipate future actions of others while only the conse-
quences of their past actions are visible. The point is not 
that market actors are psychologically restrained to expec-
tations, but that they have only one conceptual-cognitive 
frame at their disposal that allows linking the observed 
consequences of others’ actions (prices) with their possible 
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motivations: expectations. The specific infrastructure of 
financial markets – a purely mathematical economicity in 
the absence of communicative interaction between the 
participants – results in a situation in which only the effects 
of other’s actions are unambiguously visible. It is impossi-
ble for market actors to reconstruct from these visible 
effects typifications, presentiments, hopes, fears, etc. of 
the other participants, because those modes of meaning 
do not result in an imperative to decide and to act. In other 
words, they cannot be assumed to be reflected by the 
trades made. Market actors have no cognitive choice but 
to reduce the other market participants to carriers of ex-
pectations, inferring their (expectations of) expectations, 
for only (expectations of) expectations can be expected to 
leave traces in the market. 
Thus, the specific form of sociation at the financial market 
renders itself as a peculiar mode of ascription, as a social 
abstraction governing the processes of meaningful interac-
tion market participants. Ironically, this mode is none other 
than that of sociological (wo)man, that is, a modelling of 
actorhood and social meaning strictly oriented toward the 
category of expectation. Market participants cannot make 
sense of one another but as homines sociologici, i.e. as 
actors whose actions leave traces of their expectations in 
the market. Like economic value is objectivized and institu-
tionalized through the medium of the money, in future-
oriented financial markets meaning is objectivized and 
institutionalized as expectation. This, I contend, is the for-
mally, and genuinely, financial type of sociation. 
5. Summary: Expectations and the Social 
Study of Finance 
The social study of finance is gaining ground, pinpointing 
the social in the markets. The present essay is intended to 
contribute to this endeavour. Yet it follows a different 
direction than the greater share of the social study of fi-
nance, which circumscribes a sociological approach 
through playing out the social constituency of markets 
against their economic effects. The alternative strategy is to 
depict the sociological meaning of the markets in their 
specifically and genuinely economic constituency; in the 
case of the financial markets, in mathematical price forma-
tion as means of production for financial products. The 
social in the markets is thus not theorized as the social 
construction of the economic, but as the social forms of 
meaning which are of a specifically financial-economic 
nature, and which can be subjected to a sociological char-
acterization. To this aim, Simmel’s approach of a formal 
sociology was used in order to demonstrate that the genu-
inely financial mode of meaning is a sociologization of 
interactions, that is, the channelling of meaning through 
the heuristic of expectation. This formal element corre-
sponds to the economic mode of operation of financial 
markets, which is mathematical price formation. The re-
duction of the virtual multiplicity of social meaning to the 
form of expectation, being a correlate to the mode of 
operation of financial markets as means of productions, 
turns market participants into empirical sociologists who 
decipher expectations, and nothing but expectations, in 
the traces of the effects of others’ actions. 
Coda: The crisis 
It is doubtful whether the theorization suggested in this 
essay is of any immediate use in the current, financially trig-
gered, economic crisis. Arguably it will not help advance the 
discussion about concrete projects of regulation. Still it may 
be referenced to widen the focus of that discussion. 
Some advances in the political and juridical regulation of 
financial markets seem to aim at forcing more accountabil-
ity on major financial market actors like investment banks, 
demanding an increase in capital stocks as counterweight 
to their financial ventures. Inasmuch, though, as regulation 
strategies follow the idea of keeping the price mechanism 
pure and to “price in” all risks, they attribute the crisis to 
market failure, effectively following a neo-liberal approach 
that sanctifies the market mechanism and expectations as 
major mode of financial sociation. This may enhance the 
productivity of financial markets as means of production 
for financial products, i.e. prices, as the present recovery at 
the financial markets seems to indicate. Yet it will fail in 
times of crisis in which the expectation mode of sociality 
invariably compounds the crisis. 
It seems plausible that any attempt at “regulation” will 
have to contemplate whether it aims at the prevention of 
crises or at the improvement of instruments to tackle cri-
ses. However, against the background of the theorization 
proposed in this essay, I do not think that financial markets 
can be prevented from failing and causing crises, or made 
capable of developing mechanisms of self-repair, as long 
as their mode of meaning is predominantly expectations. 
They will be exposed to “psychological” roller-coaster rides 
and major breakdowns as long as their sociological infra-
structure allows it, that is, as long as ascriptions of expec-
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tations dominate the production of meaning in financial 
markets while the possibility to negotiate those ascriptions 
between market participants is absent. Actually the impor-
tance of expectations, and especially of their reflexive re-
doubling as expectations of expectations, seems to have 
increased, as traders report on accelerated market dynam-
ics resulting from the acceleration in which market partici-
pants anticipate of others’ anticipations (cf. Langenohl 
2008: 20-23). As mathematical pricing models increasingly 
include (expectations of) expectations in markets, like for 
instance with sentiment analysis, the increasing automati-
zation of financial operations, feeding the category of 
expectations directly into trading machines, is bound to 
further compound the situation. 
The discussion thus might turn to possibilities of limiting 
the reach of market participants’ attributions of expecta-
tions and their absolute convertibility as heuristics in times 
of crisis, encouraging them to embrace alternative attribu-
tions, heuristics, and modes of sociality. What these alter-
natives would be (“ambiguity” might be a good candidate, 
yet will be hard to feed into automatic trading systems), 
and how they might be institutionally fostered (sociology 
since Max Weber has put some hope in professional ethics, 
which, though, is hard to maintain these days), remains to 
be discussed; yet a glimpse into the prehistory of the fi-
nancial markets as we know them might be worthwhile. 
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Endotes 
1A theory that would explain the necessity of representations of 
others’ motivations and their normative context in the financial 
markets would probably have to go through Talcott Parsons, who 
attributed some significance to the cognitive functions of norms 
and expectations of others in social situations (s. Langenohl 2010). 
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Abstract 
Developments over the course of 2009 and early 2010 have 
demonstrated that industrialized nations are not immune to 
credit crises that can threaten their solvency. Dislocations in 
sovereign credit markets could have triggered a default of 
countries like Greece, Spain, Italy or Portugal if it had not been 
for the action by other eurozone members. While it seems 
obvious that high leverage (that is, the degree to which states 
rely on credit2) to fund their activities has been at the root of 
the problems, the Greek case suggests that fundamentals alone 
cannot explain the timing and the dynamic of recent develop-
ments. To understand what caused the evaporation of trust vis-
à-vis Greek sovereign debt titles, one has to analyze what 
determined the perception of bond investors. The paper argues 
that the media contributed to the downward spiral in the level of 
confidence by investors through its intensified and overly value-
laden coverage of the Greek case. To explain what fosters media 
bias and how it translates into bond markets dynamics the paper 
looks at institutional features of the media business and the 
functional relationship between media organizations and finan-
cial markets. The role of the media has been subject to much 
scholarly scrutiny, but has thus far not been in the realm of sove-
reign credit. This paper aims to fill this gap and, by doing so, tries 
to shed light on the recent credit crisis of the state. 
1. Introduction 
During the global financial crisis that began after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 
2008 and the economic recession that followed, fiscal 
positions deteriorated sharply. As a result of cyclical ef-
fects and large rescue packages aimed at supporting the 
banking systems and at stimulating the economies, 
budget deficits and government debt-to-GDP ratios in 
most countries in Europe and in the United States 
soared3, raising questions about the sustainability of pub-
lic finances. The financial crisis has, thus, turned into a 
credit crisis of the state as several sovereigns have been hit 
by a loss of confidence of investors. From a purely eco-
nomic perspective, this loss of trust should be a direct 
function of fundamental factors, in particular those con-
cerning the financial strength of a debtor, such as actual 
and forecast public debt ratios, public deficit estimates, 
projected growth rates, and unemployment data. This 
being said, the case of Greece is somewhat striking and 
raises questions about other, non-fundamental reasons 
behind the perception of credit risk. By looking at 
Greece’s situation over time and in comparison to other 
countries, it appears as if fundamental indicators do not 
tell the whole story. 
In a notification to the EU Commission on 21 October 
2009, the newly-elected Greek government announced 
a revision of the public deficit ratio for 2008 from 5 
percent to 7.7 percent of GDP. At the same time they 
projected that the deficit for the year 2009 would reach 
12.5 instead of 3.7 percent of GDP – the number that 
had been forecast in spring 2009. The graph below 
shows that despite the massive revisions of Greece's 
fundamentals the reaction of bond investors in the im-
mediate period following the announcement was rather 
subdued. The assessment of Greece's capacity and will-
ingness to repay its debt did not change. The risk pre-
mium for Greek debt (measured as the yield spread 
asked by investors to buy a Greek bond instead of a 
German bond) stayed flat. This is striking because ac-
cording to economic theory of market efficiency, new 
information should be priced in shortly after disclosure. 
Given the bad nature of the announcement, one would 
expect the curve to rise reflecting a higher perception of 
credit risk. However, this was not the case. This leaves 
room for two possible explanations. Either, the dire state 
of Greece's public finance was anticipated by investors 
all along and was already factored in. Or, the news was 
unexpected but did not alter the perception of risk by 
bond investors. 
See appendix, graph 1 
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Investors’ perception of risk associated with Greek sov-
ereign bonds changed only with a time lag of several 
weeks and even then only gradually. After 12 November 
2009, the risk premium for Greek bonds started to rise 
as investors began to view the credit risk associated with 
Greek debt higher than the credit risk of other eurozone 
countries also facing severe fiscal problems. In December 
and January 2010, the Greek yield spread continued its 
steady upward movement. The creeping loss of trust 
mirrored in the higher yield spread on secondary markets 
translated into rising funding costs for Greece slowly 
impairing the refinancing capacity of the sovereign. The 
perception of credit risk vis-à-vis Greece degraded 
sharply in the second quarter of 2010. Over the course 
of April and May 2010 risk premiums for Greek debt 
exploded to just below 1000 basis points despite the 
announcement of a rescue package for Greece by the 
IMF and EU member states and the successful issuance 
of several billions of money market paper. Only the an-
nouncement of the creation of a European Financial 
Stability Facility amounting to 1750 billion could calm 
down investors fears.  
The dynamic of the Greek credit crisis that manifests 
itself in the development of the yield spread brings up a 
number of questions. If the parlous state of Greece’s 
finances and the country’s weak accounting practices 
had been a well-known problem ever since the country 
joined the eurozone, why did the perception of credit 
risk remain so low over all these years and changed 
dramatically only over recent quarters?4 Why did inves-
tors start to assess the credit risk associated with a Greek 
bond increasingly higher than the credit risk of other 
eurozone countries also facing severe fiscal problems?5 
Why did the trust in Greece’s creditworthiness evaporate 
with a time lag of several weeks after the initial an-
nouncement in October and even then only gradually, 
before fading away sharply, even though no equally 
significant changes to the fiscal and economic funda-
mentals were reported afterwards? And above all, why 
did the risk perception evaporate so sharply after the 
announcements of details regarding Greece's fiscal aus-
terity regime and the support package by EU member 
states and the IMF?  
While a comparison of the fundamental situation may 
yield some explanation for the cross-country differences 
the dynamic over time seems somewhat more puzzling. 
The deterioration of Greece's funding conditions over 
time occurred against the background several consecu-
tive credit rating downgrades.6 Although no significant 
further changes to Greece's fundamental outlook were 
reported after the October announcement, all three 
major rating agencies changed their assessment of 
Greece’s creditworthiness more than once between 
December 2009 and April 2010.7 On 27 April 2010, 
Greece was downgraded to below investment-grade by 
Standard & Poor’s, fueling speculation about the coun-
try’s default. While the rating downgrades may be seen 
as triggers for a rise in perceived credit risk, remarks by 
the rating agencies suggest that the series of consecutive 
changes were themselves driven by developments in the 
market for government bonds. This leads back to the 
question: What drove the downward spiral in the level of 
confidence vis-à-vis Greece that moved the market and 
almost led to the country’s insolvency? 
As neither fundamentals nor rating changes can satisfac-
torily explain the exceptional dynamic of the loss of trust 
between October 2009 and June 2010, what other driv-
ers can be made accountable? Jones (2010) argues that 
the Greek crisis was worsened by the hesitant behavior 
of European heads of states. This paper offers a different 
explanation. I argue that it was the way media reported 
about the events that exacerbated the evaporation of 
trust in the country’s creditworthiness and consequently 
magnified the financial difficulties of Greece. To under-
stand the potential impact of the media one has to recall 
the very basic principle of credit: The extension of credit 
in an economic sense is inseparable from the cognitive 
credit that a borrower enjoys. A sovereign, who issues 
public debt to finance expenditures by raising money on 
the capital market, needs investors who trust that he will 
be capable and willing to repay the debt at the end of 
maturity. If this trust is fading, investors will ask a higher 
risk premium making it more expensive for the sovereign 
to fund its activities. If trust keeps fading further, even-
tually investors will stop buying the bonds forcing the 
sovereign into default. That means if a critical mass of 
investors starts believing that a government’s liquidity is 
impaired this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Given the uncertainty over the capacity and willingness 
to repay the debt, the assessment is nothing but a per-
sonal opinion of each individual investor. Opinions of 
individuals, however, do not develop sui generis in a 
social vacuum, as Ambirajan (2000: 2144) argues, but 
are instead shaped by the stated and implied views of 
others. In financial markets, the opinion of market par-
ticipants with regards to public debt as well as other 
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asset classes is formed by the information transmitted 
through various news channels. Being a powerful exter-
nal source of opinion, the media can be a driver of sov-
ereign credit crisis, if its content affects the assessment 
of investors and consequently their investment decisions.  
The political relevance of the Greek crisis is indisputable. 
The credit crisis that started as a financial-market phe-
nomenon has a deep impact on the lives of Greek citi-
zens. As a result of austerity measures implemented by 
the Greek government to reassure financial markets, 
large parts of the Greek population are suffering job 
losses, salary cuts, tax increases and pension reductions. 
At the same time, if it had not been for the action by EU 
members and the IMF, the market movements could 
have triggered a sovereign default of Greece and, as a 
potential consequence, also defaults of countries like 
Spain, Ireland or Portugal. Although the focus of this 
paper is on the role of the media with respect to the 
building up of credit crises, it also raises questions about 
the role of the media in the political process with regards 
to the fiscal policy of eurozone countries. 
To understand the role of the media in credit crisis of the 
state one has to address two different sets of questions: 
First, how do the media contribute to the evaporation of 
trust? This turns the focus to potential media bias that 
may manifest itself in the intensity of media coverage, 
the selection of sources, and the choice of words, the 
limiting of the debate, omissions, or the framing of 
news. The second set of questions refers to the 'why'. 
Why is media biased? The rest of the paper is divided 
into four sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
related literature the analysis draws on. Section 3 sets 
out what fosters media bias by looking at the institu-
tional features of media organizations and the functional 
relationship between the media and the financial mar-
ket. The arguments provided here also help to under-
stand the feedback loop between the media and market 
movements. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on 
media bias in the Greek credit crisis. In the last section I 
re-cap the main points and briefly comment on the pol-
icy implications. 
2. Related Literature 
The arguments presented in the paper draw on a broad 
range of literature. Important analytical aspects concern-
ing the media are derived from existing research within 
various fields of social sciences, where the power of 
news organizations is a central issue.  
The media has been a central issue of communication 
scientists for many years. Some studies look at the fac-
tors that shape news content. Most studies, however, 
have been dedicated to establishing a link between news 
coverage and opinion formation (for an overview see 
Shoemaker and Reese 1991). One major result of these 
process-and-effects studies is that media organizations 
play an important role not only with regards to “what 
people think” but also with regards to “what people 
think about” (de Vreese 2001) as the day-to-day selec-
tion and display of news by journalists focuses the pub-
lic’s attention and influences its perception (Craig and 
McCombs 2003). This links to a second finding accord-
ing to which news coverage tends to be cyclical, peaking 
during key events but hardly visible before and after (de 
Vreese 2001). These findings suggest that media cover-
age may have exacerbated Greece’s financial woes by 
overemphasizing the issue in their reporting that lead to 
an exaggerated response by investors. If media had 
turned its focus on other problem countries instead (for 
example Ireland or Spain), bond investors may have 
started to question the creditworthiness of these coun-
tries (more than they actually did) triggering a similar risk 
premium dynamic as in the Greek case. 
The question of media impact has also been debated by 
numerous sociologists (for an overview see McQuail 
1985). Most authors stress that media organizations are 
social institutions that exert an influence on the mes-
sages they transmit. Media, in their view, is manufactur-
ing a version of reality that may deviate from other pos-
sible versions of reality. While some scholars see the vast 
scale, the anonymity, and the lack of regulation critically, 
others stress the importance of free expression for edu-
cational purposes and for improving democratic partici-
pation. Some work sheds light on specific roles that 
certain media organizations play. Whether a relationship 
between audience motives and media effect exists, re-
mains a theoretical controversy. The view propagated by 
the media is likely to reflect the concerns of those who 
have most power to gain access to media. Following this 
theory financial news may reflect the views of financial 
market participants who act as a major source for finan-
cial media organizations (see section 3).  The relationship 
between financial markets and public discourses has 
come under scrutiny by economic sociologists (for an 
overview see Langenohl 2010). According to authors like 
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Knorr-Cetina (2007) or Clark, Thrift and Tickel (2004), 
financial market dynamics are determined by public 
discourses created by (real-time) communication. Clark, 
Thrift and Tickel (2004: 291 and 301) observe a "pene-
tration of media into finance" and argue that investors 
are susceptible to media influence in their decision-
making process. 
Political scientists have tended to neglect the role of the 
media. Only in recent years, researchers have turned to 
study the role of the media for politics (for an overview 
see Schudson 2002). A general assumption is that the 
media is an increasingly important and autonomous 
force in politics. The arguments refer to the patterns of 
media ownership and the behavior of news institutions, 
the social organization of networks, and the influence of 
cultural belief systems, assumptions, and values in news 
production. Apart from trying to understand and explain 
media content, many scholars are interested in its effect 
on policy processes and outcomes. Critics see the media 
as a crucial factor in the crisis of politics and political 
leadership. Authors with a somewhat more neutral 
stance argue that media increasingly shape but do not 
control politics. This view is supported by research work 
examining the impact of news content on foreign poli-
cy.8 The role of the media for fiscal policy has, so far, 
been neglected. 
The relationship between financial markets, investors 
and the media has also been subject to research by 
economists. Several economists provide evidence that a 
causal link between media reporting and market move-
ments does exist. Engelberg and Parsons (2009) find that 
the packaging and transmission by the media rather 
than the information being reported in the news is asso-
ciated with significant financial market movements. 
Tetlock (2007) explores whether financial media news 
induces, amplify, or simply reflect investors’ sentiments. 
He finds that media pessimism (measured as the share of 
negative words in a widely read news column on stock 
markets) predicts downward pressure in stock markets. 
His findings suggest that media content can serve as a 
proxy for investor sentiment and trading activity that is 
not based on true information. A more recent paper by 
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy (2008) exam-
ines the forecasting power of language used in financial 
news stories for corporate results. Their research shows 
that investors factor in the information embedded in 
words with a negative meaning. Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2005) offer an explanation for the use of loaded 
words in media coverage. They find that media accuracy 
is limited when people share similar beliefs because 
news organizations have an incentive to slant9 the news 
to match the beliefs of their audience.  
The review of the literature reveals that the role of the 
media has been subject to much academic work. Yet 
while a number of authors look at the relationship be-
tween the media and financial markets, so far, analysis 
has not been applied to sovereign credit crises. This 
paper aims to fill this gap and, by doing so, tries to shed 
light on the driving forces behind the recent sovereign 
debt market turmoil. Although some parts of the discus-
sion below describe general features of media organiza-
tions, the hypothesis and the theoretical arguments 
presented in this paper relate to financial media only. 
The term “financial media” refers to media organiza-
tions such as news agencies, TV channels and print me-
dia (as well as their respective internet pages) with a 
special focus on broadcasting economic and financial 
news. It should also be noted that when talking about 
investors the primary focus is large, institutional investors 
including insurance companies, pension funds and alter-
native investment funds (eg hedge funds) as well as 
banks' fixed income departments since they constitute 
the bulk of bond market trading. 
3. Theoretical Arguments 
To understand the underlying factors that explain media 
organizations’ supremacy to shape the credit perception 
of the broader community of institutional investors and 
to influence their willingness to give credit to sovereigns, 
one has to look at the institutional features of media 
organizations and their functional relationship with fi-
nancial markets. Both, the institutional features and the 
functional relationship, determine the production of 
news content and set the stage for a causal link between 
media reporting and financial market movements.  
Institutional features of the media 
Financial media organizations are characterized by four 
major features: freedom of press, global reach, fast diffu-
sion, and profit-orientation. These features interact with 
and reinforce one another. At the same time, they deter-
mine the dissemination of financial news. 
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Media organizations enjoy a large degree of freedom 
with regards to what they report (content) and the 
modes of presentation. In countries with sophisticated 
financial markets (such as the United States and member 
states of the European Union), the freedom of the press 
and public expression are not only formally guaranteed 
but in most respects also actually the case. Existing con-
tent regulation mainly serves to protect minors, health 
issues and matters of decency (McQuail 2001). Entrepre-
neurial deliberations may have some constraining effects 
as media corporations consider credibility issues and 
potential legal conflicts. The organizational structure of 
media organizations suggest however, that commercial 
interests play the predominant role in the selection of 
newsworthy events and the presentation hereof. 
Media organizations act global with regards to the con-
tent and the extent to which this content is distributed. 
The global reach of the financial media has been 
enlarged by the integration of financial markets through 
liberalization and even more so through the invention of 
new technological advances. Thanks to electronic forms 
of distribution like the Internet, financial information has 
become globally available. The global distribution of 
financial news serves the need of global financial mar-
kets, where sovereign bonds from most developed coun-
tries are traded internationally and therefore nearly 
around the clock. 
Technological progress, apart from spurring the integra-
tion of world economies and financial markets, has also 
increased the speed of news transmission (Sassen 2005). 
Financial market news, today, is often real-time: news 
agencies, Internet news feeds from newspapers and 
financial TV channels provide information to investors at 
the trading desks the moment they are made public. The 
speed by which information is transmitted to financial 
market participants is a major selling argument by news 
companies like Reuters or Bloomberg. It allows them to 
charge a premium for the use of their service. The servic-
ing speed of news providers is a result of both competi-
tion among media organizations and the need for speed 
demanded by investors (Knorr-Cetina 2007). Most finan-
cial trading nowadays takes place electronically. Relevant 
news is priced in in a quick fashion and on an ongoing 
basis as investors adapt their portfolios to new informa-
tion. The speed by which market activities take place 
requires that relevant news is transmitted as fast as pos-
sible. Market participants who rely on a slower news 
provider may incur real losses on their asset portfolios. 
Finally, media organizations operate as large-scale, 
commercial enterprises. As such, above ideological pur-
poses, their main goal is to make profits. With rising 
demand for profit competition for audiences has be-
come fiercer. The resulting market pressure determines 
the choice and the presentation of stories as well as the 
selection of sources of news. Commercial interests drive 
media organizations to adjust financial news content to 
the informational need of the investor audience (Pfetsch 
2002: 15), who are looking for 'guidance for investment 
decisions'. To attract a large investor audience media 
organizations seek to solicit (well-known) financial indus-
try experts to produce (additional) news content for 
them, for example by writing eye-catching opinions or 
commentaries or by serving as interview partners. Com-
petition among media organizations dealing with finan-
cial news is particularly high given that financial news 
production is a truly global business. 
Given the features discussed above, the financial media 
possess a unique capacity to reach financial market par-
ticipants worldwide, freely and quickly. Following the 
commercial logic, media organizations have not only an 
incentive to respond to the requirements of financial 
market audiences but also to dramatize and present 
issues in a spectacular and sensationalistic way (Benett 
2009: 85 and Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 257). To 
understand more thoroughly how financial media cover-
age may affect the perceptions that investors acquire of 
reality, it is necessary to take a closer look at how the 
media and financial markets interact. 
Media function and financial markets  
Sovereign bond markets, like any other financial market 
segment, cannot function efficiently without information 
sharing. Before financial markets developed, states ne-
gotiated the terms of a credit with investors directly. The 
latter usually consisted of a small group of relatively 
homogenous people. According to historians, investors 
in sovereign debt commonly received valuable goods as 
collateral. This created a strong interdependency be-
tween both parties. With the creation of financial mar-
kets the relationship between states as debtors and 
investors as creditors has become impersonal. States no 
longer negotiate directly with potential investors. In-
stead, the terms of government debt are set on the 
bond market where investors set the price by buying and 
selling public bonds. 
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Against this background, bond investors rely on publicly 
available information and external assessments of the 
quality of a sovereign’s credit to make a decision 
whether to extend credit (purchase a bond) or not and 
to set the price according to the inherent risk. The need 
for information transparency goes beyond the daily re-
porting of market activities and related price movements 
(Knorr-Cetina 2007). Information (in the form of news 
content) that goes beyond market activities and related 
price movements consists of third party opinions trans-
mitted by the media.10 Opinions are provided by finan-
cial market experts who themselves are either deeply 
involved in bond market trading (like fund managers and 
financial analysts from banks, insurance companies, and 
investment funds) or benefit by some other means from 
actively engaging in financial market opinion formation 
(for example credit ratings companies but also people 
from academia). 
Although publications of most financial market experts 
are in most cases also disseminated directly, media or-
ganizations serve as transmitter of this externally pro-
duced information. The importance of financial media 
organizations for financial markets lies in its function to 
screen and collect news from a wide range of sources.11 
They filter and select external information deemed rele-
vant for specific market segments. Given the vast 
amount of information available, the financial media 
have become an important service provider for investors, 
who would not be able to collect and filter the informa-
tion as fast and efficiently as news providers do. In this 
respect, media communication serves an important func-
tion for the efficient functioning of financial markets. 
Vice versa, financial markets have become essential for 
media organizations, too. Financial markets provide media 
organizations with a cheap and constant news flow. At 
the same time, financial market investors provide a large 
and sound audience group with a strong demand for 
information. Media organizations are drawn into a symbi-
otic relationship with the sources of information by eco-
nomic necessity and reciprocity of interest (Herman and 
Chomsky 2002 and Sigal 1987) making media organiza-
tions and financial markets “complementary institutions” 
(Langenohl and Schmidt-Beck 2008: 4345). 
By distributing existing external information media or-
ganizations react to what has happened. In that sense 
their role for financial markets is rather indirect. How-
ever, media organizations are not simply a messenger. 
Instead, one can find a more direct role of news organi-
zations for financial markets. Driven by competitive pres-
sures, media companies assume an active part through 
their selection of details and by creating news them-
selves for example by publishing special issues based on 
internal economic analysis or by asking industry experts 
to give an interview or write a comment. 
The importance of experts' opinions in the context of 
financial markets can be explained by the fact that their 
statements benefit both investors and media organiza-
tions. Experts are cast as representatives of special 
knowledge (Langenohl and Schmidt-Beck 2008). By 
looking behind the figures and providing interpretations 
experts give investors insights into particular market 
perceptions. This is why comments by financial experts 
receive a lot of attention by market participants. For 
media organizations, personalities from the financial 
market industry embody professional and eloquent fig-
ureheads, either as authors or as interview partners, who 
attract audiences by providing special reports that com-
petitors do not have. In-depth interviews, in which the 
story is the interview (Sigal 1987: 13), have become a 
current feature of news-making also in the financial 
press. In contrast to periodical reports by national and 
international institutions, expert opinions in addition to 
other more frequent publications12 provide news on an 
ongoing basis. Against this background financial media 
organizations, being driven by commercial interests, 
have strong incentives to give market experts a platform 
to make their views known to financial market partici-
pants.13 
The reliance on market experts, however, can jeopardize 
the objectiveness of media reporting. For example, fi-
nancial experts are representatives of the financial insti-
tutions they work for. As such, they have an interest not 
only to optimize their institution’s image but also to act 
in favor of their employer’s interests (Langenohl and 
Schmidt-Beck 2008). It is unlikely, that fund managers 
publicly propagate a view that differs markedly from 
their investment positioning. If other market participants 
take up their perspective that has been disseminated 
through the media this may in turn yield higher returns 
for them. The prediction of a default of a country being 
voiced by prominent experts and diffused through the 
media may trigger a sell-off of the country’s bonds mak-
ing it impossible for the country to refinance itself. In 
such a scenario, news, as Sigal (1987: 15) puts it, is not 
what happens, but what someone says has happened or 
will happen. The reaction to statements by Josef Acker-
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man illustrates the effects the publication of an opinion 
by a prominent market expert may have. In a special 
interview broadcasted on television on 13 May 2010, the 
CEO of Deutsche Bank said that it was unlikely that 
Greece would repay its debt adding that this could trig-
ger a “meltdown” on sovereign bond markets. The 
following day, the yield spread of Greece 10-year bonds 
soared by 40 basis points and continued rising thereaf-
ter, partly destroying the positive effect of the 1750 
billion rescue package announcement. By selecting cer-
tain financial experts as a source of content for their 
daily coverage, media organizations indirectly determine 
the information that is being disseminated. Asking the 
economist Nouriel Roubini (‘Mr Doom’) for a comment, 
one can be sure to receive a rather dark picture of a 
particular issue. 
Apart from the selection of content, the power of media 
organizations to shape the opinion of market partici-
pants arises from the fact that they choose between 
numerous formats to present a topic and to increase its 
salience in the news (Craig and McCombs 2003). For 
example, newspapers and magazines can print a lead 
story, display an issue as a special report, dedicate 
lengthy articles on it or use large headlines. TV channels 
can choose the opening story on the newscast or the 
length of time devoted to a story. These cues repeated 
day after day effectively communicate the importance of 
a topic. Headlining and the use of specific language in 
their reporting enables them to mobilize interest and 
outrage. 
From what has been said so far, it should have become 
clear that the transmission of information through the 
media is crucial for the functioning of financial markets. 
It reduces complexity and acts as a frame that guides the 
decision-making process of investors (Arnoldi 2006). As 
such, media coverage both reactive and proactive can be 
regarded as setting the agenda: By selecting information 
deemed as relevant and by presenting it in a specific 
way, media coverage can set the agenda for bond mar-
ket activities. Market activities, in turn, may set the pol-
icy-agenda by forcing governments to react to market 
movements, as recent events suggest. Having outlined 
the institutional and functional forces underlying media 
reporting, the next section looks at the actual content of 
media reporting as the Greek credit crisis unfolded. 
4. Media operation during the Greek 
credit crisis 
Studies by researchers like Engelberg and Parsons 
(2009), Tetlock (2007), or Telock, Saar-Tsechansky and 
Macskassy (2008) have shown that a causal link between 
media reporting and financial market movements does 
exist. According to the work of these scholars, determi-
nants can be both quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative approach assumes that the more frequent a 
given stimulus is, the more potent its impact will be. The 
qualitative approach is based on the assumption that the 
use of words that are loaded with affective rather than 
informative value or the use of certain “labels” (Shoe-
maker and Reese 1991: 33) may strongly shape peoples’ 
thoughts. It also contains the idea that the singling out 
and highlighting of certain elements, referred to as 
‘slanting’ by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), can ma-
nipulate people’s perception. Based on the existing re-
search two hypotheses will be investigated: 
H1: The visibility of Greece’s financial situation increased 
between October 2009 and July 2010 as reporting became 
more intense. The intensity of media reporting cannot be 
fully explained by the occurrence of major news events.14 
H2: The news coverage of the Greek case was characterized 
by an intense use of value – laden expressions and labels in 
their headlines that conveyed a negative sentiment. 
Obviously, searching for content patterns, one cannot 
look at every message distributed on every medium. 
Using the database LexisNexis for the empirical analysis, 
the focus is on messages in news agencies, newspapers, 
magazines and other written media, including web-
based publications. The findings presented below there-
fore relate to these types of media only. For the quanti-
tative analysis, the study focuses on news content in the 
German, the British, and the American press. The finan-
cial markets of these countries represent an important 
part of the global network of financial markets and are 
relevant with regards to financial market activities else-
where. For the qualitative analysis, the focus was nar-
rowed down to a selection of German newspapers, 
professional magazines and web-based news publica-
tions. The German market is of particular interest be-
cause German investors hold large parts of Greek debt. 
As such, the perception of German investors is highly 
relevant for the Greek bond market. 
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Quantitative Findings 
Despite the fact that the dire state of Greece’s fiscal 
situation was no secret, Greece did not face much scru-
tiny by media organizations up until autumn 2009. Be-
tween January 2009 and August 2009 the German, UK 
and US press produced an average number of 99 reports 
per month.15 This compares to a monthly average of 71 
reports in 2008. Although one can observe a slight in-
crease, the visibility of Greece’s financial situation meas-
ured as the average number of monthly reports was still 
relatively low compared to the news coverage since 
autumn 2009. Between September 2009 and July 2010 
media coverage increased significantly. The average 
number of monthly press reports dealing with public 
finance and Greece soared to 1.502 that is, fifteen times 
as high as in the previous time period. Even if one leaves 
out reports by news agencies, with 909 the number is 
still much higher. 
The comparison of media coverage in the German, UK 
and US press reveals some interesting cross-national 
differences. In the sample period German media organi-
zations (excluding news agencies) devoted most atten-
tion to the Greek crisis. Their coverage exceeded signifi-
cantly the coverage by news organizations in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Given the importance of 
German investors for the Greek bond market, this find-
ing supports the notion that German media organiza-
tions responded to the demand of the investor base and 
provided them with increased information concerning 
Greece. 
A closer look at the development of media reporting 
during the months of the crisis reveals that the dynamic 
of media reporting (measured as the sum of total press 
reports by German, UK und US press using ‘Greece’ and 
‘public finance’ as key words) matches strongly with the 
dynamic of the loss in trust in Greece’s creditworthiness 
measured by the credit spreads (see graph 3). The faster 
rise in the risk premium for Greek bonds that started in 
December 2009 coincided with a much higher reporting 
frequency. The same applies to the development in the 
weeks and months that followed this initial ascent of the 
Greek yield spread. The surge in the risk premium during 
April and May 2010 was accompanied by a strong jump 
in news coverage. During the peak period when the risk 
premium climbed to its highest level (calendar week 18, 
19 and 20) the number of reports stood between 1000 
and 1400 per calendar week. 
See appendix, graph 2 
Of course, the frequency of reports by itself provides 
little proof for an overly intense reporting by media or-
ganizations. Instead the number has to be put into per-
spective to the key events that took place during the 
respective time period. Graph 4 shows that the number 
of events increased over time. Against this background, 
the higher number of reports can be seen as a reaction 
to the increased frequency of news events. However, the 
number of events can only partly explain the increased 
scrutiny by media organizations during the observation 
period. A comparison of the number of reports and the 
number of events in the weeks that preceded the steep 
rise of the risk premium (between calendar week 6 and 
calendar week 13) suggests that the reporting during 
these weeks was much more intense than seems justi-
fied by the number of salient events. Although the high 
frequency of reports mentioning Greece’s financial situa-
tion did not immediately accelerate the loss of trust by 
bond investors, it is likely that it attracted a growing 
audience and, thus, may have set the stage for the rapid 
loss of trust in Greek bonds that followed by gradually 
impairing the perception of market participants. The 
revision of the Greek budget deficit in October 2009, in 
contrast, was not accompanied by increased media scru-
tiny and investors stayed remarkably calm. 
While the number of key events can be regarded as 
given, media organizations, driven by incentives de-
scribed above, choose the intensity of their coverage. As 
indicated, media organizations can create additional 
news by publishing written comments by and interviews 
with financial experts or by making headlines with sup-
plementary analysis. The higher ratio of reports to key 
events between calendar week 6 and calendar week 13 
suggests that the editorial approach changed over time. 
As uncertainty about Greece gained ground on financial 
markets and the need for information rose, media or-
ganizations started producing extra news, sometimes 
with a considerable time lag to or even without any 
particular reference event. 
See appendix, graph 3 
The analysis of media reporting about the Greek credit 
crisis reveals that in the first phase of the Greek crisis 
(last quarter 2009) news reports followed rather than 
preceded events. At first sight, this supports the notion 
from studies which show that media attention to certain 
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events or issues is cyclical, peaking during key events but 
hardly visible before and after (de Vreese 2001). In this 
sense, the media did not act as an agenda-setter but as 
an agenda-sender. However, this relationship between 
events and media reports became somewhat detached 
during the first half of 2010, as media attention was 
higher than the number of events would suggest. 
Against the background of the functional interaction 
between media as news provider and financial markets 
one could argue that the media reporting proved rather 
pro-cyclical in that it reinforced market developments 
through the feedback loop of its coverage. 
Qualitative Findings  
Report intensity is one possible driver for the changed 
perception of bond investors and resulting market move-
ments, news content is another. Media organizations are 
able to shape news content through their selection of 
information and specific highlights provided in their re-
ports and through their presentation in terms of language 
and placement. The selection depends on the editorial 
approach and is reflected in the use of different formats. 
Media organizations assuming a reactive role may choose 
to present predominantly official information (for example 
announcements by public authorities or ratings compa-
nies) in factual articles. Or, they may provide additional 
information in the form of special issues, extra analysis or 
expert opinions either in written form or provided in an 
interview context, thus, assuming a more proactive role by 
artificially increasing the range of available information. 
The use of value-laden words, expressions, or labels can 
be regarded as another characteristic of the proactive 
approach. 
The analysis of the headlines of a selection of 450 press 
reports by German (web-based) newspapers and maga-
zines indicates that starting in December 2009 media 
organizations followed an increasingly proactive ap-
proach.16 As the focus of financial market participants 
turned to Greece, media organizations reacted to the 
increased demand for information with the provision of 
additional news. The number of written opinions and 
interviews between February 2010 and May 2010 rose 
not only in absolute terms but also as a share of all the 
press reports in the sample. Media coverage, thus, in-
creasingly published personal views held by financial 
experts and market participants who were asked to 
provide their opinion.  
The turn to a more proactive approach becomes evident 
not only in the choice of additional formats but also in 
the language used to present the news. In December, 
the term “Greek crisis” appeared as a leading label in 
media reports. It was introduced in headlines in different 
formats such as articles, special features and analysis 
dealing with Greece’s fiscal situation. The term “crisis” 
defines an abrupt and unexpected situation that creates 
uncertainty, threatens important goals and calls for 
change. Although the revision of the Greek budget and 
debt figures in October 2009 did meet these criteria, 
media reports not only in Germany but also in the 
United Kingdom and the United States started using the 
label “Greek crisis” after the rating downgrade by the 
rating company Fitch on 8 December 2009. In the 
months that followed, further labels emerged, among 
them “Greek drama”, “Greek tragedy” and to a lesser 
extent also “Greek virus”. The connotation of these 
terms is clearly negative or even alarming. By using these 
labels in headlines and titles news reports purported a 
notion of doom irrespective of the actual content of the 
article they referred to. 
A closer look at the wording in headlines and introduc-
tion texts provides more evidence that media organiza-
tions followed a rather proactive approach. Against the 
operative convention that objective media reporting 
should guarantee no explicit bias and a minimum of 
interpretation and values, headlines and introduction 
texts of press reports in the analyzed sample contained a 
large amount of value-laden vocabulary or expressions. 
In nearly half of the press reports, titles were either 
overly negative or filled with sarcasm and cynicism. Titles 
like “Time bomb for the euro” (Der Spiegel, 7 December 
2009), “Shockwave from Athens” (Die Welt, 16 January 
2010), “The next tsunami” (manager magazine, 1 Feb-
ruary 2010), “Prayers on the deathbed” (Der Spiegel, 15 
March 2010), or “Looming default. Economists give up 
on Greece” (Spiegel Online, 28 April 2010) are just a 
few examples for the use of sensational language in 
press reports during the observation period. The wording 
used by the media clearly created a psychology of loom-
ing collapse. Even if investors did not believe in a Greek 
default at first, they were much more likely to do so 
after hearing or reading the news on Greece. 
With headlines like “Carry calculators to Athens” 
(Börsen-Zeitung, 9 December 2009) and “Athens’ crea-
tive accountants” (Die Welt, 27 February 2010), media 
reports slanted the news by using images with a clearly 
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discrediting meaning. Press reports by influential media 
organizations covering the political responses by EU 
member states were also characterized by sarcasm as 
titles like “EU sets up for fight show against speculators” 
(Spiegel Online, 10 March 2010), “Wavering until the 
system crashes” (Spiegel Online, 29 April 2010), “Greece 
under total control” (Die Welt, 5 May 2010) reveal. The 
examples give an idea of the public discourse with re-
gards to the Greek case which was led by German media 
organizations. Although only tentative, the findings 
indicate that media reporting was characterized by the 
use of value-laden words that may have accentuated 
negative sentiments and the uncertainty felt by market 
investors. Taken together, the quantitative and qualita-
tive results provide evidence that media coverage con-
tributed to the dynamic of the Greek credit crisis by 
magnifying investors’ risk perception. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the media worsened the loss of 
trust in the Greek state by accentuating the looming risk 
perception of market participants. To be sure, under-
standing the impact of the media in the Greek credit 
crisis is not an easy task and leaves room for controver-
sial discussions. The contribution of this paper is that it 
provides an analytical framework to think about the role 
of the media in the context of financial markets and to 
analyze media output against this background.17 The 
analytical framework encompasses three different levels 
of arguments: the institutional features of media organi-
zations, the functional relationship between media or-
ganizations and financial markets, and the way news 
content is being presented. From what has been said, it 
should have become clear that it is not the media by 
itself but rather the interaction and the mutual rein-
forcement of institutional and functional features and 
the tools of the media that are critical with a view to 
financial market developments. 
What does this imply for policy makers? The prevalence 
of the media, as Strobel (2000) notes, contracts the 
policy-making process, giving officials less time to re-
spond. This is particularly true with regards to financial 
markets where new information is processed and acted 
upon very fast creating a dynamic setting for policy ac-
tion. Although this does not mean that the media de-
termines policy outcomes it can build up considerable 
pressure on policy makers. When it comes to activities 
on sovereign debt markets, this pressure is especially 
strong, since the funding of the state and, thus, the 
room for maneuver of policy makers is directly affected. 
There is little disagreement that freedom of press is a 
necessary precondition to provide a common space for 
communication in which ideas can be exchanged and 
public opinion can develop. The freedom of press is 
particularly important in the context of financial markets 
because information sharing is a prerequisite for an 
orderly functioning of the pricing mechanism that takes 
place via the market. Even if press freedom is not suffi-
cient to create a public accountability, regulation is no 
solution. Instead, policy makers need to be aware of the 
complex relationship between financial markets, finan-
cial news coverage and the potential impact on their 
own fiscal situation. Otherwise, they might have to take 
decisions which are forced upon them by the market. 
Although, in the case of Greece, one may argue that in 
the long run this may bring about some positive turn-
around, the resulting legitimacy deficit is not desirable. 
See appendix, table 1 
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Endnotes 
1Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International 
Relations Conference: September 9-11, 2010. For comments 
please contact sonja.juko@gmx.net . 
2The meaning of ‘credit’, in this context, refers to the legal 
contract where one party receives financial resources from 
another party and promises to repay him in the future along 
with interest, thus ‘credit’ in a purely financial or economic 
sense. 
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3When measured as a ratio to gross domestic product, part of 
this effect is automatic. This is because economic crises affect 
both the numerator (a government’s fiscal deficit) and the 
denominator (a country’s gross domestic product). 
4In 1999, the Economist wrote that it was clear that Greek 
statisticians had learned from its Spanish and Italian colleagues 
how to fudge accounts to the satisfaction of bureaucrats in 
Brussels in order to join the monetary union [Economists, 23-
01-1999]. See also Jones (2010): 26. 
5The countries illustrated here rank lowest in the eurozone with 
regards to their fiscal and economic performance. For an over-
view of major fiscal and economic indicators see Appendix 2. 
6In the course of the past twenty years, credit ratings have 
become a key component of publicly traded securities and thus 
an integral part of today’s financial markets. Based on an anal-
ysis of the macroeconomic fundamentals of a country, sove-
reign credit ratings provide an external opinion of the capacity 
and willingness of governments and other debtors to repay 
their debt in full and in time. For a detailed discussion of sove-
reign credit ratings see Bhatia (2002). 
7For a chronicle of the rating events see Appendix 1.  
8Strobel (2000) investigates a phenomenon called “CNN Ef-
fect” according to which the TV News and the print media are 
pivotal in causing the government to pursue certain foreign 
policies. He comes to the conclusion that the effect of CNN 
news coverage on foreign policy is clearly “exaggerated” (Stro-
bel 2000: 172). Yet he states that the media, in particular the 
prevalence of real-time media, does have an impact for political 
action. 
9‘Slanting’ describes the process of selecting details that are 
favorable or unfavorable to the subject being described (Haya-
kawa 1990). See Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) for an illu-
stration of slanting financial news. 
10Following Habermas (1989), financial media reporting in-
volves to a large extent ideologies and viewpoints, turning 
media organizations into leaders and dealers of opinions. 
11Apart from market experts, governmental institutions, na-
tional and international organizations also serve as a news 
source. 
12For example, reports, reviews, and outlooks by credit rating 
companies as well as credit market analysis by financial institu-
tions. 
13Hermann and Chomsky (2002) argue that using experts 
serves media organizations threefold: First, they provide a 
steady flow of news. Second, it is cost-efficient. And third, it 
helps to protect media coverage from criticism of bias. 
14The study distinguishes five types of key news events: Rating 
events, Greek bond emissions, official announcements by the 
Greek government with regards to economic or fiscal issues, offi-
cial announcements by international organizations and EU institu-
tions and other relevant news (see chronicle in Appendix 1). 
15This is the result of a news search using a combination of 
“Greece” and “Public Finance” as key words.  
16The sample of press reports is the result of a news search 
using a combination of “Greece”, “Public Finance” and 
“Economy” as key words. The selection of news papers and 
magazines encompasses Börsen-Zeitung, Die Welt, Der Spiegel, 
Spiegel-Online, Focus Magazin, Focus Money, Manager Maga-
zin, Capital, Finance, Platow and Euro. 
17The explanatory framework developed in the paper is not 
solely applicable to the credit crises of the state but virtually to 
any financial market dynamic. The paper is, thus, a contribution 
to a more general discussion about the relationship between 
financial markets, the media and policy making. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Yield spread* of selected European countries vis-à-vis Germany since September 2009. Source: Bloomberg. 
               *Differences of 10-year bond yields in basis (bp) taking German bonds as a benchmark 
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Graph 2: Greek credit spreads and media reporting. Source: Nexis Lexis 
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Graph 3: Greek credit spread and news events. Source: Bloomberg and various newspapers. 
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Table 1: Chronicle of key news events between October 2009 and May 2010 
Date Event Event details 
05.10.2009 Official Greek Announcement Greek socialists win election 
21.10.2009 Official Greek Announcement New Greek government revises budgetary and fiscal statistics 
29.10.2009 Rating Event Moody’s warned Greek and Portuguese goverments of possible future downgrades of their sovereign debt 
10.11.2009 Greek bond emission Greece issues 15-year bond amounting to 7 bn Euro at 5,3% 
13.11.2009 Official Greek Announcement Greece announced that recession continued in Q3 
08.11.2009 Rating Event Fitch downgrades Greece to BBB+ 
16.12.2009 Rating Event S&P downgrades Greece to BBB+ 
17.12.2009 Official Greek Announcement Greece announces austerity measures 
22.12.2009 Rating Event Moody’s downgrades Greece to A2 
14.01.2010 Rating Event S&P downgrades Greece to A“ 
26.01.2010 Greek bond emission Greece issues 5-year bond amounting to 8bn Euros at 6,1 % 
27.01.2010 Official Greek Announcement Greece disclaims that China will invest in Greek bonds 
11.02.2010 Official EU Announcement EU leaders declare to be ready for coordinated action to secure financial stability in the euroarea 
16.02.2010 Official EU Announcement Ecofin urges Greece to reduce public deficit 
23.02.2010 Rating Event Fitch downgrades Greek banks; the rating company argues that austerity measure will slow down economy, 
weaking credit quality 
24.02.2010 Rating Event S§P puts Greek outlook on negative 
03.03.2010 Official Greek Announcement Greece presents austerity plan 
04.03.2010 Greek bond emission Greece issues 10-year bond amounting to 5bn Euros; investors demand is strong 
16.03.2010 Official EU Announcement Ecofin audits implementation of austerity measures; draw positive conclusion 
25.03.2010 Official EU Announcement EU leaders announce coordinated action to safeguard financial stability in the euroarea declaring that rescue 
package is “ultima ratio” 
29.03.2010 Greek bond emission Greece issues 12-year bond amounting to 390 Mio at 5,9 
31.03.2010 Rating Event Moody’s downgrades Greek banks from A1 to A2 
09.04.2010 Rating Event Fitch downgrades Greece from BBB toBBB- 
12.04.2010 Official EU Announcement and 
Rating Event 
EU and IMF announce details of rescue package for Greece; at the same time Fitch downgrades Greek banks 
13.04.2010 Greek bond emission Greece issues money market paper with 6 and 12 month maturity amounting to 780 mio Euro each (higher than 
envisaged) 
15.04.2010 Greek bond emission Greece increases money market issuance by 180 mio Euro 
21.04.2010 Greek bond emission Greece issues money market paper with 2 month maturity amounting to1,92 bn Euro ant 3,65% 
22.04.2010 Official EU Announcement and 
Rating Event 
Moody’s downgrades Greece; Eurostat revises Greek deficit for 2009 from 12,7% to 13,6% 
23.04.2010 Official Greek Announcement Greece applies for support package; support covers funding needs for 2010 and 1/3 of 2011 
27.04.2010 Rating Event S§P downgrades Greece to BB+ (non-investmentgrade) 
03.05.2010 Official EU Announcement and 
Other 
IMF, ECB, EU commission and Greece agree on austerity grogram; The federal cabinet of Germany approves 
German assistance 
04.05.2010 Other German banks agree to buy Greek government bonds 
05.05.2010 Official EU Announcement and 
Other 
Three people get killed during protests in Athens against the austerity regime; EU commission reports that 
deficits have reached all time highs 
06.05.2010 Other General strike in Greece 
07.05.2010 Other German parliament and the upper house approve German assistance law 
10.05.2010 Official EU Announcement and 
Other 
EU and IMF announce 750 bn Euro rescue package 
12.05.2010 Official Greek Announcement Greece receives first tranche of IMF loans (5.5 bn Euro) 
18.05.2010 Official Greek Announcement Greece receives first tranche of EU support (14.5 bn Euro) 
20.05.2010 Other Protests in Greece 
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Transfer Union or Common Bond? On the Moral 
Economy of the Eurozone
By Nigel Dodd and Johannes Lenhard 
Department of Sociology, London School of Economics  
For the past year the eurozone has been facing a crisis that 
some observers predict will not pass until the basic struc-
ture of the monetary union is transformed. One of its 
member-states could be ejected for ‘breaking the rules,’ 
while others face a strict insolvency regime and a set of 
fiscal controls that further compromise their sovereignty. If 
this is ‘Phase 2’ of a global financial crisis, it has a distinc-
tive European flavour as arguments about who (or what) is 
to blame go to the heart of what the euro was all about in 
the first place. In this note we want to highlight one aspect 
of the debate, namely, the claim that the eurozone has 
become a transfer union. Framing the eurozone in terms of 
a notion ‘moral economy’ drawn from Bataille, we argue 
that this claim is misjudged. 
‘Transfer union’ has become part of the euro lexicon only 
recently.1 Examples of its use include Jörg Krämer, chief 
economist at Commerzbank, claimed that the eurozone 
‘has moved away from a monetary union and towards a 
transfer union’ (New York Times, May 11 2010); and Co-
lumbia’s Economics Professor, Jagdish Bhagwati, who in an 
interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published 
on 20 June 2010, said: ‘It is possible that the monetary 
union turns into a transfer union,’ he said, ‘if the weak 
countries have problems and everyone gets worried about 
the Euro, the question rapidly becomes political. It is in the 
end not good for Europe if countries such as Greece de-
fault. There will therefore be a transfer of money in such 
situations – to a certain extend they will be forced to do 
so’. The notion of a transfer union is generally used in such 
instances as a proxy for aid programme, and invoked to 
describe redistributive functions that – so it is argued by 
critics – were never intended for the euro. As Ralph Atkins 
writes in the Financial Times, ‘the ECB’s critics believe buy-
ing government bonds even on a small scale blurs mone-
tary and fiscal policies, favours the fiscally irresponsible and 
risks turning the eurozone into a “transfer union” in which 
richer nations support poorer rivals – all of which are 
against the terms on which Germans thought they had 
joined the euro in 1999’ (7 July 2010). 
The idea of a transfer union is expressed, for the most part, 
in negative terms. In this article, we offer an alternative 
view and propose a re-framing of the idea of a transfer 
union in terms of arguments about moral economy – par-
ticularly by Mauss and Bataille2 – that suggest that the 
notion of a transfer union is not as problematic as it pres-
ently appears. Indeed, elements of such a union have ar-
guably been a crucial feature of the eurozone from its very 
inception. The article is divided into three main sections. 
The first part will lay down the basic theoretical arguments 
about the concept of a transfer union, using the work of 
Bataille as a starting point. In the second part, this concept 
will be further developed with regard to current (and, we 
suggest, misconceived) arguments about winners and 
losers within the eurozone. The last part of the paper will 
consider one possible development of the eurozone which 
addresses some of these issues, namely a common euro-
bond. 
General Economy 
Bataille uses the notion of gift exchange to develop a 
highly distinctive interpretation of ‘political economy’. His 
main contention is that gift exchange conforms to a model 
of economic life, which he calls general economy, which 
contrasts with our own (neoclassical) model of restricted 
economy. Whereas restricted economy starts with the 
problem of scarcity and focuses on ‘particular operations 
with limited ends’ (1949: 22), general economy starts with 
the problem of excess. For Bataille, gift exchange is never a 
matter for purely ‘economic’ calculations, but rather ‘po-
litical’ ones: ‘More often than not it is the solemn giving of 
considerable riches, offered by a chief to his rival for the 
purpose of humiliating, challenging and obligating him.3 
The recipient has to erase the humiliation and take up the 
challenge; he must satisfy the obligation that was con-
tracted by accepting’ (ibid., 67). Moreover, ‘a good many 
of our behaviours are reducible to the laws of potlatch; 
they have the same significance as it does’ (69). A similar 
argument is put forward by Mauss in The Gift, where he 
describes the potlatch among the Indians of the American 
northwest as a contract whose collective nature is crucial 
to its position within a more general system of ‘total ser-
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vices’ in society. Material and moral life, and exchange, 
function here ‘in a form that is both disinterested and 
obligatory’ – a sense of obligation which, Mauss says, is 
‘expressed in a mythical and imaginary way or, one might 
say, symbolic and collective’ (1950: 42). 
Bataille does not simply explore gift exchange and sacrifice 
among the Aztecs, but somewhat surprisingly, addresses 
the Marshall Plan in the book’s final chapter. Formally 
known the European Recovery Programme (ERP), the Plan 
(named after George Marshall, the US Secretary of State) 
was put into operation in 1947-51 to support the postwar 
reconstruction of the European economy – some US$13 
billion worth of economic and technical assistance (as 
against a US GDP of $258 billion in 1948) were given via 
the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) to those Euro-
pean countries joining the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation (OECD). Transfers under the Plan 
operated as loans: American suppliers were paid in US 
dollars credited against ERP funds. They were explcitly not 
gifts: the European recipients had to repay the monies in 
local currency, which was then deposited by the govern-
ment in a counterpart fund. This money, in turn, could be 
used by the ERP countries for further investment projects. 
The Marshall Plan was significant for the development of 
the international monetary system. It was instrumental in 
the establishment of the European Payments Union (EPU) 
in 1950, lifting the majority of capital controls in Europe 
while encouraging a system of fixed exchange rates and a 
degree of trade liberalization. Moreover, drawing rights 
connected to the EPU were supported by ECA funds, and 
facilitated the process of establishing full convertibility 
under Bretton Woods. 
Describing it as ‘an investment in the worlds interest,’ 
Bataille saw the Plan as an answer to general economy’s 
fundamental problem: excess. He charaterized its pay-
ments as condemned wealth (182) that had been gener-
ated by an economy ‘so developed that the needs of 
growth are having a hard time absorbing its excess re-
sources’ (179). In making this argument, Bataille drew on 
François Perroux’s 1948 text, Le Plan Marshall ou l’Europe 
nécessaire au monde. Perroux, a Professor at the Collège 
de France, drew a distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘gen-
eral’ economy which maps onto Bataille’s basic framework. 
According to Perroux, in ‘classical’ economics we make 
calculations according to isolated interests, as against a 
general interest to which the ‘national point of view’ was 
‘irrelevant’ (cited in Bataille, 1949: 189). How, though, 
might such discussions about the postwar reconstruction 
of the European economy be relevant to the present-day 
plight of the eurozone? The differences are, of course, 
significant: the Marshall Plan consisted of funds from out-
side Europe, and for all Perroux’s talk of the general inter-
est, the motivation to resist Soviet interests in Europe was 
an important part of the rational behind the Plan as it was 
eventually put into operation. Nevertheless, Bataille’s 
framework can be used to place the idea of a ‘transfer 
union’ in rather more positive light. 
Winners and Losers 
The description of the eurozone as a transfer union has 
been provoked and sustained by the ‘bailout’ of Greece: 
the ‘stabilization facility,’ worth some 1750bn., that was 
set up in May, drawing on funds from the IMF (up to 
1250bn.) contributions from euro zone member states 
(1440bn.) and the EC (160bn.). A bond supporting this 
facility has been established, backed by member-state 
guarantees, and was rated AAA by Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch in mid-September. One significant function of the 
eurozone stabilization facility is that it merely renders visi-
ble economic asymmetries that have existed all along. As 
the existence of this stabilization fund suggests, the cur-
rent crisis in the eurozone is being inextricably linked to an 
underlying problem of imbalances among member states. 
But the imbalances that necessitate what looks like ‘aid’ 
from some member-states to others did not emerge sud-
denly, their basic contours have been present in the euro-
zone ever since its inception. They are also part of long-
standing debates comparing the eurozone to Mundell’s 
(1961) model of an optimum currency area (OCA). Al-
though Mundell was largely positive about monetary union 
in Europe – and even about a world currency (1968) – 
OCA theory has been invoked mainly by the euro’s critics. 
Now, more than a decade since the euro’s inception, dis-
cussions of OCA theory have given way to arguments 
about transfer that focus directly on perceived losses and 
gains between surplus and deficit countries incurred as a 
direct result of their membership of the eurozone. Accord-
ing to Sinn, for example, Germany has not only been a net 
contributor to the EU budgets but has lost out from its 
inclusion in the eurozone. His argument focuses on fi-
nance, and suggests that convergence in interest rates 
provoked an ‘investment’ boom elsewhere in the euro 
zone (e.g. Spain and Greece) which not only starved the 
German economy of investment but fed rampant consum-
erism and booming house prices elsewhere. According to 
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this view, German net investment was very low between 
1995 and 2008, with the consequence that Germany had 
the second lowest growth rate (behind Italy) in the euro-
zone between 1995 and 2009. 
Sinn’s account has not gone unchallenged. Wolf, author of 
Fixing Global Finance (2010a) and one of the FT’s most 
influential columnists, argues that German investment was 
kept low by a combination of weak domestic demand, 
structural rigidities and globalisation – not its eurozone 
membership (2010b). If the outflow of savings from Ger-
many to countries on the periphery of the eurozone fed 
consumption and growing current account deficits, these 
can hardly be described as ‘gains’ but rather present very 
short-term ‘booms’ whose damaging consequences are now 
being experienced by citizens in those very same countries. 
The contrary argument, that Germany has in fact gained 
from its membership of the eurozone, rests on the fact that 
a relatively high percentage of its exports – two-fifths – go 
to other eurozone countries. Moreover, its surplus position 
has been helped by the euro’s stable value, whereas an 
independent German currency that appreciated in value 
would have reduced its competitiveness. 
As this debate suggests, the euro project has always been 
driven by a complex interplay of individual and general 
interests. According to Dumas, for example, those coun-
tries in the eurozone that are now in account surplus have 
been benefitting directly from the deficits that have been 
accumulating elsewhere: ‘In effect, these economies have 
been taking a free ride, generating income and building up 
assets by selling into the domestic demand of the deficit 
economies, fuelled by borrowing that should not have 
taken place’ (2010: 160). Dumas applies this analysis to 
Italy (where real consumption rose by 3.5% between 
2001-9, as against 0.5% in Germany) as well as Greece: 
‘without those Italians spending away,’ he claims, ‘German 
output, jobs, incomes and consumption would have been 
even worse. The folly of the miser indeed’ (ibid., 169-70).  
Significantly, any ‘Keynesian’ solution to the crisis in the 
eurozone – using expenditute to stimulate aggregate de-
mand – tends to be viewed as contrary to the interest of 
those states deemed to be strongest because it would 
mean surplus countries saving less and spending more. 
Saving may seem ‘virtuous’ when considered in isolation – 
as may a balanced budget, which Dumas regards as the 
key ideology underpinning Germany’s economic policy 
(ibid.,168) – but under the circumstances that prevail in the 
eurozone, where there are significant current account 
imbalances between core and peripheral states, there is a 
classic paradox of thrift: 
In the Keynesian scheme of things, what appears to suit a firm, 
for example cutting wages, may seem damaging for all (in-
cluding the firm) if applied generally throughout the economy, 
if aggregate incomes falls and with it demand and profits. 
Similarly, what seems prudent for an individual – or even an 
inidvidual country – may not prove prident if too widely prac-
tised. In the modern world economy, an apparently prudent 
saver may ultimately prove to be imprudent, even assessed 
from the most narrow, selfish standpoint. And in the process of 
saving too much, the globalized economy and system have 
been strained, with reduced willingness to sustain globalized 
markets, especially free trade, on which savers, especially sav-
ing countries, depend. (ibid.,11-12) 
According to Dumas, the eurozone faces precisely this 
dilemma between the interests of individual member-states 
and what is in the collective interest, and this relates to the 
problem of maintaining the integrity of the system as a 
whole. This mirrors exactly Bataille’s perspective of general 
versus restricted economy. Indeed, Dumas suggests that 
the euro will fail if ‘the countries that are competitive – in 
Europe, Germany and its immediate surrounds – refuse to 
spend their income’ (ibid., 155, italics added).4 The prob-
lem, in other words, is one of expenditure.5 Following, 
Bataille, what seem like rational economic strategies when 
viewed in isolation – ‘austerity,’ or the denial of expendi-
ture – may turn out to be anything but, even when viewed 
‘from the most narrow, selfish standpoint’. Viewed with 
the collective interest in mind, such behaviour may cause 
long-lasting damage. 
The Eurobond 
The stabilization facility – which Bataille might characterise 
as condemned wealth – is a temporary compromise. Driven 
by a collective interest in avoiding the fall-out from any 
Greek default as the crisis was in full swing earlier this 
year, the facility merely delays the crucial decision about 
how – not whether – the eurozone should be reconsti-
tuted. One significant aspect of this decision should be to 
address the financial architecture of the Euro. This has 
been flawed from the outset. When the Maastrich Treaty 
was signed in 1992, the eurozone got a central bank but 
no central treasury. It was never the aim to establish fiscal 
integration - politically, this was always a step too far. Less 
widely discussed at the time was the other side of sover-
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eign financing: not tax, but bonds. When it came to sover-
eign credit, here, too, eurozone members were apparently 
on their own: they were to be part of a collective monetary 
arrangement while still needing to make their own inde-
pendent financial arrangements. Until the present crisis, 
however, things did not quite work out this way. As the 
chart below indicates, the introduction of the euro coin-
cided with a de facto ‘unification’ of government bond 
yields. Member-states were borrowing at similar rates, as if 
they were exposed to the same same underlying degree of 
risk. Given their collective interest in ensuring that mone-
tary union was a success, and given that there was no 
provision for any member to exit the euro, perhaps this 
was a reasonable assumption. 
The impact of this ‘unification’ on Greece is especially strik-
ing: starting with a yield of over 11% in the beginning of 
1998, it declined constantly to about 6% in mid 2000 and 
even further to a low at 3.3% in September 2005. Similar 
examples can be seen with both Slovenia and Slovakia ex-
periencing a rapid lowering of bond rates. All of this implies 
that one significant benefit of eurozone membership for 
these states was cheaper government borrowing. 
See appendix, graph 1 
Writing early on in the eurozone’s lifetime, Aglietta and 
Scialom suggested that rates reflected a common ‘bench-
marking’ of German interest rates: 
Government bonds have been converted into Euros since the 
first day of EMU ... The process has included outstanding debt 
as well as new issues. By the second half of 1998, interest rates 
of the same maturity bonds had already converged, with very 
low spreads. This was an indication that the market was un-
concerned about the sustainability and solvency of government 
debt in participating countries. German bonds provided the 
benchmark because their market was deeper and broader ... It 
is as if a single yield curve has been established. (2003: 52) 
One implication of this is that the eurozone could be seen 
as an arrangement that has already worked as a ‘transfer 
union’ as regards sovereign borrowing. That is to say, 
some member-states benefited from easier credit condi-
tions – through the bond markets and filtering through 
into private corporate and household debt – specifically 
because of their membership of the euro. So why have 
rates diverged? One answer is that debt has been used in a 
different way since the global crisis. De Grauwe, for exam-
ple, points to the ‘flight to safety’ of investors dumping 
private debt and turning to low-risk sovereign debt. Cru-
cially, this means that those eurozone governments with a 
stronger reputation have enjoyed a lowering of rates, while 
those countries considered weaker could not draw the 
same benefit. Spreads have therefore increased. And yet as 
he points out, some states – Greece and Ireland, particu-
larly – saw their rates actually rise, and he views this as a 
function of perceived credit risk: ‘This has probably to do 
with the fact that some of these countries (e.g. Greece) 
have high levels of debt, and others, like Ireland, experi-
enced a fast deterioration of their government debt levels’ 
(2009: 243). 
In light of this, the underlying rationale of the eurozone is 
up for questioning once more. But the current crisis seems 
particularly intractable not simply because the different 
member states lack the political will or ability to resolve it. 
Rather, it is especially difficult for them to do so because 
the euro’s configuration as a monetary system is at odds 
with the financial architecture that supports it. Although 
member-states’ debts are in their own ‘domestic’ currency 
(euros) their lack of independent control over that currency 
severely limits their options when dealing with sovereign 
debt. This is due to monetary integration. On the other 
side, some member-states are confronting serious difficul-
ties in raising debt through bonds. This is a form of finan-
cial disintegration. The result is a confused mixture 
whereby sovereignty is both pooled and not pooled. One 
currency, sixteen state debtors. 
In the current crisis, the pursuit of self-interest by eurozone 
member-states will probably lead nowhere. In order go 
somewhere, on the other hand, the logical choice seems to 
be between a) integrating the euro’s financial architecture, 
b) reducing the eurozone’s size, or c) dismantling it alto-
gether. While option b) is favoured by many, there is no 
guarantee that it will work without attending to a) at least 
in some form. Indeed, one could argue that a) has been 
happening anyway, up to a point. As we have noted, 
member-states were largely borrowing as if there was a 
common rate prior to the present crisis, and the stabiliza-
tion facility has its own dedicated eurobond. If it is to sur-
vive, member states within the eurozone need to pursue 
objectives that are framed by collective interests. Arguably, 
a eurobond is the logical extension of this argument in the 
sense that it would, for the time being at least, be the 
most tangible and concrete – and, above all, achievable – 
embodiment of a eurozone not only conceived but operat-
ing according to collective interests. 
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Discussion of the eurobond has been minimal. Prominent 
interventions on the issue include those by Issing and So-
ros, who take opposing views, but there has not been 
much debate. According to Issing, the eurobond looks 
attractive only as a short-term solution to the crisis, i.e. as a 
means of deleting the interest rate spread and providing 
guarantees that the weaker states – the PIIGS – cannot 
default. But the longer term consequences would be dam-
aging, according to Issing: ‘the argument that some coun-
tries are in such a terrrible situation that they will be un-
able to get out without substantial help from their 
neighbours is ... unconvincing [and] would turn against a 
common bond,’ he says, before concluding: ‘It would be 
hard to find a clearer case of free riding’ (2009: 78). Like-
wise, it would be hard to find a clearer case of a discussion 
of the eurobond issue that is so tightly framed by the ema-
ciated logic of restricted economy.  
Soros, by contrast, argues that the absence of a eurobond 
is a ‘structural defect’ of the eurozone. However, he envis-
ages a common bond not as a replacement for bonds 
issued by individual states but rather as an addition – 
which, presumably, is a role the stabilization bond now 
fills. For one thing, it would lend credence to the rescue of 
the banking system and allow additional support to the 
newer and more vulnerable members of the EU. For an-
other, it would serve as a financing mechanism for co-
ordinated counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Properly struc-
tured, it would relieve Germany’s anxiety about other 
countries picking its pocket. 
The main use of monies acquired by this means would be to 
fund infrastructural projects such as gas and oil networks that 
would both increase member-states’ independence, while also 
fulfilling what Soros refers to as a ‘counter-cyclical’ function – 
presumably, this means providing stimulus at times of crisis. 
(‘The eurozone needs a government bond market,’ FT, Febru-
ary 18 2009) 
Soros’s eurobond proposal is something of a halfway 
house, whereby member-state governments borrow collec-
tively without conceding their additional capacity to bor-
row as independent states. One clear advantage of such an 
arrangement would be that it avoids what Issing regards as 
the greatest danger of the eurobond, which is that the 
strong states face higher borrowing costs. A similar com-
promise is envisaged by De Grauwe and Moesen, whose 
proposed a eurobond would be a means of reducing the 
‘distortions’ and ‘externalities’ created by divergent bond 
yield spreads. However, in order to placate German fears 
that a eurobond would generate moral hazard problems - 
i.e. ‘weaker’ states would borrow feeely in the expectation 
of a bailout – they propose a system of differential pricing: 
‘the interest rate (coupon) on the euro bond would be a 
weighed average of the yields observed in each govern-
ment bond market at the moment of the issue’ (2009: 
134). This would be a transfer of security – there would be 
an underlying collective guarantee for the bond – but not 
of resources. So the free-rider problem that Germany fears 
is circumvented whereas the bankruptcy issue is solved. 
Greece would benefit nonetheless: the possibility of being 
shut from the market would not exist any longer – money 
would always be available. 
De Grauwe’s fear – shared by Issing – is that without dif-
ferential pricing there would be a problem of free riding or 
moral hazard. In Issing’s article, one paragraph stands out 
that both expresses this fear while arguably exposing a 
flaw in the reasoning behind it: 
Supporters of the European bond idea argue that this would 
mean that the “strongest” guarantee for the “weakest”, and 
ask whether this isn’t exactly what Europeans mean when they 
talk of solidarity? (2009: 77) 
The question appears to be rhetorical - but arguably, the 
answer to it is ‘no’. ‘Solidarity’ in the context of the euro-
zone is not simply a question of strong taking care of weak 
– doing so is ostensibly in the interests of the latter but 
against the interest of the former – but rather of a pooling 
of resources according to the collective interest. Issing’s 
case – and, to a lesser extent, that of De Grauwe and 
Moesen – takes an isolated, restricted economic view of 
the eurozone which arguably starts from the wrong place. 
From a different, general economic perspective, as Dumas 
has said, the stronger states ‘beggar’ as well as ‘subsidise’ 
the weaker states within the euro zone: a strong exporter 
such as Germany needed its ‘irresponsible’ Greeks and 
Italians. Once the problem is viewed in this way, the free 
rider argument looks less self-evident, and the moral 
judgements that are so often attached to the distinction 
between ‘strong’and ‘weak’ states appear somewhat my-
opic. In practice, the euro operates as an elaborate system 
of wealth distribution whose underlying asymmetries have 
been laid bare during the current crisis. In this sense, the 
critics are only half-right after all when they say that the 
euro is a transfer union. It always has been, and must con-
tinue to be if the euro is to survive, let alone thrive. In this 
sense, we would agree with Eichengreen: 
Transfer Union or Common Bond? 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 12, Number 1 (November 2010) 
47 
Only when a homogenous debt instrument with a euro wide 
market comes into existence, when it is backed by the full faith 
and credit of euro area governments as a group, and only when 
it is backstopped by the ECB will the euro be in a position to 
seriously rival the dollar as a reserve currency. (2009: 17) 
Concluding remarks 
‘It will be said that only a madman could perceive such 
things in the Marshall and Truman plans. I am that mad-
man,’ Bataille wrote (1949: 197 n. 22). As things turned 
out, the formula he proposed for the Marshall Plan was 
very close to that which was adopted six months later 
(Surya, 2002: 377). Using the same reasoning, the ‘mad-
man’s’ solution to the eurozone – if it is to survive on any-
thing like its present scale – must involve deeper union, 
and this requires some form of financial (not just fiscal) 
integration. The alternative is a different kind of madness: 
the all-too-familiar pattern of serial crisis-and-compromise 
as we are left speculating about whether specific member-
states – Greece now, Ireland next? – will still be part of the 
eurozone in a year’s time. 
Endotes 
1The word ‘transfer’ comes up four times in the original Maas-
tricht Treaty - see Articles 73h and 205 - and never in line with 
current usage. 
2Although Bataille is not widely cited in economic sociology, ideas 
closely related to his work, focused mainly on gift exchange, are 
widely used and have featured in recent issues of this newsletter 
(e.g. November 2009 issue). In relation to money, the notion of 
gift exchange has been used successfully by Keith Hart, who has 
been interviewed for this Newsletter (November 2007). Mauss is 
cautious about applying the gift exchange framework to contem-
porary society, but does occasionally turn his attention to con-
temporary phenomena, as in discussions of Friendly Societies and 
the morality of the ‘liberal professions’ (1950: 89). ‘We touch on 
fundamentals,’ he says. 
3Space prevents us from going into the aspect of rivalry that is so 
important to Bataille’s approach, but suffice to say it seems to be 
readily applicable to the political dynamics of the eurozone. As we 
are seeing at present, only the finest of lines separates co-
operation from open rivalry and conflict. However, it is the collec-
tive interest underpinning institutions in the general economy 
framework that we wish to bring out: this is fundamental to 
Bataille’s remarks on the Marshall Plan, and to our interpretation 
of the eurozone’s current predicament. 
4In any case, budget deficits in the eurozone’s periphery under-
mine the immediate prospects for any Keynesian stimulus, in so 
far as ‘investor confidence requires tightening the budget in small 
countries with proportionately large deficits, especially those with 
outstanding debt already’ (ibid., 157). The stabilization fund has 
served merely as a stopgap in this sense, enabling Greece to fund 
its deficit for the time being but – according to Dumas – under-
mining the ‘spirit’ of the euro project sufficiently to cast doubt on 
Greece’s continuing membership and, more generally, on wheth-
er the logical next stage – ‘fusion into a proto nation-state’ (ibid., 
158) – will ever be achieved. 
5Bataille invokes Keynes just once, referring in the ‘Preface’ to 
The Accursed Share to the ‘mystery of Keynes’s bottles’ (1949: 
13) – an example from Chapter 10 of The General Theory (1936) 
dealing with the use of expenditure to stimulate demand. 
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The outbreak of the global financial crisis in Autumn 2008 
drew the attention of the general public to the financial 
markets. Over the last two years we have seen a number 
of popular as well as academic attempts to explain the 
reasons for the crisis, most of them focusing on the Ameri-
can subprime mortgages on the one hand and the grow-
ing market for derivatives on the other. Even before the 
current financial crisis we could observe a growing interest 
of social scientists in the financial markets. There has been 
a number of very detailed analysis concerning the work of 
financial investors (Knorr Cetina/ Preda2004, Langenohl/ 
Schmidt-Beck 2007), social sciences of finance (Kalthoff 
2009) or ethnographical analyses (MacKenzie 2006) to 
name just a few. However, so far not many sociological 
analyses of power relations with a specific focus on finan-
cial markets have seen the light of the day.1 One of the 
main interests in developing this power-matrix (as well as a 
series of related analyses, cf. Wetzel/ Zieliński [forthcom-
ing]) was to identify a gap in current research and to pro-
vide a first attempt at analysing the power relations be-
tween banks and other social fields and institutions.2 The 
starting point was the assumption that it must be possible 
to leave the level of purely functional analysis and to look 
at causal relations between various institutional actors with 
a focus on major banks. When looking at the current fi-
nancial crisis it seems plausible to assume that the concen-
tration of power in the hands of a few actors, among them 
some of the biggest banks in the world, is one of the main 
consequences of the ongoing financial crisis. Of course not 
all major banks can be considered as „winners“ of the crisis, 
but surprisingly many.3 
In our forthcoming publication we have proceeded in two 
steps: First we drew a complex picture of the financial 
market apparatus showing the central position of large 
transnational private banks in it but also a number of im-
portant relations between the important institutional pro-
tagonists (eg. rating agencies or the IMF). In a second step 
we undertook an in-depth analysis of three areas of inter-
est concerning the power of banks: a power-matrix identi-
fying the most important forms of power in the relations 
between major banks and other institutions, the question 
of regulative practices as well as an analysis of the ongoing 
process of concentration in the field of banks. For the 
purpose of this article we have decided to narrow down 
the scope and focus on the power-matrix. It is the result of 
an attempt at identifying different forms of power rela-
tions between banks and other areas of societal life. At the 
base we have the work of Heinrich Popitz who distin-
guished – from an anthropological perspective – four 
forms of power. We provided them with a social construc-
tionist twist and analysed various forms of power relations 
in a highly differentiated society. 
While the main focus of our work does not lie on central 
banks, it is still necessary to include them in an analysis of 
the power of banks. Through interest rates they have a big 
influence on the economic cycle and on the realm of pos-
sibilities of the major banks. From a critical sociological 
perspective it seems important to highlight mainly two 
moments: the dogma of political independence of central 
banks as well as the possibilities of profit that low interest 
rates offer to banks. Since the establishment of the Federal 
Reserve in 1913, the independence of central banks from 
political institutions has been a central dogma in financial 
policy. Nowadays practically every country in the world has 
a more or less independent central bank. Since being inde-
pendent from the political system is not a given fact, it 
must be fought for politically. Traditionally, the big private 
banks have been the major supporter of the independence 
of central banks (Epstein 2009). From this perspective it is 
not surprising that the commission which was established 
in the United States to formulate the bailout in October 
2008, had as its members mainly representatives of the 
major banks (as well as the treasure secretary, Henry Paul-
son, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs).4 Concerning the 
policy of interest rates it is now common – other than e.g. 
a hundred years ago – that the prime interest rate is not 
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the same as the lowest rates for private and business loans. 
Instead an interest rate exists for inter-banking loans (in 
the European Union the Euribor), which is the average of 
the actual interest rates and forms the base for all other 
credits which are usually 2% higher than the Euribor. 
Obviously big banks are the primary institutions that are 
interested in low prime interest rates: They are able to 
access large sums of money more or less for free and as-
sume that the interest rates they have to pay on these 
loans will be paid for by the loan takers. Over the last dec-
ades it has become less and less appealing to invest this 
money into so called „real economy“, instead the banks 
use the money for investments into financial markets. 
Our working hypothesis is that major banks have managed 
to profit from the momentum and to use the financial 
crisis to strengthen their position and to expand their 
power, also through the use of state aid. Of course we 
must not forget that the patterns that we will present here 
are merely a heuristic snap-shot – in reality the power 
relations are much more dynamic and overlapping. The 
reasoning behind the analyses of power relations is that for 
a long time (that is Max Weber's perspective for example) 
it was rather difficult to study relations of power in society 
which led social scientists to focus on the analysis of rule. 
Nowadays, however, especially if we take Giorgio Agam-
ben's thesis of the permanence of the state of emergency 
(Agamben 2005) seriously, it is rather difficult to identify 
stable structures of rule in contemporary society (especially 
in the supranational context). This is why it makes sense to 
analyse power relations between major players and assume 
that there might be a connection between these relations 
and emerging structures of rule. Of course – as the name 
“relations“ implies – it is important to remember that 
power relations are always two-fold and reciprocal. 
Matrix of power relations 
The basis for the following matrix is Heinrich Popitz' power 
typology (Popitz 1992). Popitz defines power (following 
Weber) as the ability to prevail against external forces 
(Popitz 1992: 22). His phenomenological approach identi-
fies power as anthropological constants. We would like to 
follow Michel Foucault and speak of power relations in-
stead (Wetzel 2004). However, Popitz' typology is a good 
way to label diverse power relations in different fields of 
society. 
For Popitz the power of action is based on the vulnerability 
of living beings. He adds: „the vulnerability as creature is 
complemented by economic vulnerability.“ (Popitz 1992: 
24). The power of mobilisation is an instrumental form of 
power. It relies on the possibility to give or take, ie. on a 
disposition about penalties and rewards that is based on 
alternatives and credible for the concerned persons or 
institutions. The power of data setting is founded on the 
fact that by producing artefacts one is able to exercise 
power over persons who use these artefacts. It is inherent 
to these artefacts and often latent over a long period of 
time, but can become manifest at any time. The power of 
position draws the attention to the fact that actors in cer-
tain positions possess a special kind of power over other 
actors which are subordinated to them hierarchically. We 
add to Popitz' typology another common type of power, 
the power of definition. It stands for the ability to exercise 
power through the definition of a situation. In this process 
the complexity of a situation is reduced in a manner which 
makes certain interpretations plausible while excluding 
others. 
In a second step we add a horizontal axis to our power-
matrix. On this axis we locate the social fields. We focus on 
those areas of social reality which we consider most rele-
vant from the perspective of power sociology, namely: 
economy, politics and mass media. The result is the follow-
ing 5 x 3 matrix describing the various forms of power 
relations between big banks and other institutions. 
See appendix, table 1 
On the following pages we will describe those forms of 
power relations that we consider the most important ones. 
Of course more details could be added to the description 
of every field. The examples are meant more as an illustra-
tion than as a proof for the correctness of the diagnosis. 
We begin with the power of definition where the creation 
of highly complex derivatives (SIVs) can be interpreted as 
an important form of power of the banks. A number of 
banks, above all Citigroup, had created a number of struc-
tured products that were then sold to private and institu-
tional investors from all over the world. The CMDs which 
played an important role in the subprime crisis are a good 
example of such SIVs. CMDs are securitisations5 of Ameri-
can subprime mortgages, i.e. mortgages that have been 
loaned although it was highly unlikely that the loan takers 
would be able to pay them back. This power of definition is 
linked to what we have identified as power of data setting: 
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The Revised Framework on International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, better known 
as Basel II, which was implemented for all European banks 
on 1 January 2007. This document set new rules for the 
assessment of investment risk and the according equity ratio 
while at the same time raising the minimum equity ratio. 
Due to the prominent role of banks for loan-giving not 
only to companies but through mortgage or consumption 
loans also to private persons this power of data setting can 
– in a relatively short time span – have big implications for 
the whole economy. It is easier to assess the range of this 
power of the Banking Supervision if one remembers that 
the rules which had been implemented before, the Basel I 
accord, led to the development of a second accounting (so 
called 'shadow banking') where banks covered a part of 
their investments in order to circumvent the regulations of 
Basel I concerning the equity ratio.6 It seems likely that for at 
least some of these institutions these measures were neces-
sary to prevent bankruptcy.7 One of the consequences of 
Basel II was that these investments had to be properly ac-
counted for. Since they were linked to the American im-
mobility market through the above mentioned securitiza-
tions, they lost a big part of their value when prices for 
houses started falling which had the consequence that 
many banks „became heavily undercapitalized“ (Fratianni 
und Marchionne 2009: 3). 
It is necessary to link this process to the power of action of 
banks in the field of economy which we have identified as 
the possibility to enforce a credit crunch. Above all it is the 
procyclical effect of the Basel II rules that shows its effects: 
In times of crisis many companies face a decline in orders 
which makes it harder for them to pay back their loans. 
Banks are then forced to consider these loans as more 
risky, which needs more equity and can lead to an addi-
tional decline in loans. 
After this short overview of some of the most important 
forms of power of banks in the field of economy, we 
would like to turn our attention to the field of politics. The 
first thing we notice concerns the power of definition 
(„who is able to define that we face a crisis?“): If we take 
a close look at the emergence of the financial crisis in 
2007/2008 it quickly becomes obvious that the only insti-
tutions which are able to diagnose a comprehensive finan-
cial crisis are the banks: The decisive event was the break-
down of the inter-banking trade in August 20078 as well 
as in September 2008.9 Retrospectively this can be re-
garded as the starting point of the ongoing financial crisis 
which is directly linked to the self-regulation of the finan-
cial institutions: Since nobody else is able to check the 
validity of the balance sheets of banks, it is only the actors 
on the financial markets, that can declare a crisis.10 We 
would like to illustrate how little overview let alone influ-
ence politicians have in this area with a quote from the 
former German financial minister who declared on 25 
September 2008, that is only a few hours before the 
emergency meeting between the German government and 
representatives of the major German banks, that „the 
financial crisis is mainly an American problem“ (Schäfer 
2009: 203). Leading Swiss politicians made similar state-
ments. It is thus no surprise that journalists like the chief of 
the economy department of the daily German newspaper 
Süddeutsche Zeitung considered the crisis a blackmail by 
the financial markets (Schäfer 2009: 205). Critical econo-
mists like the American Michael Hudson even went so far 
as to speak of a coup of the „banksters“ (Hudson 2008). 
This influence of banks on politics leads us to the power of 
action and decision. There are mainly two reasons why the 
political system in contemporary democracies can get un-
der heavy pressure from the financial markets: First there is 
the aforementioned monopoly on the diagnosis of crisis, 
on the other hand we have the fact, that due the huge 
amount of public debt and the independence of central 
banks virtually all nation states have to rely on good rela-
tions with the financial markets. Just to cite one example 
among many for this progressing financialization of soci-
ety: pension funds invest their assets, i.e. the future pen-
sions of a lot of employees, into financial markets hoping 
for a maximal return on investment. Thus it seems highly 
likely that a possible breakdown of institutions which are 
very important for the functioning of the system would 
have far-reaching consequences for society as a whole (so 
called systemic risk). Another popular way to formulate this 
interconnectedness was the “too big to fail” slogan. 
The mutual work on the rescue packages from the state – 
which we interpret as a form of power of mobilisation – of 
politicians and representatives of the major banks appears 
then as a almost logical consequence of these structural 
implications. We would like to remind the reader that the 
bailout had not enough support at all during its first read-
ing in the Congress. The necessary majority was estab-
lished only a couple of days later – we are left with specu-
lations on the degree of influence and/or pressure exer-
cised on the Congressmen in between to convince them, 
that and why it was necessary to enact the bailout in such 
a form (keyword: lobbying). In Germany not even the 
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members of parliament belonging to the oppositional 
fraction voted against the so called Finanzmarktstabilitäts-
gesetz [law on stability of financial markets], although no 
form of parliamentary, ie. democratic control was imple-
mented regarding the use of these funds.11 
During the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, where 
countermeasures to the crisis were discussed and imple-
mented, the responsible persons were the ministers of 
finance on one hand and the directors of the central banks 
on the other hand. This can be regarded as an extreme 
form of lobbying which we interpret as power of position: 
Lobbying nowadays does not take place indirectly through 
gratifications for chosen members of parliament but very 
directly – the person in the government which is most 
responsible for financial affairs is closely related to the big 
banks. It is thus hardly surprising that the state aid pack-
ages were constructed in such a form that mainly those 
institutions profited from this process that already be-
longed to the more powerful actors in the field: „In both 
cases, before and after the financial crisis, the biggest play-
ers on the market had the biggest benefits: before the crisis 
the highest gains and after the crisis the farthest reaching 
liquidity guarantees.“ (Honegger et al. 2010: 311). 
In the last part of this section concerning the power-matrix 
we will focus on different forms of power relations be-
tween big banks and mass media. Andreas Langenohl 
reminds us, that in the last 100 years „the presence of 
financial markets in mass media has increased a lot“ (Lan-
genohl 2009: 253), which can be seen not the least in the 
way how actors on financial markets try not only to shape 
but also to anticipate the perception and the image of 
financial products in the media. Following up on Michel 
Callon we can observe how „framing“12 plays an impor-
tant role concerning the perception of financial markets of 
laymen (Callon 1998). At the same time news become 
more and more a form of merchandise. Critical media 
theorists have interpreted this process as the ability to 
medially create, or even invent reality (Parenti 1993). As a 
consequence of this we expect far reaching interconnec-
tions between financial markets and mass media, as they 
can be observed for example in the fact that the two big-
gest wire agencies – Reuter’s and AP – now belong to the 
Canadian financial agglomerate Thomson.13 
Regarding the central forms of power relations in this field 
of society we have to be rather cursory compared to econ-
omy and politics since research in this area began only very 
recently (Reichert 2009). A crucial element of the heavy 
influence exercised by financial institutions upon average 
consumers lies in the fact that over the last 20 years we 
saw a massive increase in the amount of reports regarding 
the financial markets and written with laypeople in mind 
which led to a de-mystification of stock markets.14 Until 
the 1990ies the masses considered investing in stocks as 
something reserved for the upper classes of society. We 
put forth the hypothesis that as a result of this PR cam-
paign a rising number of persons from the middle class 
began investing their savings in stocks. From there it was 
only a small step to motivate them to invest their money 
into products which can bring more profit – but which at 
the same time are also more risky. This is an important 
form of the power of mobilization. 
We see a connection to the ability of institutional actors on 
financial markets to influence the direction of media re-
ports about financial markets in general through adver-
tisement (power of position). Over the last 10 years this 
form of influence-taking has gained importance through the 
advent of free newspapers. These papers have very small 
editorial staff and rely heavily on wire services like Reuter's 
or AP, which leads to a high selectivity of reported news – 
these papers focus on news that „sell“, ie. crime, sex and 
celebrities. It is more important to provide the latest news 
fast than to research them in-depth. At the same time free 
newspapers follow the 'infotainment' paradigm (Postman 
1985) and are – due to being available to the readers for 
free while still having costs of printing etc. – totally depend-
ent on revenue generated through advertisements. At the 
same time an increasing concentration of the media land-
scape in the hands of very few huge concerns can be ob-
served concerning which we cannot get into in detail here 
due to place constraints. It can be assumed, though, that 
actors with more accumulated wealth are in a stronger 
position to influence the public opinion.15 
Finally we would like to turn our attention to the power of 
data setting which is especially visible regarding the publi-
cation of balance sheet of banks and other financial insti-
tutions. As already mentioned, it is very difficult or almost 
impossible to obtain exact numbers about the actual bal-
ance sheet of banks. Concerning companies the situation 
is slightly different: they are obliged to publish their num-
bers due to the public character of stock exchange. How-
ever, the published numbers are not always reliable: A 
report of the GAO [General Accountability Office, then: 
General Accounting Office] showed that between January 
1997 and June 2002 around 900 published financial in-
formations had to be corrected due to substantial errors. 
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This corresponds to around 10% of companies from the 
NYSE. In the following years these numbers have risen 
dramatically.16 The scandal around the energy corporation 
Enron was the case which received most public attention 
worldwide. Enron broke down in December 2001 as the 
result of one of the biggest accounting scandals till then.17 
It is hard to establish a direct connection between this cor-
poration and the major banks. Fact is though, that not only 
the Bank of America and Lehman Brothers but also Citi-
group and J.P.Morgan reached out of court agreements and 
paid totally five billion USD to affected investors. However 
they refused to acknowledge any form of guilt. The prosecu-
tors accused the banks of helping Enron to falsify their fi-
nancial statements and to cover up their indebtedness. An-
other charge was that analysts knowingly formulated wrong 
stock evaluations (FAZnet, 15 June 200518). 
Finally it can be argued that regarding the steerage of the 
perception of the crisis mass media have a huge impact on 
how the public opinion perceives the events on financial mar-
kets. The involved persons consider it to be so huge that at 
the outbreak of the financial crisis the German chancellor 
Angela Merkel met the chief editors of the biggest German 
daily newspapers to suggest to them a cool-headed coverage. 
Conclusion 
Analyses of power relations in contemporary society often 
face the objection that they are overly pessimistic, even 
fatalistic, and that they do not offer any solutions for im-
provements of the situation. Obviously this article is not the 
right place to start a political debate on possible reforms of 
the financial system (see Mügge in this issue). Instead we 
would like to draw your attention to the concept of profana-
tions in the sense that Giorgio Agamben (2007 [2005]) gave 
to this word in his essay In Praise of Profanation. 
What is a profanation? According to Agamben it means to 
„return things to the free use of men“ (Agamben 2007: 73), 
things, that had been first sacralized. Distinguishing profana-
tion from secularization, Agamben connects the former to 
the concept of power in a very specific way: „[profanation] 
deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to com-
mon use the spaces that power had seized“ (Agamben 
2007: 77). In his essay Agamben refers to Walter Benjamin's 
classical fragment Capitalism as Religion.19 In his thesis on 
the religious character of the capitalist system Benjamin 
identified three principal traits of such a theological concep-
tion of Capitalism. First, it is a „purely cultic religion, perhaps 
the most extreme that ever existed“ (Benjamin 2004 [1921]: 
288). This means that it does not need specific dogmas or 
even a theology to function. Second, it is the only religion 
where the cult is permanent. There is no „weekday“ in the 
capitalist system – the celebration of God through the flow 
of money never stops.20 Third, it is the first religion ever 
which is not directed at the absolution or repentance of its 
followers but at their guilt (Schuld in German which at the 
same time means “debt”) – one of the main functions of 
capitalism being the production of relations of debt. Benja-
min identifies a fourth trait as well regarding the representa-
tion of God when he wrote that „its God must become 
concealed“ (Benjamin 2004 [1921]: 289). 
Agamben concludes his lucid analysis with the thesis that 
in the meantime capitalism has managed to „generalize in 
every domain the structure of separation the defines relig-
ion“ (Agamben 2007: 81) which makes profanation very 
difficult, albeit not impossible, thus making „the profana-
tion of the unprofanable the political task of the coming 
generation“ (Agamben 2007: 92). We would like to leave 
it to the imagination of the reader to think of possible 
connections between financial markets, religious structures 
and profanations. 
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Endnotes 
1Cf. Wixforth 1997 and Pfeiffer 1993. Other than the usual analys-
es of the power of banks we aren't interested in the interdepen-
dences between banks and companies, like the proxy voting power 
or seats in directories (cf. Brendel 2001), but intend to analyse far 
reaching forms of power in relation to society as a whole. 
2The notion of power relations as opposed to a quasi-ontological 
analysis of power stems from Michel Foucault. He defines a 
“power relation” as an “action that tries to influence the action 
of others” (Foucault 1982:220). 
3In Germany the Deutsche Bank can be considered the main 
winner, in Switzerland this position belongs to Crédit Suisse, while 
the UBS in Switzerland and the Hypo Real Estate in Germany 
belong to the losers who needed state rescue, cf. Wet-
zel/Hofstätter/Flück 2010. 
4According to the Wall Street Journal „the participation of Ken 
Lewis, CEO of the Bank of America, Jamie Dimon, CEO of 
J.P.Morgan Chase; Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of the Goldman Sachs 
Gruppe; John Mack, CEO of Morgan Stanley; and Robert P. Kelly, 
CEO of the Bank of New York Mellon“ was expected. 
5The problem with securitizations is that the risk of a loan is 
being transferred from the bank which gives the loan to the 
market and can have as a consequence that the bank does not 
pay that much attention to whom it provides with loans as long 
as it can make sure that someone else buys the securitization. 
6“At the end of 2007, J.P.Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup 
each had nearly $1 trillion in assets held off their books in special 
securitization vehicles. For Citigroup this represented about half 
the bank’s overall assets” (Crotty 2009: 570, our accentuation). 
7Wagster points out that already before the implementation of 
Basel-I, „banks greatly increased their level of involvement in 
contingent, as opposed to immediate, claims on the bank (, …) 
so-called off-balance sheet activities” (Wagster 1996: 1324). 
8„On 9 August 2007 (...) the interest rate which is taken into 
account for short-term lending between banks became very vola-
tile. Usually it varies by one or two hundreds of a percent, now it 
had suddenly risen by 70 hundreds. Banks were making inter-
banking loans more expensive and hindering the circulation of 
money “ (FAZ, 14 February 2009). 
9„But the inter-banking trade almost didn't exist. 'The financial 
markets completely broke down' said Christoph Rieger from 
Dresdner Kleinwort. 'The central banks are the only ones who put 
money into the market, nobody else is lending anything.' The 
important point of reference in the inter-banking trade, the daily 
libor for the USD, rose as high as never before, by 481 basis 
points to 6,88 per cent, and ranks much higher than the prime 
interest rates of the central banks (EU: 4,25 per cent, USA: 2 per 
cent).“ (Frankfurter Rundschau, 01 October 2008). 
10Cf. the interview with Charles Wyplosz, a professor in econom-
ics from Geneva in the Swiss daily newspaper NZZ on 3 January 
2010: „NZZ: How healthy is the financial and banking system 
these days? CW: This is the well protected secret of the regulators 
like the Finma [the Swiss SEC] (...) The public opinion never knows 
how good or bad the balance sheet of the banks really are.“  
11Just to remind the casual reader that in many industrial coun-
tries the current ministers of finance are former employees of big 
financial institutes: Henry Paulson (USA) came from Goldman 
Sachs, Hans-Rudolf Merz (Switzerland) from the UBS. Already 
Robert Rubin, American treasury secretary in the 1990ies, came 
from Goldman Sachs (cf. Blomert 2007: 451). 
12Cf. Thompson 2009 for an overview of two academic and four 
popular frames of the ongoing financial crisis. 
13Cf. Hack 2007 for a reconstruction of the role this transnatio-
nal company played in the concentration processes in European 
economy in the last 30 years. 
14Which is not equal to more transparency on the financial markets. 
15Just one example from Switzerland: The widely read left-liberal 
magazine Weltwoche was bought in 2002 by Tito Tettamanti, a 
wealthy investor. Before the purchase the magazine featured a wide 
range of political opinions. After a very short time span many journal-
ists left the magazine and it became an important propaganda tool 
for neoliberal thinking, sometimes with latently racist tendencies. 
16Source:http://www.rwp.bwl.uni-
muenchen.de/files/download/bilanzskandale.pdf  
17Only half a year later the revision of the financial statements of 
Worldcom, a transnational company in the field of telecommuni-
cation, found out grave discrepancies. Expenses had been 
accounted for as investments, which increased the revenues by 
3,8 billion USD. The responsible managers were sentenced to high 
jail sentences, cf. Bryce 2002. 
18http://www.faz.net/s/RubC9401175958F4DE28E143E6888882
5F6/Doc~ED389CD5E2C0C48B19C3E61  
CCFF69275D~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html 
19Of course, Benjamin was not the first one to make this com-
parison. Another well-known author who dedicated a whole book 
to the subject was Paul Lafargue. In 1886 he published La réligion 
du capital where he describes the limitless power of capital 
consisting in four interrelated traits: a) ubiquity of capital, b) 
capital as “prime substance” and “world soul”, c) the ability of 
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capital to transform and destroy all that exists and d) capital as 
real and thus true God (Lafargue 2009: 94). Recently quite a large 
number of publications on the analogy between capitalism and 
religion has been published. To name just a few: Baecker 2003, 
Deutschmann 2001, Fleischmann 2010, Goodchild 2002, 2009, 
Grau 2004, Knitter/Muzaffar 2002. 
20Benjamin Barber (2007) identifies five forms of the rule of the 
market: ubiquity, omnipresence, addictive character, self-
replication and omnilegitimacy. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Matrix of power relations for major banks 
 Economy Politics Media 
Power of Definition To configure structured products To diagnose the crisis Information management 
Power of Acting 
and Deciding 
To communicate a ‘credit crunch’ Pressure through (systemic) 
threats 
To produce in-transparency 
Power of Action 
and Mobilization 
Capital accumulation, Mergers To prepare the rescue packages Motivate to investments 
Power of Data 
Setting 
Setting up rules for capital quota 
(Basel I and II) 
Interest rates Publication of Balance Sheet 
Power of Position Stabilizing or destabilizing effect Lobbying Advertising 
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The financial crisis shattered many of the shibboleths of 
orthodox economics and monetary policy. These in-
cluded the “efficient markets hypothesis” so often used 
to justify the deregulation of the financial sector and the 
monetarist belief that inflation targeting through interest 
rate adjustments was the most effective and only neces-
sary tool for stabilizing the economy (Galbraith 2009). 
Rather less, however, has been heard about what the 
crisis means for our understanding of the production 
and allocation of money. In a similar vein, discussions of 
financial reform and regulation have mainly focused 
upon institutions – banks, credit rating agencies, regula-
tors – rather than more fundamental questions about 
the existing modes and rules around monetary produc-
tion and allocation. For example, few within the main-
stream are questioning the fact that, through a gradual 
process of centralization, deregulation and advances in 
ICT, today 97% of money in circulation is issued by 
profit-making commercial organizations (banks) as inter-
est-bearing debt, while only 60 years ago, this was closer 
to 50% with the remainder issued as coins and notes by 
the state (Morrison 2006: 51-53). This despite the ‘unor-
thodox’ ventures in to quantitative easing by Central 
Banks which have revealed that, under a fiat credit-
based monetary system, there is nothing to stop sover-
eign states directly creating money whenever they really 
need to.1 Neither has policy focused much upon how 
reforms of the monetary system might meet the global 
challenges of inequality and ecological sustainability.2 
Two ‘mainstream’ schools of thought can be identified 
in modern monetary theory3 (Goodhart 1998; Ingham 
2006). The dominant ‘Mengerien’ (Menger 1892) theory 
(also Metallist or commodity-theory theory) in orthodox 
economics – and also in modern monetary policy, at 
least pre-crisis – views modern money as arising naturally 
out of market exchange as a unique kind of commodity 
against which all goods could be traded and priced.  
Money is the ‘universal equivalent’ that enables multilat-
eral exchange and enables users to circumvent the ‘coin-
cidence of wants’ required for barter (Jevons 1875; 
Menger 1892). The emphasis here is upon money’s key’s 
function being as a means of exchange.  When this 
concept of money is fed in to neo-classical general equi-
librium models of the economy, it becomes a ‘neutral 
veil’ enabling production and consumption (supply and 
demand) to meet more efficiently than barter. Such a 
model is based upon widely discredited assumptions of 
perfect information and competition (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). Leon Walrus based his model of general equilib-
rium upon an omnipotent ‘auctioneer’ who knew the 
value of everything immediately all the time. The para-
dox is that if we really did have perfect or symmetric 
information about the value of every good and service 
we wouldn’t need money at all, nor financial intermedi-
aries of any kind, as the problem of requiring a double 
coincidence of wants would never appear (Werner 2005: 
193; Lapavitsas 2005). 
In contrast, the ‘Chartalist school’ of monetary theory 
regards modern money as a creation of the state as the 
only actor capable of guaranteeing confidence in a cur-
rency through its ability to act as the guarantor of an 
abstract ‘money of account’ (Knapp 1905; Keynes 1930; 
Wray 1998; Ingham 2004). The unit of account function 
of money is held to be logically anterior to its role as 
means of exchange or store of value and held to be vital 
in the establishment of stable pricing system, large-scale 
market exchange, settlement of debts and modern capi-
talism itself (Ingham 2008: 65-92). Money is a social 
relation of abstract value defined by a sovereign money 
of account. 
The Mengerian school relies mainly upon deductive ab-
stract theoretical models (see Kyotaki and Wright 1989 
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for a modern micro-economic model of the Mengerien 
position).  The Chartalists draw upon a richer range of 
research, including wide-ranging historical analysis (Ing-
ham 2004) but very little original research. Economic 
sociologists have adopted a more inductive approach, 
emphasizing more the social construction of money in 
everyday use and the way institutions and people actu-
ally produce and use money today (Zelizer 1997; Dodd 
2005; Thrift and Leyshon 1997). These scholars suggest 
modern fiat credit-money, based as it is upon a social 
relation of credit and debt, requires empirical study of 
the social and political construction of ‘monetary net-
works’ that enable the modern monetary system to 
function. For Dodd (1994: xxiii): 
Each function of money (medium of exchange, store of 
value) relies on an extended network of social relation-
ships… the analysis of monetary networks provides a basis 
for detailed empirical study of specific monetary forms 
without ruling out comparison between them or presuppos-
ing which types of social action monetary transaction prin-
cipally involves. 
Recognising the dominance of the financial sector in the 
production and distribution of modern fiat credit-money, 
a few scholars have taken up Dodd’s challenge in rela-
tion to the monetary networks that maintain modern 
finance (Thrift 1994; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; 
Mackenzie 2006). A fourth ‘function’ of money – as a 
tool for speculation – has gradually become accepted as 
part of the challenge facing a globalised largely elec-
tronic debt-based money system where credit is largely 
issued by commercial banks4 [Lietaer 2000: p332]. 
Monetary innovation driven by speculative profit was 
already a popular topic even before the financial crisis 
with numerous articles on derivatives and securitization 
and more broadly the process of ‘financialisation’ (Pryke 
and Allen 2000; Mügge 2009; Barret et al 2010). 
Much less attention, however, has been paid by scholars 
to monetary innovations that lie outside the world of high 
finance. This includes both recent state innovations such 
as quantitative easing and monetary innovations emerging 
from civil society and the non-bank sector, in particular 
the small and medium sized enterprise sector which ap-
pears increasingly disadvantaged by financialisation and 
banking consolidation (Dymski 1999). These latter exam-
ples are often referred to as ‘complementary currencies’, 
an unsatisfactory term that doesn’t capture their diversity 
or function, since often they involve alternative or com-
plementary payment or banking systems as well as actual 
currencies. I shall instead use the term complementary 
monetary innovations (CMIs). CMIs are perhaps paid less 
attention because of their smaller scale and impact. Some 
in the Chartalist school have used examples of the emer-
gence of complementary currencies to reinforce the ar-
gument that money is essentially sovereign in nature, 
citing examples of ‘weak states’ giving rise to bartering 
such as those that emerged in Argentina in 2000 (North 
2008; Ingham 2004) and in Russia after the break up of 
the Soviet Union (Woodruff 1999). 
Against the Chartalist position, it has been suggested 
that financialisation and globalization are undermining 
the monetary authority of individual states, including its 
guaranteeing of the ‘money of account’ function. ‘Dol-
larisation’, the emergence of the Euro and the exponen-
tial growth in privately created monetary instruments, 
such as derivatives, are used as examples to illustrate this 
phenomenon (Strange 1988; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; 
Cohen 2000; Dodd 2005). Mengeriens might argue that 
these phenomenon represent moves towards greater 
efficiencies of scale (Mundell 1961). But there are also 
interesting monetary developments along an opposite 
trajectory, involving the decentralizing, some would say 
‘democratizing’ of monetary forms. In particular atten-
tion has focused upon the internet as enabling new 
forms of commercial, social or private online clearing 
houses that could supersede central bank’s roles as 
guarantors of the unit of account function (King 1999; 
Hart 2000; Greco 2009). In terms of sheer economic 
scale, commercial monetary instruments such as loyalty 
cards, bi-lateral countertrade (incompletely monetized 
international trade), which is estimated to account for 
10% of world trade (Marin and Schnitzer 1995) and, on 
a smaller scale, regional commercial barter networks also 
appear to challenge the Chartalist position. These latter 
examples also extend back to well before the emergence 
of the internet.5 
But rather than debating complementary currency’s 
relevance based on economic or geographical scale, we 
can also turn the argument on its head consider whether 
interesting lessons about the nature of modern money 
might emanate from examining CMI’s successes and 
failures, past and present. CMIs can perhaps be thought 
of as types of large-scale ‘breaching experiments’ that 
test the strength of adherence of citizens and institu-
tional actors to assumed social and institutional norms 
and values around money (Garfinkel 1966; Goffman 
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1985; North 2010: 203). What both the Mengerien and 
Chartalist schools have in common is an overly deductiv-
ist approach to conceptualising money which neglects 
the socially constructed and embedded nature of their 
subject, despite, in the Chartalist case, a recognition that 
modern money is an inherently social phenomenon. 
In this article, two examples of complementary monetary 
innovation are examined with a more inductive meth-
odological perspective, both of which can be thought of, 
to some extent, as being stimulated by financial crises: 
the Brixton Pound (B£) local currency* and the long-
standing Swiss WIR credit clearing system**. Both of 
these monetary innovations are aimed at supporting 
small and medium sized enterprises, a sector which his-
torically is most endangered by credit crises given their 
lack of reserves and rapid turnover (Nilsen 2002).  
*www.brixtonpound.org and **www.wir.ch 
The B£ was launched in September 2009, almost a year 
to the day after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
with the local Council (the London Borough of Lambeth) 
having launched a ‘Credit-Crunch taskforce’ to support 
SMEs and poorer residents. As a founder-member and 
now Director of the scheme, I have been conducting 
‘action research’ on the project over the past 18 months 
with privileged access to its founding, growth and chal-
lenges. The Swiss WIR, in contrast, was founded in 1930 
following the Great Depression and is perhaps the most 
successful complementary monetary innovation of mod-
ern times in terms of scale and longevity. I review the WIR 
through secondary sources, particularly the work of the 
confusingly named Tobias Studer and James Stodder. 
The success and failures of these models – which despite 
both being aimed at supporting the SME sector – are 
quite different in design, are reviewed and lessons 
drawn out about what this tells us about the nature of 
modern money and the social construction of monetary 
networks. Particular attention is paid to the way in which 
these two models have attempted to complement or 
circumvent the dominance of orthodox state credit-
money in determining the ‘money of account’ function. 
The Brixton Pound (B£) 
One of the most remarkable developments in the UK 
complementary currency ‘movement’ in recent times has 
been the emergence of local, sterling-backed paper 
currency schemes in ‘Transition towns’.6 Following Tot-
nes in 2007, the towns of Lewes, Stroud and Brixton in 
South London have all launched local ‘pounds’, the us-
age of which is restricted to independent businesses in 
their respective areas. There are also a number of ‘nas-
cent’ Transition currencies in the planning stages. 
The aim of these currency systems is to keep a greater 
proportion of local spend circulating within a ‘local area’, 
support the diversity of the high street and ultimately to 
help re-localise production and consumption patterns. 
The ideas is that this will create more resilient local or 
regional economies, less dependent on oil-intensive 
global supply chains and less carbon-intensive forms of 
production; both key elements of the wider ‘Transition 
movement’ (Hopkins 2008; 2010). Ecological economists 
have argued for local and regional currencies as impor-
tant tools for encouraging more effective economic 
development and greater resilience to external economic 
shocks (Douthwaite 1996; Jacobs 1985; Lietaer 2001). 
The currencies can also be viewed as a reaction against 
the ‘Clone Town’ phenomenon, whereby the dominance 
of chain stores and decline of small shops leaves the 
UK’s high streets looking identical (nef 2002). Initial 
research suggests the Transition currencies schemes also 
strengthen community networks7 and they have un-
doubtedly raised the profile of the areas where they are 
situated through widespread local, national and interna-
tional media coverage. Lambeth council, where Brixton is 
based, estimated the scheme realized £100,000 of value 
in terms of positive media coverage for the area.  Here I 
focus upon the Brixton Pound (B£) drawing upon find-
ings from qualitative research.8 
The B£ can seen as a monetary innovation that favours 
the means of exchange function over the store of value 
function. In fact, the B£ cannot be ‘stored’ as there is no 
B£ ‘bank’. The aim was that the currency would circulate 
more rapidly than sterling among Brixton’s small busi-
nesses, increasing demand through a ‘local multiplier’ 
effect, rather than ‘leaking out’ of the local economy 
(nef 2002). By backing the B£ against sterling and mak-
ing it freely interchangeable with, the currency does not 
challenge the sovereign ‘money of account’. Members of 
the scheme debated alternative ‘backings’ for some time 
prior to the launch of the currency but eventually de-
cided, impressed by the launch of the Lewes £ in Sep-
tember 2008, that a sterling-backing currency would be 
the best way of creating initial confidence and encourag-
ing a critical mass of traders to adopt it.9 The group also 
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opted for a range of security features on each note, 
again conscious of creating initial confidence in the 
money.10 
From an orthodox Mengerien perspective, the B£ makes 
little sense. The B£ fails at least three of Stanley Jevons’ 
(1875) characteristics of successful money (in compari-
son with sterling). B£s last only a limited period of time 
(two years), they are not easily exchangeable (there are 
only two places in Brixton where it is possible to change 
back B£s to sterling) and not easily divisible (B£s are 
issued in £1, £5, £10 and £20 notes only with no coins). 
Perhaps most significantly, the B£ is simply not widely 
accepted – they can, by definition, only be used in se-
lected businesses. In addition, the transaction costs asso-
ciated with B£s are also high relative to sterling since the 
currency is paper only. As one user reports, the B£ is a 
‘bit of a pain’: 
“So since it launched anyway, I’ve used them on and off, but 
they’re a little bit difficult to get your hands on sometimes… 
If you work nine-to-five, um… So I use them when I can 
and when I remember, but I don’t always, like, they’re a 
little bit of a pain. Like, evern when you want to use them, 
like I do… they’re a little bit difficult. And also, it becomes 
an extra chore… Because you have to go to the cash point 
and then you have to go to some place where you can do it 
again. So it makes going to the cashpoint a two point ex-
perience.” 
Only a few of the businesses involved in the scheme 
believe the B£ is actually boosting their turnover or foot-
fall, most suggesting that the main users were already 
regular customers.11 In addition, the scheme’s organiz-
ers have struggled to persuade businesses to offer dis-
counts to customers paying in B£s – currently around 
one third  of such businesses do so – so the economic 
advantage to the user also appears marginal. 
Despite this there are currently around B£30,000 in 
‘circulation’ (that is, issued and not exchanged back in to 
sterling), 180 businesses accepting the currency (from 60 
at the launch in September 2009), ranging across all 
sectors12, with only 3-4 businesses dropping out and 
over 1000 ‘users’ who have agreed to receive emails 
about the scheme. Users of the scheme, both businesses 
and customers, appear mainly to be motivated by non-
economic, political or ethical considerations. Although 
an inner city area with high levels of crime and ethnic 
diversity might seem the last place where a local cur-
rency might successfully be introduced, Brixton has a 
vibrant alternative subculture, with a history of political 
resistance, squatting and more recently environmental 
activism. Hundreds of Brixton residents turned out for 
the launch of the B£ in September last year. Some of the 
businesses supporting the scheme related to this history 
and a shared, identifiable sense of the Brixton ‘local 
economy’ as a reason for their participation: 
[owner of Brixton cycles] “Its about marketing and its not 
just about business, its about long term business.  So we've 
obviously been here about what nearly 30 years and we hope 
to be here for another 30 years…  without sort of banging 
your own drum, we are sort of like a stalwart Brixton busi-
ness who have been here since the riots, so it adds consis-
tency to people's lives.  So its like, “Oh thingy might be in 
trouble, but there is always Brixton Cycles”.  Brixton cycles 
is there, some things are always constant and I think being 
involved in the Brixton £ just reiterates our commitment to 
the community…”13 (Owner of cycling shop) 
Well I mean the Brixton Pound does create a lot of com-
monality… remember what Brixton is, its kind of a kaleido-
scope of different, you understand, coming together… and I 
think that having that as a common denominator does 
bring some kind of… you know it does something for the 
community, it does, it, it acts as a common denominator 
right, in as much as it is money or in err err  and also as to 
the ‘our thing’ you know, you understand, the mafia aspect 
of it, ‘cosa nostra’, our thing, you understand, everybody 
loves that.14 (Sole trader selling ginger beer) 
These kind of sentiments support Viviana Zelizer’s (1989) 
concept of money as being structured by cultural and 
social meaning. Zelizer focused on the way in which 
orthodox money ($US) were ‘earmarked’ for different 
purposes in the domestic context – for instance pin 
money for housewives to spend, money for gifts – and 
how this changed over a 60 year period, from 1870-
1930, reflecting changing social norms. When purchas-
ing B£s at least some users might be thought of as ‘ear-
marking’ a percentage of their spend for the ‘local 
economy’, recognizing the value of small businesses over 
and above corporate chains: 
“Well I think the B£ is really good. Money that actually 
revolves in the local economy and builds the local economy, 
and supports local people trying to build their own busi-
nesses is a really good idea. I don’t like the idea of ohhh 
money going to a lot of conglomerates, to pay shareholders.  
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Ummm… who are not doing any work… (User, inter-
viewed 25th June 2010) 
Interestingly, the scheme’s organizers have struggled to 
engage many of Brixton’s market traders with the 
scheme.  This is a source of some concern given that 
many businesses that do accept the currency source 
goods from the market. Many of these traders, although 
having worked in Brixton for many years, do not live 
there and were not born there or in the UK (many are 
have Afghani or Pakistani origins). A typical response 
that I received many times when talking to them about 
he currency was ‘you can’t put it in the bank’ and ‘its 
not real money’ or ‘you can’t pay car parking fees or 
petrol with it’. 
These traders clearly saw that the B£ only partially ful-
filled one of money’s key functions as a store of value – 
because it could not be ‘put in the bank’ at least without 
changing it back in to sterling.  Interviews with B£-
accepting businesses who sourced from traders and 
users who had tried to use the currency with them were 
also revealing, with a number of them intimating that 
these traders ‘background’ meant that they were unable 
to conceptualize the notion of a Brixton currency as 
having real value: 
[restaurant owner] P: “Well the obvious thing is the view that 
its ‘Mickey Mouse’ money, and there’s a very deeply held view 
amongst, particularly amongst, ummm, ummm… you know, 
particularly amongst immigrant and ummm…. Now, you 
know, and I am actually talking about the shops here, not 
consumers, and it may well be true of consumers.  And quite 
often, the people who own businesses and operate businesses, 
don’t actually live in the area… 
MT: And on the first issue, the Mickey Mouse money, what 
do you think we can do about that? 
P: I think… I don’t know how long it took for other areas to 
establish their money, but I think its about quantity of the 
money, you build it up and you build it up until its in regu-
lar use, and people are seeing it on a daily basis and you can 
get over that prejudice…” [Restaurant owner] 
[Café owner] SH: Well, to be quite honest with you, I just 
use various in the market, I couldn’t really name one par-
ticular one And a lot of them, ummm, a lot of them are sort 
of like, they’re not, sort of they’re not of… how can I say 
this?  They’re not of local background, so basically you know 
all they know is the pound, real pound, you know, they look 
at your money and they think ‘what’s that?’  Monopoly 
money, or something like that, do you know what I mean? 
[Café owner] 
[user] Um. I mean I know that some of the, um, traders in 
the market think its not real money. Like I’ve heard some of 
the Afro-Caribbean guys say, oh that’s not real money, I’m 
not taking it.  So I guess that’s an awareness issue. 
We can see clearly from the above comments how the 
social construction of the B£’s value is an ongoing proc-
ess, determined by complex and collectively defined 
conceptions of what counts as the ‘the local economy’ 
which determines the trade off with universally recog-
nized additional transaction costs. 
The B£ organiser’s ambitious aim of genuinely support-
ing small businesses and re-localising the Brixton econ-
omy appears some considerable distance away. Most 
businesses see a turnover of little more than £30-60 a 
week at the present time. Very few of the businesses 
involved purchase supplies from other local businesses 
using the B£ and many complain of ‘just pilling it up in 
the till’ and then having to change it back in to sterling. 
This involves additional transaction costs for the busi-
nesses, although it is free of charge, and somewhat 
undermines the purpose of the scheme. Hence the B£ 
organizers are attempting to persuade the local council, 
the London Borough of Lambeth, to accept B£s as a 
form of tax, as was suggested by the Chief Executive of 
the Council at the launch of the scheme in September 
2011 when he announced he would like ‘B£s to be 
accepted as council tax’.15 The Council could then act 
as a clearing house for the local currency, mimicking the 
state’s role at the national level in creating demand 
through accepting sterling for tax (Wray 2009).  To help 
in this process, the B£ organisers are currently examining 
the potential for creating an electronic version of the 
currency that could be traded with mobile phones, al-
lowing for the creation of bank accounts and avoiding 
many of the transactions costs. 
Whatever the outcome of the B£ project, the fact that 
such a broad range of businesses agreed to become and 
continue to be involved in the scheme, despite a lack of 
tangible economic benefit, does suggest the latent po-
tential for complementary monetary innovations based 
upon values other than profit, even in inner-city London.  
The B£ monetary network may well be fragile but, at 
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180 businesses, it may have reached a critical mass in 
terms of people’s confidence in the value of the money.  
The sheer empirical fact of the scheme appears to fly in 
the face of many of the assumptions of the Megerian 
and Chartalist schools of though on money.  Let us turn 
now to a much larger-scale complementary monetary 
innovation which may shed further light upon these 
tentative findings. 
The Swiss WIR 
The Swiss WIR (formerly WIR Economic Circle Coopera-
tive or Wirtschaftsring) is perhaps the most ‘successful’ 
complementary monetary innovation – in terms of scale 
and longevity - in modern times. It is a centralized credit 
clearing system for multilateral exchange with no physi-
cal currency but rather debits and credits held at the WIR 
Cooperative bank. Compared to the B£, the WIR is mas-
sive in scale with 68,000 members trading 1.6bn Swiss 
Francs equivalent in 2009.16 
The WIR was founded in October 1934, in the midst of 
the Great Depression, as a self-help organization to 
promote solidarity amongst the Swiss entrepreneurial 
middle classes. Revenues in Switzerland from exports 
and tourism had plummeted by 65 percent in the five 
years between 1929 and 1934 and the domestic econ-
omy was suffering from high rates of unemployment 
and increasing bankruptcies (Studer 1998: 10).  The 
objective of the WIR Cooperative Bank was to enable its 
members to buy from and sell to one another despite 
the shortage of official Swiss Francs. The article of intent 
of the original statutes of 1934 envisioned "to jointly 
procure and develop possibilities for work through a ring 
exchange system and mutual help (...) promotion of local 
industries and trades, and mutual support in all business 
ventures." (Defila 1994) 
Initially members acquired WIR credit by depositing an 
equivalent amount in Swiss francs, much in the way B£s 
are currently obtained. Shortly after, however, WIR de-
posits were created by making “loans” against collateral, 
just as in the same way as modern credit-money is cre-
ated by commercial banks. The key differences being 
that WIR credit could only be traded amongst fellow 
members of the WIR cooperative and that WIR credits 
were loaned at zero interest and accrue zero interest 
whilst being held in the bank. The function of granting 
WIR credit loans to members “allows for the creation of 
an economically significant volume of means of pay-
ment, and thus of the needed liquidity for an intense 
level of barter business, one that can make a significant 
difference in the economic activity of the individual par-
ticipant.” (Studer 1998: 32). Like the B£, the WIR is 
primarily designed to favour the ‘means of exchange’ 
function of money over its store of value function. 
All types of goods and services are exchanged – house 
painting, hotel stays, used cars, legal services – with 
offerings posted online and in publications like WIR-Plus. 
Prices are quoted in units of WIRcredit (or CHW), which 
for ease of comparison are denominated in – but not 
redeemable for – Swiss Francs (SFr). The WIR-Bank keeps 
accounts for each household or firm in terms of its WIR-
credits or debits. From the individual’s point of view, an 
account in WIR is much like an ordinary checking ac-
count with clearing balances and limits on how large a 
negative balance can be run. 
By the end of 1934 WIR had three thousand participants 
and its first year of operation, turnover surpassed one 
million francs, ten times the volume of WIR account 
balances (Greco 2009: 153). As recorded by Professor 
Tobias Studer (1998) in his major study of the WIR, it 
continued to grow steadily with occasional crises and 
reorganizations and in 1994 turnover peaked at 2.5 
billion (equivalent to about US$1.6bn and 80,000 mem-
bers) – (Stodder 2009: 81). This was still a small fraction 
of the total Swiss economy, but a significant amount of 
the members’ combined business volume. In 1996, the 
WIR bank made the decisions to also accept deposits of 
Swiss francs and began making loans in Swiss Francs.  
Since then there has been a large and steady increase in 
its Swiss franc deposits and the volume of its Swiss franc 
loans, so they now make up a larger portion of its total 
turnover that WIR trade. Many trades involve part-
payment in WIR. 
The WIR’s success poses a challenge for the Chartalist 
position that sovereign-backed abstract money of ac-
count is required for modern successful modern money. 
The WIR has no state-like authority other the WIR-bank 
itself and its members, all 68,000 of which agree to 
accept the WIR at least in part-payment.  Why then has 
it proved so popular? Research by American economist 
James Stodder (2009), who carried out regression analy-
sis WIR turnover and credit-issue over 56 years, suggests 
that the WIR is highly counter-cyclical. Its use increases 
when the Swiss franc (M2 money supply) becomes more 
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scarce. Stodder argues this may go someway to explain-
ing its longevity and popularity with small and medium-
sized enterprises, which make up the majority of its 
membership and historically tend to be most squeezed 
during credit crises, a dynamic that can also be seen in 
the use of trade credits (or corporate barter schemes) 
(Nilsen 2002). 
Interestingly, Stodder suggests the WIR’s success is due 
to it being even less restricted than orthodox fiat credit-
money its ability to create liquidity for its members. 
Whilst the money supply created by a system of demand 
deposits is fixed by its reserve requirements, the total 
volume of WIR-credits can grow – or shrink – without 
limit (Stodder 2009: 85). As Studer (1998: 32) suggests, 
“every [extra] franc of WIR-credit automatically and 
immediately becomes a franc of WIR payment medium 
to be used anywhere in the system”. The WIR Bank is 
able to act in a similar way to a Central Bank for its 
members as it can, at any time, increase the WIR money 
supply by creating new or larger overdrafts or loans. This 
is a clear economic advantage of the WIR over the Brix-
ton £ model which at the moment can only be bought in 
to circulation with £sterling so does not create any addi-
tional liquidity.  In fact, in reaction to the 2009 financial 
crises, the WIR bank even conducted its own program of 
‘quantitative easing’ – called ‘Impetus SME’ – making 
available CHW 100 million to ‘encourage investment 
projects’ with a maximum loan of 250,000 CHW per 
applicant.17 
Stodder pays less attention in his analysis to the WIR 
Bank’s adherence to strict cooperative lending principles 
and refusal to engage in speculative financial activity. 
Both are factors which may be equally important its in 
longevity and survival of the financial crisis relatively 
unscathed. It is also interesting to note the WIR’s geo-
graphical scale. Unlike many cooperatives in Switzerland 
and other European countries, such as Germany and 
Italy, it is national rather than regional in scale, operating 
across all the Swiss cantons and used by clients speaking 
Italian, French and German. As Stodder suggests, its 
capacity to be of benefit to SMEs across such a cultural 
and physical geography suggests it has the potential to 
be replicated in other countries. Such a concept, on an 
EU-wide scale, has been proposed by ecological econo-
mists as a solution to future European credit crises (Li-
etaer et al. 2008) and more generally as the most effec-
tive model for ‘democratizing’ the monetary system 
(Greco 2009). 
Stodder’s research is backed up by other studies on the 
counter-cyclical nature of trade credit and commercial 
barter systems (Nilsen 2002). However, whilst Stodder 
make an eloquent abstract economic case for the adop-
tion and persistence of the WIR, his research says very 
little about the social and political dynamics – the con-
struction of the monetary network – that have enabled 
the WIR to succeed. 
The WIR bank is recognized as a normal Swiss Bank 
under Swiss law despite clearly issuing a currency that is 
not convertible in to Swiss Francs. This is in contrast to 
the variety of other complementary currencies – ‘scrips’ - 
that circulated in the United States in the early 19th 
century and that emerged during the Great Depression 
both in the US and Europe, but which were either out-
lawed or taxed out of existence by Governments and 
Central Banks who became concerned about losing 
centralized monetary control (Fisher 1933; Zelizer 1997: 
17) Why did the Swiss Government and Central Bank 
allowed the WIR to grow to such a large scale? What are 
the key properties of the monetary network (Dodd 1994: 
xxiv) that holds the Swiss WIR together? To what extent 
are WIR members purely driven by perceived economic 
gains from joining the scheme as opposed to the ethical 
or political motives that appear to drive membership of 
the B£? Given that WIR is not convertible in to the sov-
ereign currency of the state, how do we conceptualise 
its function as a ‘unit of account’ and its wide accep-
tance across ‘space-time’? Answers to above questions 
will require empirical, sociological study – they certainly 
cannot be gleaned from economists’ ideal-type models 
of the economy. 
Conclusion: a research agenda on 
complementary monetary innovations 
Much of the debate about the nature of the money and 
indeed the ‘future of money’ is conducted within the 
confines of incommensurable epistemological paradigms 
– this includes the Mengerian ‘orthodox economics’ and 
Chartalist debate but also Marxist, ecological and femi-
nist economists and more utopian thinkers who point to 
the internet as enabling the re-democratization of 
money (Hart 2000; Greco 2009). What these schools 
appear to have in common is a lack of engagement with 
how people and institutions actually construct the mone-
tary networks that maintain or fail to maintain their 
monetary systems that surround us. 
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A more inductive approach to understanding modern 
money is required with its theory based upon an under-
standing of what is actually happening rather than what 
should happen (Werner 2005: 17). Economic sociology, 
with its emphasis on the social embeddness of economic 
action ((Polanyi 1957; Granovetter 1985) and its em-
brace of ethnographic research methodologies, is well 
placed to do this. The initial research described above on 
the B£ and the Swiss WIR raises a number of interesting 
questions about the social construction of modern 
money and challenges the dominant Mengerian and 
Chartalist theory. Further empirical studies of Comple-
mentary Monetary Innovations could serve as a particular 
useful research arena given their unique positioning in 
challenging the legal, institutional and cultural bounda-
ries of orthodox ‘state money’ and the capacity of non-
state and non-financial actors to challenge a monetary 
system with fundamental flaws. 
Josh Ryan-Collins is a Researcher at nef (the new eco-
nomics foundation), a leading UK think tank campaign-
ing for ecological sustainability, social justice and well-
being. nef has for many years promoted complementary 
currencies and helped introduce LETS and Timebanking 
in the UK. He recently co-authored The New Wealth of 
Time, a major review of timebanking in the UK and 
United States. Josh is also a Founder and Director of the 
Brixton Pound (B£) Community Interest Company, the 
UK’s first urban local currency based in inner-city south 
London. The B£ is currently accepted by 180 independ-
ent businesses with B£30,000 in circulation. Josh is 
trained in Sociology and is also studying part-time for a 
PhD examining what complementary monetary innova-
tions tell us about monetary theory in the School of 
Environmental Science at the University of East Anglia, 
supervised by Dr. Gill Seyfang. He has previously worked 
in strategic communications for the UK government and 
in the private sector and for an economic development 
consultancy. He regularly speaks at national and interna-
tional academic, policy and NGO conferences and writes 
for the nef ‘triple crunch’ blog. 
Endotes 
1Martin Wolf, Economics editor of the Financial Times, is one 
of the few commentators who does seem to realize there are 
alternatives: see for example is his article on June 22nd, ‘Why 
its right for central banks to keep on printing money’, where he 
quotes Milton Friedman’s work. 
2For critiques of debt-based money based upon ecological and 
social arguments, see Daly 1999: 133-168; Douthwaite 2000; 
LIetaer 2000; and Mellor 2010). 
3There are range of other ‘schools’ in monetary theory which 
we do not have space to discuss here but include Post-
Keynesian, ‘Circuitist’, Marxist, Austrian or ‘Free-banking’ and 
Ecological and feminist economists as well as more utopian 
thinkers. For theoretical overviews see Smithin (2000) and 
Ingham (2006). 
4The vast majority of the word’s foreign exchange transactions 
and held to be speculative in nature (need ref). 
5The International Reciprocal Trade Assocation (IRTA) – a US 
based association for regional commercial barter networks 
estimates that $8.25 billion was traded within its regional 
ecchanges worldwide in 2004 (www.irta.com ). 
6For in depth reviews of Transition currencies, see Ryan-Collins 
(forthcoming) and North (2010). 
725% of respondents in a survey of users conducted in Febru-
ary 2010 felt the B£ had enhanced their relationships with local 
businesses. 
8The quotes below are taken from qualitative interviews con-
ducted by the author, Annie Quick, Himi Hall and Myfanwy 
Taylor as part of a paid project to understand the potential for 
Brixton businesses to source more of their goods locally and as 
part of an MSc dissertation by Ms. Taylor (Taylor 2010). The 
quotes should be interpreted as representative illustrations of 
my interpretation of ‘what is happening’ with the Brixton £, 
based also upon my own experiences of initiating the scheme 
and having regular contact with Brixton businesses and users 
over the past 2 years. 
9Brixton £ group meeting minutes, Wednesday 27th August 
2008 and Monday 15th September 2008. 
10Brixton £ note design brief, 23rd July 2009. 
11Based upon qualitative interviews with 20 businesses, June-
August 2010. 
12see http://brixtonpound.org/where/spend  
13Interview with Brixton Cycles by Annie Quick 
14Interview with Ossies’ Fresh Ginger by Myfanwy Taylor 
15Derrick Anderson, Chief Executive of Lambeth Council, 
September 16th 2009 
16WIR Annual reports available from www.wir.ch 
17Banque WIR, Rapport de gestion (WIR Annual Report) 2009, 22. 
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Grassroots Innovations for Sustainable 
Development: a New Research Agenda
By Gill Seyfang, Adrian Smith 
and Noel Longhurst 
Community action for sustainable development is an im-
portant element of most countries’ policies for sustainable 
development. Appeals to ‘big society’ from the new UK 
coalition government imply an enlarged role and responsi-
bility for civil society in achieving policy objectives around 
climate change and sustainability, among other things. 
We welcome this growing recognition of the role of civil 
society in achieving sustainability objectives, but tempered 
with a few words of caution: First, there is very little em-
pirical evidence to support claims that such objectives are 
realistic or achievable; second there is a lack of under-
standing about how to best harness and support the activi-
ties that are taking place; and third, existing evidence 
points to the need for policy support and public invest-
ment, and that effective communities may require effective 
states. In short, the ‘big society’ rhetoric promises a grow-
ing role for civil society, but must not be a smokescreen for 
community development budget cuts. 
Spurred on by these issues, we have developed a research 
agenda to deepen our understanding of these civil society 
processes, and their potential. Our recent research into this 
field, which we term ‘grassroots innovations’ examines the 
processes by which community-led initiatives might de-
velop new solutions for sustainable development, and how 
those ideas and practices might grow and diffuse into 
wider society.  
Two ongoing projects are underpinned by the recognition 
that much social innovation for sustainable development 
takes place in civil society, outside of the institutions that 
are normally associated with the term ‘innovation’. In con-
ceptualizing complementary currencies and community 
projects in sustainable energy as ‘green niches’ we are 
seeking to understand the contexts within which such 
innovation takes place, and how it might be translated to 
more ‘mainstream’ contexts. We aim to inform policymak-
ers about how they can support and harness the creative 
energies and innovative potential of grassroots communi-
ties, to help meet sustainable development policy goals. 
This short paper sets out our recent research findings, and 
reports on two new projects, in this field. First, we summa-
rise our arguments about grassroots innovations, distin-
guishing them from other forms of civil society action, or 
environmental initiatives. Then we discuss two projects in 
turn which aim to empirically develop these ideas with new 
evidence and theory-testing, through detailed investigation 
of case studies in sustainable energy, and sustainable cur-
rencies, in turn. 
Introducing Grassroots Innovations 
Grassroots innovations for sustainable development take 
many different forms. Examples include furniture recycling 
schemes, organic food co-operatives, low impact self-
housing developments, farmers’ markets, cycle networks, 
local car clubs, and community composting schemes. Since 
1992, local authorities in the UK have produced over 400 
sustainability strategies that promote these kinds of activi-
ties. Shell Better Britain’s network of groups grew from 
10,000 in 1992 to 26,000 in 2002. 
We understand them to involve networks of activists and 
community groups generating novel, bottom-up solutions 
for sustainable development, and that typically respond to 
the local situation and the interests and values of the 
communities involved. In contrast to mainstream business 
greening, grassroots innovations operate in civil society 
and social enterprise arenas. Important points about grass-
roots innovators are provided below. 
 Conventionally, government policy and support for 
sustainable development has considered ‘innovation’ sepa-
rately from ‘community involvement’. Sustainable innova-
tions are led by firms and market settings; community 
involvement encourages participation and behaviour 
change. 
 This division misses an opportunity for considering local 
communities as sites of innovative activity for sustainable 
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development. Social enterprise and community involve-
ment can be considered as sources of innovative potential. 
 Policy to promote sustainable innovation should extend 
its view and consider how it can support grassroots innova-
tion in and between communities. 
 Communities can provide niche settings, out of which 
grassroots innovations can spread, scale-up and be 
adopted into more commercial and market settings 
(though this process is far from automatic). Grassroots 
innovators provide green ideas, not sustainable blueprints. 
 The kinds of innovation that take place in communities 
are not limited to greener technologies. More usually, it 
involves novel organisational arrangements, new values 
and lifestyle practices that facilitate the use of greener 
technologies. 
 Small initiatives, repeated many times over, can add up 
to significant environmental improvements. Local knowl-
edge and capabilities help develop tailor-made sustainable 
solutions where top-down sometimes measures fail. 
 Certain communities can champion unpopular and diffi-
cult issues because it matters to them. This provides a vital 
source of innovative diversity when similar issues become 
salient more widely. 
 Grassroots innovations mobilise collective solutions to 
sustainability, which helps overcome a sense of powerless-
ness or futility when sustainability is considered merely a 
matter of individual consumer choices. 
 However, many grassroots innovators struggle to obtain 
resources for their projects. Raising grants to survive can 
eclipse investment in long-term development of an initia-
tive. 
 Many grassroots initiatives are technology takers – the 
production of modern technologies makes it difficult to 
adopt and develop locally appropriate forms.  
 The local roots of grassroots initiatives can make scaling-
up and diffusion difficult. Amongst socially excluded 
groups, the initiative is a means to another end, such as 
the skills to enter employment, or wealth to purchase 
goods and services. 
 Many grassroots initiatives fail. Risk aversion amongst 
policy-makers means they are reluctant to support these 
ventures. But failure and, more importantly, learning from 
failure is a positive part of the innovation experience. Pol-
icy-makers need to take risks, but to do so with effective 
mechanisms for learning in place. 
 Significant change relies on forces that operate way 
above the local level. Grassroots innovators alone are un-
able to drive sustainable development, but they are able to 
provide diverse seeds for change when conditions in the 
wider society and economy are right. 
 Finally, our understanding and policies for innovation, 
developed in commercial and market settings, may be 
inadequate for grassroots community initiatives. Research 
is needed to develop our understanding of local communi-
ties as sources of sustainable innovations. 
Having set out our key understandings of grassroots inno-
vations, we now turn to each of two new research projects 
which seeks to deepen, test, revise and extend some of the 
claims made for grassroots innovation above. 
Community Innovation for Sustainable 
Energy 
“Decentralising energy and embracing the potential of small-
scale generation is a crucial component of the green switch in 
energy... A decentralised approach saves energy and puts gen-
eration under the control of local people.” 
Chris Huhne, MP 
UK Secretary of State for  Energy and Climate Change (REF) 
Recent years have seen a surge in interest and activity in 
small-scale, sustainable energy projects led by local com-
munities. Examples include solar water heating clubs and 
insulation clubs, which provide mutual support for system 
installation; energy awareness and behaviour networks, 
which provide guidance and reassurance to neighbours on 
energy matters relevant to them; and co-operatively-
owned small-scale renewable energy systems, such as 
micro-hydro and wind energy. 
Our research project will study the diffusion of community 
energy projects in the UK. It explores the extent of net-
working between projects, and whether this is assisting in 
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the innovation of community energy. We do this with a 
view to providing independent advice to policy-makers, 
community groups and energy businesses about the merits 
and processes for supporting community energy. 
The project is being carried out by a team of researchers 
from SPRU at the University of Sussex and CSERGE at the 
University of East Anglia who have experience in the analy-
sis of grassroots innovation for sustainable development. 
We will draw upon the findings of our research to develop 
with practitioners a number of Foresight scenarios for 
community energy in the UK. 
There have been a number of initiatives to promote and 
support community energy projects in recent years. Most 
recently, in late 2009, the Government’s Low Carbon 
Community Challenge attracted over 500 expressions of 
interest. It joins a dynamic portfolio of policies helping 
innovative community projects. It is argued these projects 
nurture local support for other forms of low carbon en-
ergy. Intermediary organisations, such as local and national 
energy agencies, span local groups through their advice 
and support, and help new groups access resources and 
networks. 
Are these networks of community-based approaches a 
promising component for low carbon energy transitions? 
Existing research on these ‘grassroots innovations’ finds 
that individual projects bring small but significant sustain-
ability benefits, but face challenges in meeting their objec-
tives. First, participants have diverse objectives and expec-
tations: boosting their local economy; enhancing local 
energy security; cutting carbon emissions; contributing to 
sustainable communities; catalysing wider environmental 
behaviours; and democratising energy. Second, social en-
trepreneurs and intermediaries can help develop the social 
networks involved in the development and diffusion of 
community energy initiatives. Third, community project 
activity promotes social learning amongst participants 
about wider energy issues. However, realising these objec-
tives requires committed individuals, resources, skills, and 
access to technologies and supportive infrastructures that 
are not often readily available. Trying to replicate an exem-
plary community energy project elsewhere appears to be 
far from straightforward. Scaling-up projects or translating 
aspects of them to different circumstances can be just as 
challenging. Each time, innovative adaptations to the proc-
ess and content of community energy projects can be 
important. 
We aim to examine a previously under-researched area of 
how these expectations, networks and social learning de-
velop across and between projects, and so aid diffusion 
into wider society. Furthermore, might these constitute an 
influential community energy ‘niche’ within the UK energy 
system with its own identity and interests? How do pro-
jects replicate, scale-up and translate sustainable energy 
innovations between communities? 
Our project runs from October 2010 until September 
2013. We will be surveying community energy projects and 
evaluating their energy and carbon performance. This will 
be complemented by twelve in-depth case studies into 
community energy projects, both exemplars and failures. 
These will offer insights into the way innovations in tech-
nologies, organisational structures, market and business 
models, and strategies for securing support, diffuse across 
projects. We will also be interviewing advice organisations 
and policy-makers that provide support to community 
groups. A series of events, reports and a website will inform 
policy towards community energy projects, assess the poten-
tial of community energy in wider low carbon transition 
processes, and help improve the success of community en-
ergy practitioners at growing and spreading their initiatives. 
Complementary Currencies for 
Sustainability 
The second of our empirical studies concerns complemen-
tary currencies, which are new systems of finance and 
exchange – new forms of money. The research will gather 
empirical data on complementary currencies to test the 
applicability of existing theory of niche sustainable innova-
tions in this new setting, and develop new theory where 
necessary. The two-year project runs until May 2012, and 
we will convene an international expert practitioners work-
shop, and an international academic workshop, to inform 
the project and share our findings. 
These ideas will be applied through the first international 
study of ‘complementary currencies’, a wealth of local 
community-led exchange systems that exist alongside 
mainstream money. They arise for a variety of reasons, in 
different forms and contexts, worldwide: the German 
‘Regio’ regional money aims to boost local economic de-
velopment; in the UK and US, Time Banks strengthen social 
networks and community cohesion by promoting recipro-
cal volunteering; a new wave of ‘Transition Currencies’ is 
launching local money to promote local resilience, and the 
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Dutch NU-Spaarpas incentivises sustainable consumption 
patterns through a green ‘loyalty card’. 
However, despite their intrinsic benefits and potential, 
complementary currencies have remained small and mar-
ginal. Little is known about the processes and contexts 
necessary for mainstreaming them. For the first time, com-
plementary currencies will be investigated as specifically 
innovative activities, in order to: 
 Examine the diversity and characteristics of ‘complemen-
tary currencies’ in contemporary practice. 
 Conceptualise these ‘grassroots innovations’ as ‘niches’ 
where new social infrastructure may be tested, and inves-
tigate the range of contextual factors which contribute to 
the emergence, success or failure of these innovations, and 
their diffusion into wider society. 
 Relate these findings to wider debates on sustainable 
innovations and transition management, sustainable de-
velopment and the social economy. 
We will map out the range of complementary currencies in 
existence; assess how they have tried to grow and diffuse; 
and identify the factors which have helped or hindered this 
process complementary currency diffusion. We will then 
investigate how this experience relates to theories of sus-
tainable innovation and green niches, to highlight what is 
distinctive about grassroots innovations, and how innova-
tion theory can adapt to better explain community-led 
initiatives. We will recommend policy changes to nurture 
and grow grassroots innovations for sustainability. 
First, a scoping review of existing complementary curren-
cies research and practitioner literature will produce a new 
dataset cataloguing the breadth and diversity of global 
complementary currencies, drawing on the applicant’s 
extensive international contacts. 
Second, approximately 12 exemplar currencies will be 
selected from the dataset, and further qualitative research 
with these exemplars will investigate their innovation-
diffusion strategies (how they approach replication, scaling 
up, and translating ideas to mainstream settings). It will 
assess success, barriers, and factors which best support 
widespread diffusion, such as linking with local institutions, 
or using familiar technologies. A model of currency diffu-
sion will be developed, linking contextual factors with 
innovativeness. 
Third, theoretical work will review the literature on diffus-
ing niche socio-technical innovations and identify what is 
new about grassroots innovations, and the implications for 
theory, policy and practice. 
Contributions will be made to debates on complementary 
currency research, innovation/transition management, and 
sustainable consumption . The research will deliver timely 
evidence for policymakers to help them harness the poten-
tial of grassroots innovations, and policy recommendations 
will be suggested, forming the basis of a framework with 
action points for international, national, regional and local 
action. 
Conclusions 
The programme of research we’re embarking upon prom-
ises to open up exciting new areas for investigation, and 
offer new understandings about some of the critical areas 
of action for sustainable development. How do these inno-
vative projects come about, how do they grow and spread, 
and what are the critical factors for them to ‘catch on’? 
We have launched the research agenda with a new web-
site (www.grassrootsinnovations.org) where we will post 
project news, research briefings, papers and other informa-
tion, and which links in to our other work in the field. We 
invite your contributions, through commenting on our 
research blog, to feedback on our papers, and participa-
tion at our events. We look forward to developing an on-
going conversation among academics, practitioners and 
policymakers, with the aim of better supporting and har-
nessing the energy of community-led innovative action for 
sustainability. 
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Announcement 
Michael Lounsbury and Paul M. Hirsch (eds.), Markets on Trial: The Economic 
Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis. 2010, Volumes 30a and b of Research in the 
Sociology of Organizations, Emerald Publishing
The current global financial crisis, visibly catalyzed by the 
rapid drop in securitized mortgage valuations in the sum-
mer 2007, has entailed a dramatic decrease in the avail-
ability of credit, wealth destruction linked to stock market 
valuations, the failure of banks and insurance companies, 
numerous other bankruptcies, the growth of governmental 
intervention, a deep and protracted recession, and a gen-
eral rise in the uncertainty of Capitalist institutions. It is in 
unsettled times such as these that hegemonic and taken-
for-granted ideas and institutions may be challenged, and 
new alternatives cultivated. In the context of the early 21st 
century, it is the neoliberal ideal of free markets and mar-
ket-based solutions that are on trial. 
While the conceptual apparatus of micro-economics has 
been a dominant force in the structuring of financial mar-
ket policy and design, the recent crisis has led many 
economists to question the intellectual underpinnings of 
their policy prescriptions. To wit, in October of 2008, Alan 
Greenspan admitted that he was in a state of “shocked 
disbelief” because “the whole intellectual edifice” support-
ing his hands-off deregulatory approach to financial mar-
kets had “collapsed.” In contrast to the deregulatory em-
phasis of neoliberalism and contemporary micro-economics 
that was embraced and purported by Greenspan and his 
contemporaries, economic sociologists have alternatively 
emphasized that markets are not naturally self-regulating, 
but are complex institutions that require rules, regulatory 
frameworks and related infrastructures that enable mar-
kets to function. 
Economic sociology offers a robust alternative to the cur-
rent psychologizing fashion in behavioral economics that 
emphasizes the role of "animal spirits" or "overconfi-
dence" in explaining the crisis (e.g., Akerlof, Thaler etc.). 
Focusing more on how economic activity is fundamentally 
interpenetrated with social, political and cultural dynamics, 
the lens of economic sociology offers a conceptual ap-
proach that is better able to shed light on how crises are 
socially produced and managed. In addition, this intellec-
tual canon has policy implications that can usefully expand 
current discussions of how to develop more efficacious 
regulatory structures and policies that may facilitate eco-
nomic growth and development in a way that is more 
equitable and less volatile. 
Markets on Trial gathered some of the most prominent 
economic sociologists in North America to provide fresh 
analyses of the recent financial crisis and to develop policy 
implications and insights based on their work. To support 
the development of this enterprise, a workshop was held 
in October, 2009 at the Kellogg Graduate School of Man-
agement, and papers were developed into this special 2 
volume set. Papers range from more historical approaches 
that examined the sources of the crisis to more detailed 
archaeologies of how the crisis has unfolded and been 
managed. 
Below is the table of contents for the 2 volume set: 
Volume 1 
Introduction to the special 2 volume set 
Chapter 1: 
Markets on Trial: Towards a Policy-Oriented Economic Sociology, 
Michael Lounsbury (University of Alberta) and Paul M. Hirsch (North-
western University) 
Section I: The Financial Crisis and its Unfolding 
Chapter 2 
The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis 
Neil Fligstein and Adam Goldstein (University of California at Berkeley) 
Chapter 3 
The Structure of Confidence and the Collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
Richard Swedberg (Cornell University) 
Chapter 4 
The Role of Ratings in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Art of 
Corporate and the Science of Consumer Credit Rating 
Akos Rona-Tas (University of California at San Diego) and Stefanie Hiss 
(University of Jena) 
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Chapter 5 
Knowledge and Liquidity: Institutional and Cognitive Foundations of 
the SubPrime Crisis 
Bruce Carruthers (Northwestern University) 
Chapter 6 
Terminal Isomorphism and the Self-Destructive Potential of Success: 
Lessons from Sub-Prime Mortgage Origination and Securitization 
Jo-Ellen Pozner (University of California at Berkeley), Mary Katherine 
Stimmler (University of California at Berkeley) and Paul Hirsch (North-
western University) 
Section II: The Normal Accident Perspective 
Chapter 7 
A Normal Accident Analysis of the Mortgage Meltdown 
Don Palmer and Michael Maher (University of California at Davis) 
Chapter 8 
The Global Crisis of 2007-2009: Markets, Politics, and Organizations 
Mauro F. Guillén (University of Pennsylvania) and Sandra L. Suárez 
(Temple University) 
Chapter 9 
Regulating and Redesigning Finance: Market Architectures, Normal 
Accidents and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform 
Marc Schneiberg (Reed College) and Tim Bartley (Indiana University) 
Chapter 10 
The Meltdown was not an Accident 
Charles Perrow (Yale University) 
Volume 2 
Section III: Historical Origins of the U.S. Financial Crisis 
Chapter 11 
The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: How Agency Theory 
Brought Down the Economy and Why it Might Again 
Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung (Harvard University) 
Chapter 12 
Neoliberalism in Crisis: Regulatory Roots of the U.S. Financial Melt-
down 
John Campbell (Dartmouth College) 
Chapter 13 
The American Corporate Elite and the Historical Roots of the Financial 
Crisis of 2008 
Mark Mizruchi (University of Michigan) 
Chapter 14 
The Political Economy of Financial Exuberance 
Greta Krippner (University of Michigan) 
Section IV: Crisis Production: Speculative Bubbles and Business 
Cycles 
Chapter 15 
The Institutional Embeddedness of Market Failure: Why Speculative 
Bubbles Still Occur 
Mitch Abolafia (State University of New York at Albany) 
Chapter 16 
The Social Construction of Causality: The Effects of Institutional Myths 
on Financial Regulation 
Anna Rubtsova (Emory University), Rich DeJordy (Boston College), 
Mary Ann Glynn (Boston College) and Mayer Zald (University of 
Michigan) 
Chapter 17 
Business Cycles, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Crisis in the Com-
mercial Building Market: Toward a Mesoeconomics 
Tom Beamish and Nicole Biggart (University of California at Davis) 
Section V: Comparative Institutional Dynamics 
Chapter 18 
Through the Looking Glass: Inefficient Deregulation in the United 
States and Efficient State-Ownership in China 
Doug Guthrie and David Slocum (New York University) 
Chapter 19 
Precedence for the Unprecedented: A Comparative Institutionalist 
View of the Financial Crisis 
Gerald McDermott (University of South Carolina) 
Section VI: A Future Society and Economy 
Chapter 20 
After the Ownership Society: Another World is Possible 
Jerry Davis (University of Michigan) 
Section VII: Postscripts 
Chapter 21 
What If We Had Been in Charge? The Sociologist as Builder of Ra-
tional Institutions 
Ezra Zuckerman (MIT) 
Chapter 22 
The Future of Economics, New Circuits for Capital, and Re-envisioning 
the Relation of State and Market 
Fred Block (University of California at Davis) 
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Book Reviews
Books: Schrage, Dominik, 2009: Die Verfügbarkeit der Dinge. Eine his-
torische Soziologie des Konsums. Frankfurt/New York: Campus./Nepomuk 
Gasteiger, 2010: Der Konsument. Verbraucherbilder in Werbung, Konsum-
kritik und Verbraucherschutz 1948-1989. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Reviewer: Kai-Uwe Hellmann, Technische Universität 
Berlin, kai-uwe.hellmann@gmx.de  
I am starting with a preliminary remark: the books by Dominik 
Schrage and Nepomuk Gasteiger both are mainly historical 
studies about modern consumption and consumers. This is 
important to know because in this light questions of socio-
logical theories and methods appear secondary. Of course, 
there is a theoretical background, especially within the book 
of Schrage, who is a sociologist concernd with discursive 
analysis and systems theory, but theory remain implicit. Con-
cerning its methods Schrage’s study resembles a sociologically 
told history of ideas discussing influential authors and books 
in a chronological way while Gasteiger, who is a historian, is 
typically concentrated on texts of different provenience from 
classical historical sources. 
Schrage is most of all interested in the role consumption is 
playing within modern society. It is obvious that consumption 
became a quite ubiquitous and powerful factor in (post)modern 
life. So the question comes up how to assess the status of con-
sumption. Against this background, Schrage differentiates 
between consumption as an anthropological triviality which 
happens constantly all over the history of mankind on the one 
hand, and commodity consumption, which is historically singu-
lar and structurally specific since the establishment of modern 
society some centuries ago on the other hand. The link be-
tween consumption and commodities available only by money 
exchange gives modern consumption its uniqueness. 
Schrage’s study is divided into two parts. The first part begins 
with the conceptual history of the term “consumption” and 
its two meanings “cōnsūmere” and “cōnsummare” and leads 
on to the evolution of society and the establishment of mod-
ern consumption patterns from the 18th to the 19th century 
in Europe. It is important to be familiar with the conceptual 
history of the term “consumption” because, unlike today, at 
the beginning of the history of this term there were still two 
meanings in use: “cōnsūmere” in the sense of destruc-
tion/wastage and “cōnsummare” in the sense of accom-
plishment/perfection. Over the decades, the first meaning 
advanced and received more attention, especially by political 
economists, while the second meaning vanished step by step. 
Today the public discourse considers consumption often as 
wastage. Subsequently, Schrage reconstructs the highly con-
troversial debates on luxury and consumption during these 
two centuries and then turns to the monetarization of social 
relationships and the emergence of the role of the consumer. 
Here, Schrage argues, by implicitly referring to Georg Simmel 
and Michel Foucault, that the relevance of consumption for 
daily life has grown since the 19th century to an extent that 
we can speak of an increasing subjectivation by consumption. 
This establishes a genuine perspective to observe society and 
the world in general. 
After a short resume and forecast of the second part, Schrage 
discusses briefly the relationship between fashion and con-
sumption, sketches the amazing appearance of the new de-
partment stores and then concentrates on the North Ameri-
can way of consumption. Here we can observe the very be-
ginnings of what consumption has become today almost 
everywhere. He first outlines the overwhelming influence of 
Henry Ford, then describes the dissemination and acceleration 
of mass consumption as a model of private life conduct. Here, 
Schrage mainly refers to Thorstein Veblen and David Riesman 
and emphasizes that the actual perception of consumption as 
a global, quite contested, perspective could develop especially 
in the environment of the North American society with its 
specific requirements of differentiation and integration. 
In his last chapter, Schrage summarizes his concept of the find-
ings and insights of the genealogy of modern consumption. 
Most important is the emancipation of consumption from 
traditional constraints so that we can say that commodity con-
sumption became autonomous, a sphere by its own, on the 
one hand closely linked to the system of economy with money 
as its medium and on the other hand, to everybody’s need of 
orientation and definition of a specific social position in con-
temporary society. Because consumption helps individuals to 
integrate into modern society and to behave in a way con-
trolled by society, (referring to a classic argument by David 
Riesman and Howard Roseborough), consumption can be 
acknowledged for its forceful drive. One could almost call it an 
institution of modern society. 
Schrage’s study is a sociologically well informed, highly elabo-
rated historization of modern consumption starting in the 18th 
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century and ending with the Second World War when the 
core conditions of modern consumption were all fully devel-
oped and unfolded. The basic assumption of this study is that 
from observing semantics we can get an idea of what happens 
on the structural, societal level. Here he borrows from the 
sociology of knowledge. For this reason, Schrage repeatedly 
leaves the level of semantics and “descends down” to the 
structural level of present day corresponding effects and shifts. 
For this purpose, he refers, while always relating to concrete 
problems, to theories and concepts from Baudrillard, Foucault, 
Luhmann, Riesman, Simmel, Veblen, just to mention some of 
them. The empirical evidence stems mainly from canonical 
texts and books which were selected and combined to recon-
struct the history of modern consumption. 
When Schrage’s study ends shortly after the Second World 
War, Gasteiger’s study begins exactly there. His scientific 
intention is to describe how the consumer was seen in Ger-
many between 1945 and 1989. For this purpose he analyzes 
the images of the consumer in academic discussions among 
consumer researchers and consumption critics based on a 
broad selection of monographs and journal articles. As a 
result four different images of the consumer in Germany 
emerge within these more than four decades: the rational 
consumer, the psycho-social consumer, the controlled con-
sumer and the postmodern consumer. 
The rational consumer came up first and was mainly a phe-
nomenon of the 1950ies when consumerism and consumer 
protection gained plenty of attention in Germany. Because 
of this public power, professionals doing marketing, adver-
tising and consumer research felt forced to react to this 
public pressure and to treat the individual consumer as a 
highly rational, calculating person. They focused on putting 
information and truth in the foreground in order to give the 
consumers the best of advice. Naturally, this was mainly a 
strategy for legitimating their work. 
During the 1960ies, a paradigm shift can be observed. Con-
sumers reached a certain degree of saturation and didn’t 
behave any longer in an easily predictable way. On the con-
trary, the complexity of consumer behaviour grew so fast that 
totally new methods of consumer research were needed. The 
most spectacular method during these years has been motiva-
tional research referring to psychoanalysis and similar con-
cepts. Suddenly the psychological and sociological conditions 
and processes of daily life were studied in order to gain from 
them a better understanding of the new psycho-social con-
sumer. This was a very dynamic and vital episode in Germany 
concerning this specific business and academic field. 
At the end of the 1960ies, the mood shifted again. Intellec-
tuals like Herbert Marcuse, the students’ movement and 
other changes of society, triggered a new critical approach 
towards consumer culture. Now the consumer became a 
subject of politics because critics accused professionals very 
successfully of manipulating consumers. Business felt a per-
manent legitimatory crisis over those years. Institutions like 
“Stiftung Warentest” gained political attention and influ-
ence and established themselves firmly. 
The last type in this development is the postmodern consumer. 
His biography started in the 1970ies and stabilized over the 
1980ies. This new image emancipated itself from all precursors. 
The pluralization of society, the silent revolution, the oil crisis 
and increasing unemployment, just to mention some aspects, 
pushed consumers into a new era of consumption. Freedom of 
choice was never greater. The accusation of manipulating con-
sumers became old-fashioned. In consequence, consumerism 
and consumer protection movement lost influence and financial 
power. Here ends the study of Nepomuk Gasteiger. 
His work presupposes und uses a broad and accepted 
scheme of interpreting the decades since the Second World 
War as far as the consumer is concerned. From this point of 
view Gasteiger confirms many well known facets of these 
years and changes. On the other hand, there are almost no 
surprises, which means that the state of the art concerning 
the academic consumer research obviously is of high quality. 
The main strength of this study is the volume of the col-
lected materials, especially how they were selected and how 
they were used. Under theoretical aspects, Gasteiger’s study 
also is focused in the first place on semantics which raises 
the question what really happens within the lives of the 
consumers. This question can’t be answered within this 
study. But it may be guessed that these four images of the 
consumer between 1945 and 1989 were not totally uninflu-
ential, that all four images are still simultaneously in use and 
that since 1989 some new models entered center stage. 
Probably this will inspire further research concentrated on 
the years between 1989 until today, a period that was ex-
tremely eventful in the field of consumption and consumer 
developments (Gabriel/Lang 2006). 
References 
Gabriel, Yiannis/Tim Lang, 2006: The Unmanageable Con-
sumer. Contemporary Consumption and Its Fragmentation. Sec-
ond Edition. London. 
 
PhD Projects Projects in Economic Sociology 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 12, Number 1 (November 2010) 
77 
PhD Projects Projects in Economic Sociology 
The Economization of the Sacred: The 
Transformation of the Death Care 
Industry in Germany 
Institution: MPIfG Köln 
Author: Dominic Akyel, da@mpifg.de  
One distinctive feature of our current period of economic 
transformation is a strong trend towards the expansion of 
market relations. Yet the question concerning which goods 
can properly be bought and sold is subject to controversy and 
debate. There are certain things that cause personal and social 
conflict in individuals when, in the process of their commodifi-
cation, these things begin to be actually perceived as com-
modities. This holds true for services that are traded on fu-
neral markets and thereby causes economic activity in this 
area to be denied legitimacy. Nevertheless, the German death 
care industry has recently shifted towards market-oriented 
reforms, while exchange relations among market actors have 
became more ‘economic’. Focusing on these transformations, 
I study how market structures, regulation, sacred values, and 
legitimacy interact during processes of marketization. 
The marketization of the death care industry 
The expansion of market relations in the funeral business 
included the privatization of previously state-run funeral 
homes, crematories, and cemeteries. In addition, the industry 
experienced profound changes in the dynamics of competi-
tion. While the number of deaths has decreased steadily in 
recent decades, a large number of new firms have entered 
the market since the 1990s. Entrepreneurs have been espe-
cially attracted by the impending demise of the baby boom 
generation, which will mean a large number of deaths in the 
near future. Furthermore, an international trade of funeral 
supplies – in particular with Eastern Europe – started to 
emerge after the fall of the Iron Curtain. As a result, the mar-
ket became more dynamic and highly competitive. Compa-
nies tried to compensate for decreasing profits by inventing 
new products and applying new business strategies. 
The detraditionalization of the funeral 
For many centuries, the purchase decisions made at the end 
of life were strongly influenced by religious beliefs and politi-
cal ideas. In recent years, however, the authority of collective 
orientations has eroded and thereby widened the scope for 
more individualistic funeral choices. At the same time, de-
creasing numbers of funeral attendees and cemetery visitors 
also indicate a fading significance of the funeral as such. In 
addition, the abolishment of the death grants in 2003 – a 
payment that was granted by the compulsory health insur-
ance funds on the occasion of death – made it increasingly 
difficult for people to raise the large amount of money neces-
sary for a burial. While funerals costs and cemetery fees in-
creased, individuals had fewer resources to spend. These 
developments opened the door for cheaper and less elaborate 
forms of burial. As a result, individuals adopted decision-
making strategies that would have previously been considered 
inappropriate in the funeral market. 
Towards a legitimate market 
The funeral industry of today operates much more on a mar-
ket-oriented basis than it did 20 years ago. Apparent eco-
nomic activities such as advertising, price competition, and 
price comparison have become more legitimate in recent 
years. Furthermore, representations of the sacred – coffins, 
grave markers, and other memorial products – have become 
commodified to a larger extent. The case of the funeral mar-
ket can help us understand how social and historical trans-
formations set the stage for processes of marketization that 
promote the shift of certain areas of exchange from illegiti-
macy towards legitimacy. 
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